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I 
 
ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this research is to examine whether the current practices of Islamic 
banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia are compatible with the principles of 
Shariah. This examination includes the current uses of sukuk (Islamic bonds), the models of 
takaful (Islamic insurance) and accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured 
finance (Islamic derivatives). The second purpose is to investigate the basic laws of banking 
and financial activities in Saudi Arabia and examine whether they are compatible with 
Shariah principles. The final aim is to suggest solutions to the absence of regulatory and 
supervisory systems of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia by proposing a legislative and 
regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia.  
The research findings show that there are no specific laws and regulations governing Islamic 
banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. In addition, there is no independent central 
Shariah board to regulate and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi 
Arabia, nor are there are any specialised commercial courts to look into banking issues. The 
research finds that there are some articles in the law of supervision of cooperative insurance 
companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations, which do not comply with 
Shariah, and in addition, there is some incompatibility between the law and its implementing 
regulations. The final finding is that the issuance of sukuk and Islamic financial derivatives in 
Saudi Arabia are not consistent with Shariah requirements, due to the absence of regulatory 
policies and supervisory harmonisation, while Islamic insurance needs to amend some 
articles of the law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies in Saudi Arabia, and its 
implementing regulations, in order to comply with Shariah and also to avoid incompatibility 
between them. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Overview 
With the advent of globalisation and economic liberalisation, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to ignore the Islamic financial industry. Islamic finance is growing at a rate of 
approximately 15% per annum.
1
  It is practised in more than 500 Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) operating in the world in over 75 countries including Western ones.
2
 Currently, the 
circulating assets of Islamic finance are estimated to have reached US $ 1.4 trillion, which 
means that Islamic finance is one of the fastest growing financial sectors in the world, and in 
particular, in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), due to the oil boom.
3
 
Islamic finance is based on Shariah, which is derived from the Holy Book of Islam (Quran), 
the authorised sayings or actions of the prophet Muhammed (Sunnah), the unanimous 
consensus of Muslims scholars on a given issue on a particular time (Ijma) and Qiyas which 
is considered derivation of a law on the analogy of an existing law if the basis of the two are 
the same.
4
 The basic principles of Islamic finance are the prohibition of riba (usury or 
interest), gharar (contractual ambiguity), and maisir (speculation or gambling); and equity 
profit-and-loss sharing (PLS).
5
 Therefore, any activities not compatible with the provisions of 
Shariah are forbidden for Muslims.
6
  
Saudi Arabia is one of the largest markets for Islamic banking and finance in the world, 
accounting for a substantial share of the sector’s total assets, valued at nearly $1.6 trillion.7 
Currently, in Saudi Arabia, there are four Islamic banks and 11 branches of foreign banks 
providing Islamic banking and financial services in accordance with the principles of 
                                                 
1
 Beng Soon Chong & Ming-Hua Liu, ‘Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based’ Science Direct  (2009) 
17 (1) 126. 
2
 Yoko Ishigaki, ‘The development of the Islamic financial  market - The Tokyo sukuk case study’ (2009) 
Company Lawyer 30 (5) 3; Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2007) 
15. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2007) 41.  
5
 Hij Siti Faridah Abd Jabbar, ‘Sharia-compliant financial instruments: principles and practice’, Company 
Lawyer (2009) 30 (1) 176. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 See the official website of The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), available at:  
http://www.irti.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IRTI/CM/downloads/IRTI_A
nnual_Report_1433H_2012_En.pdf  [Accessed 30 December 2013]. 
2 
 
Shariah.
8
 There is also the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul ), which is considered one of the 
most highly capitalized stock exchanges in the Arab world, where the issuance of sukuk in 
Saudi Arabia is traded on the Saudi Stock Exchange.
9
 In addition, Saudi Arabia’s takaful 
insurance industry is considered the largest one in the world. In 2011, Gross Written 
Premiums (GWP) in the Saudi insurance market reached SR 18.504 billion, up from SR 
16.387 billion in 2010.
10
  
1.2  Research Significance 
The significant contribution of this thesis is to propose a legislative and regulatory framework 
for Islamic banking and finance including Islamic insurance (takaful) in Saudi Arabia. This 
proposal is due to the absence of specific laws governing all Islamic banking and financial 
activities, including takaful business, in Saudi Arabia, and also the lack of an independent 
central Shariah board as the highest Shariah authority in the field of Islamic banking and 
finance in Saudi Arabia to regulate and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities. 
This proposal might therefore be regarded as a first step in the enactment of a law regulating 
Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia.  
This thesis provides the baseline information needed to adopt a specific law and also to 
establish a Shariah Advisory Council to regulate and supervise all Islamic banking and 
financial activities including takaful business in Saudi Arabia. This study would be beneficial 
to the Saudi Ministry of Finance, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) in order to develop Islamic banking and financial activities 
in Saudi Arabia.  
It also gives a comprehensive and critical review of Islamic finance on the basis of 
comparative analysis with conventional finance from the Shariah point of view. The purpose 
of this comparison is to understand the underlying philosophy of both Islamic and 
conventional finance in order to determine the main similarities and differences between 
                                                 
8
 See the official website of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, available at: 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/economy_global_trade/banking.aspx [Accessed 26 
November 2013]. 
9
 See the official website of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, available at: 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/economy_global_trade/banking.aspx [Accessed 26 
November 2013]. 
10
 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 'Insurance Supervision Department', The Saudi Insurance Market Report 
2011, 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/InssuranceLib/SUR_InsuaMarketSurvey2011_En_2011.> 
[Accessed 18 May 2013]. 
3 
 
them and then evaluate them from the Shariah point of view. This thesis also adopts a 
comparative approach between Saudi Arabia and Malaysia in order to determine the 
advantages and disadvantages of Islamic financial contracting forms in Saudi Arabia and then 
attempt to transfer the Malaysian experience to Saudi Arabia.  
This thesis investigates how sukuk work in Saudi Arabia, and the extent to which the issuance 
of them in Saudi Arabia is consistent with Shariah requirements. Furthermore, it gives a 
critical analysis of the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi 
Arabia, and its implementing regulations, and examines whether Saudi insurance law is 
consistent with Islamic Shariah. It also offers a comprehensive and critical review of Islamic 
derivatives as an alternative to conventional derivatives in Saudi Arabia, and examines 
whether the current uses of accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance 
are compatible with the principles of Shariah. 
1.3  Motivation 
There are three reasons for choosing three types of Islamic financial contracting forms in 
Saudi Arabia; namely, Islamic bonds (sukuk), Islamic insurance (takaful) and Islamic 
financial derivatives. The first reason is the remarkable growth of the Islamic financial 
market and huge Islamic mutual funds in Saudi Arabia which is considered the world’s 
largest Islamic financial market. The Saudi cooperative insurance market is considered the 
largest takaful industry in the world, having reached SR 18.504 billion in 2011, up from SR 
16.387 billion in 2010.
11
 With regard to the sukuk market in Saudi Arabia, this has grown 
substantially in recent years due to the vast financing requirements necessitated by a 
proactive public spending policy.
12
 The Saudi sukuk market contributed more than 14 percent 
to the total value of sukuk issued globally in 2010, by when the global sukuk market had 
reached a record SAR 180 billion.
13
  
The next reason is the multiplicity of laws and supervisory authorities on the activities of 
Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia. There are three laws and also a set of regulations that 
regulate Islamic bonds, Islamic insurance and Islamic financial derivatives side-by-side with 
                                                 
11
 See the official website of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), available at: 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/InssuranceLib/SUR_InsuaMarketSurvey2011_En_2011, 
[Accessed 18 May 2013].   
12
 Kalid Alsaeed, ‘Sukuk Issuance in Saudi Arabia: Recent Trends and Positive Expectations’, (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, Durham University 2012) 245. 
13
 Ibid. 
4 
 
conventional commercial banking businesses in Saudi Arabia. The issuance of sukuk in Saudi 
Arabia is regulated under the Offers of Securities Regulations and the Listing Rules, while 
Islamic financial derivatives are regulated under the Banking Control Law (BCL) of 1966, 
and Islamic insurance is regulated under the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies and its implementing regulations. Despite the existence of these laws and 
regulations, there is not one article that refers to sukuk or takaful or Islamic financial 
derivatives. Moreover, the existing law of the BCL 1966 is still applicable and has not been 
repealed or amended in order to cover a wider range of financial investment instruments, 
such as Islamic financial derivatives and Islamic sukuk.
14
 This means that IFIs in Saudi 
Arabia operate under a strange legal framework where there is no specific law governing 
Islamic banking and finance in spite of Saudi Arabia being considered the world’s largest 
Islamic financial market. Furthermore, there is a conflict or incompatibility between some 
articles in the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and its implementing 
regulations.
15
 This conflict has generated serious arguments between Islamic scholars in 
Saudi Arabia about the legality of cooperative insurance in Saudi Arabia.
16
  With regard to 
supervisory authorities, there are different ones that oversee these three types in Saudi 
Arabia. Islamic insurance and Islamic financial derivatives are supervised by SAMA, 
whereas Islamic bonds are supervised by CMA. These supervisory authorities oversee 
Islamic financial contracting forms in Saudi Arabia including these three types without a 
Shariah supervisory board. One of the main tasks of the Shariah supervisory board is to 
ascertain that the operations of Islamic financial institutions or Islamic windows of 
conventional banks are undertaken according to Shariah principles. Therefore, it is difficult 
to ensure that the operations of Islamic bonds, Islamic insurance and Islamic financial 
derivatives in Saudi Arabia are compliant with Shariah, unless there is a Shariah supervisory 
board issuing fatwas, Shariah rulings, Shariah standards, and governance standards 
concerning Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia.   
The third reason is the multiplicity of quasi-judicial committees that oversee Islamic banking 
and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. The reason for the existence of these committees is 
the lack of commercial courts in Saudi Arabia to look into Islamic banking and finance 
                                                 
14
 Zulkifli Hasan, ‘Regulatory Framework of Shariah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the 
UK’, Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies (2010 3 (2) 97. 
15
 Yuosef Alhumoudi, Islamic Insurance Takaful and its Application in Saudi Arabia, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
Brunel University 2012) 229-230. 
16
 Ibid. 
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disputes. The problem is that decisions issued by quasi-judicial committees related to Islamic 
banking and financial disputes are not conclusive or do not have a peremptory character 
because they are not Shariah courts. Moreover, these committees are also not independent; 
they are linked with the boards of directors of SAMA and CMA and the Ministry of 
Commerce. 
1.4  Research Problem 
There are specific laws governing Islamic banking and finance in some Muslim countries, 
such as the Islamic Banking Act 1983 in Malaysia, the Islamic Banking Law 1983 in Iran and 
the Banking Regulation Act 2003 in Sudan.
17
 In addition, some GCC countries have 
mentioned Islamic banking in their legislation. For example, in Kuwait, the Central Bank of 
Law was amended to bring the Islamic banks formally under the jurisdiction of the Central 
Bank of Kuwait (CBK).
18
 In Bahrain, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) issued a rulebook 
for Islamic Banks
19
. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 
mentions ten articles regarding Islamic banking, financial institutions and investment 
companies.
20
 
In contrast, in Saudi Arabia, there are no specific laws governing Islamic banking and 
financial activities. Islamic banking and financial activities are regulated and supervised side-
by-side with conventional commercial banking businesses by SAMA under the BCL of 1966. 
Islamic insurance is regulated and supervised side-by-side with conventional insurance by 
SAMA under the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and its 
implementing regulations. The issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is regulated and supervised 
side-by-side with the issuance of shares and debt instruments by CMA under the Offers of 
Securities Regulations and the Listing Rules.  
In addition to the absence of regulatory policies and supervisory harmonisation, there is no 
independent central Shariah board for validating Islamic banking and financial activities so 
as to ensure their compatibility with the Shariah principles. Moreover, there is no uniform 
                                                 
17
 Beng Soon Chong & Ming-Hua Liu, ‘Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based’, Science Direct (2009) 
17 (1) 126-130. 
18
 Kabir Hassan and Mervyn Lewis & Mervyn Lewis, Handbook of Islamic banking (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2007) 122. 
19
 See the official website of the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB), available at: http://www.cbb.gov.bh/page-p-
cbb_rule_book.htm, [Accessed 20 October 2013]. 
20
 Federal Law No. 6 of 1985. 
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guidance on Shariah compliance or uniform interpretation of Shariah principles of Islamic 
banking and financial activities. Furthermore, there are no commercial courts for resolving 
banking disputes in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, the main research problem is the absence of regulatory policies and supervisory 
harmonisation of Islamic banking and financial activities including Islamic bonds, Islamic 
insurance and Islamic derivatives in Saudi Arabia.  
1.5  Thesis aim 
The primary aim of thesis is to examine whether the current practices of Islamic banking and 
financial activities in Saudi Arabia including the current uses of sukuk (Islamic bonds), the 
models of takaful (Islamic insurance) and accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic 
structured finance (Islamic derivatives) are compatible with the principles of Shariah. 
However, the research has a variety of additional aims, which are as follows:  
1. To discuss and analyse the basic laws of banking and financial activities in Saudi 
Arabia and examine whether they are compatible with the principles of Shariah.  
2. To conduct a comparative study of the Islamic financing contracting forms and the 
conventional ones.  
3. To determine the legal challenges that face Islamic banking and financial activities in 
Saudi Arabia from the Shariah point of view. 
4. To determine the legal conflict between the Law of Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies and its implementing regulations, in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.   
5. To suggest solutions to develop a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic 
banking and finance in Saudi, in line with the standards of the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) of Islamic finance 
and also the Malaysian experience. 
1.6  Research Questions 
The main research question is to what extent Islamic financial contracting forms in Saudi 
Arabia comply with Shariah principles. In addition, there are additional research questions 
have been carefully selected to suggest reforms to the current uses of Islamic bonds, Islamic 
insurance and accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance and also to 
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propose a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi 
Arabia. They have been determined in accordance with the absence of specific laws 
governing Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia, and also the lack of an 
independent central Shariah board. In order to achieve the research aims, the following 
research questions will be answered:  
1. What are the basic laws for Islamic banking and financial activities including Islamic 
bonds, Islamic insurance and Islamic derivatives in Saudi Arabia? 
2. What are the different Islamic financial contracting forms that are available and what 
are their specifications and advantages and disadvantages? 
3. What is the major difference between conventional and Islamic financial contracting 
forms? 
4. To what extent does the legal framework of the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia 
comply with Shariah principles?  
5. To what extent do the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies in 
Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations, comply with Shariah law?  
6. How do Islamic financial derivatives work in Saudi Arabia from the perspective of 
Islamic Shariah Law? 
1.7  Research Scope and Limitation 
The scope of this research covers the current uses of sukuk, the models of takaful and 
accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance in Saudi Arabia from the 
perspective of Islamic Shariah law. This research analyses whether the current practices of 
Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia are compatible with the principles of 
Shariah. The views of scholars of Shariah in the banking and financial issues in this work are 
limited to the Sunni sect or school (madhhab). 
This research is limited to discussing and analysing three basic laws of banking and financial 
activities in Saudi Arabia that regulate and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities 
side-by-side with conventional commercial banking businesses. It is also limited to focusing 
on three types of key financial institutions that are offering Islamic banking and financial 
products and services in Saudi Arabia, namely Islamic banks and Islamic windows of 
conventional banks, cooperative insurance companies and Islamic capital markets. 
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This research focuses on the SAMA, and the CMA, which are considered the authorities 
responsible for the regulation and supervision of banking and financial products in Saudi 
Arabia. However, the focus of this work is on how to transfer the Malaysian experience in the 
field of Islamic banking and finance to Saudi Arabia, with some modifications that are 
commensurate with the nature of the Saudi regime. The main reason for choosing Malaysia is 
that it is considered one of the most advanced Islamic finance industries in the world, 
particularly in terms of Islamic bonds (sukuk) where it is the world's largest sukuk market 
with a number of Malaysia’s sukuk issues by 68.9%, or USD 62 billion of total global 
outstanding  sukuk at the end of 2007.
21
 In addition, Malaysia has issued a number of laws 
and regulations related to Islamic finance and takaful to regulate and supervise IFIs in 
Malaysia. It has also established the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) as the sole Shariah 
authority for the Islamic banking and takaful industries.
22
  
1.8  Research Methodology 
The selected research methods for this research are both a critical literature review and 
comparative analysis. Thus, the first step in this research will be an in-depth critical literature 
review to cover Islamic financing contracts as an alternative to conventional loan products. 
At this stage, the researcher will conduct the review in order to comprehend as much as 
possible of the published research related to the shortcomings of the conventional economic 
system from the Shariah point of view. The starting point will be reviewing the books, 
guidelines, and reports to comprehend the procedures, laws, regulations, and the actual 
practices of Islamic banking and finance. The next step will be reviewing the academic 
journals which are concerned with contract law, Islamic economic regulations and Islamic 
finance and banking systems. Such a comprehensive literature review will help the researcher 
to comprehend the underlying concepts, laws and philosophies of these two different schools, 
Islamic and conventional.  This will also assist him in identifying the strengths and weak 
points in them in order to have a firm basis for determining, comparing and evaluating the 
major differences between them.  
                                                 
21
 Mohamad Zaid Mohd Zin, Ahamad Asmadi Sakat, Nurfahiratul Azlina Ahmad, Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor, 
Azri Bhari, Saurdi Ishak and Mohd Sapawi Jamain, ‘The Effectiveness of Sukuk in Islamic Finance Market’ 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences (2011) 5 (12) 476. 
22
 Hjh Abd Jabbar, ‘The governance of Shari’a advisers of Islamic financial institutions: the practice in 
Malaysia’, Company Lawyer (2009) 30 (10) 312. 
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The focus will be on Saudi Arabia's legal structure and the banking and financial systems. At 
this stage, the researcher's critical literature review will focus on the existing laws and 
regulations governing Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia in order to 
determine the difficulties, limitations and barriers of applying the Islamic financing contracts 
system in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the critical literature review will cover the SAMA, and 
the CMA as the authorities who are responsible for the regulation and supervision of Islamic 
banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia, in order to determine the legal challenges 
that face these activities from the Shariah point of view, and to attempt to address them from 
the perspective of Shariah.  
The second method is a comparative approach. This approach will be applied in this research 
to achieve its aims. The comparison will be carried out between the current practices of 
Islamic banking and financial products in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. The purpose of this 
comparison is to explore a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and 
financial activities in Saudi Arabia. This will be helpful to build upon and try to take further 
steps towards transferring the Malaysian experience in the field of Islamic banking and 
finance to Saudi Arabia with some modifications that are commensurate with the nature of 
the Saudi regime. The comparison will be vital for identifying the difficulties, limitations and 
barriers in relation to the existing laws and regulations governing Islamic banking and 
financial activities in Saudi Arabia. 
1.9  Research Structure 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter has presented a general 
introduction to the thesis components. In this chapter, the research significance, research 
problem, aims, questions, scope and limitation and research methodology are defined and 
formulated.  
The second chapter will provide background information to the Saudi legal structure and the 
Islamic banking and financial systems in Saudi Arabia. The chapter will give a brief 
overview of the meaning of Shariah and its legal sources, and also the main Sunni schools 
(madhhab). It will also discuss the authorities responsible for the regulation and supervision 
of Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. This chapter will answer research 
question one.  
10 
 
Chapter Three will use a comparative approach to explain the nature and scope of Islamic 
finance in comparison with the conventional system. A review of the body of knowledge 
concerning Islamic finance will be covered in this chapter, including the definition of Islamic 
finance, its distinguishing features, its main principles, its laws and regulations, and the risks 
and challenges involved. The chapter will then discuss the differences between Islamic 
finance and conventional finance. Research questions two and three will be answered in this 
chapter. 
Chapter Four will give a critical analysis of the regulatory framework of the issuance of 
sukuk in Saudi Arabia, and the legal challenges, and provide recommendations to overcome 
these challenges from the Shariah point of view. This chapter will discuss whether the 
issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia, which is regulated and supervised by the CMA side-by-
side with the issuance of shares and debt instruments under the Offers of Securities 
Regulations and the Listing Rules, complies with Shariah principles. This chapter will 
discuss the difference between sukuk and a conventional bond. Research question four will be 
answered in this chapter.   
Chapter Five will give a comprehensive and critical review of takaful applications in Saudi 
Arabia. This chapter will determine the legal conflict between the Law of Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations. The 
chapter will investigate whether this law and its implementing regulations comply with 
Shariah law or are in need of reform. The chapter will then review the body of knowledge 
concerning Islamic insurance, its principles, regulation and supervision, challenges and 
models from the Shariah point of view. Finally, this chapter will discuss the difference 
between takaful and conventional insurance, and why conventional insurance is prohibited 
and unacceptable in Shariah.  Research question five will be answered in this chapter. 
Chapter Six will give a comprehensive and critical review of Islamic derivatives as an 
alternative to conventional derivatives in Saudi Arabia, and examine whether the current uses 
of accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance are compatible with the 
principles of Shariah. The chapter will then discuss the difference between derivatives in 
Islamic and conventional finance, and why derivatives in conventional finance are prohibited 
and unacceptable in Shariah. It will also critically analyse how Islamic financial derivatives 
work in Saudi Arabia from the Shariah point of view. At the end of this chapter, the 
11 
 
researcher will propose a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and 
finance including Islamic financial derivatives in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter Seven will conclude the whole thesis, and make recommendations from the study in 
order to reform the current systems of Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia. The 
contributions made by the study and suggestions for future research will be included in this 
final chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE SAUDI LEGAL STRUCTURE AND 
ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
2.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain multiple issues that relate to the chapters that follow 
it.  It therefore provides background information to the Saudi legal structure and the Islamic 
banking and financial systems in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, there are three sections in this 
chapter. The first one provides an overview of Saudi Arabia, offering a brief review of the 
development of Islamic banking and finance there. This section also clarifies exactly what is 
meant by Shariah, explaining the legal sources of Shariah, either the primary sources or the 
secondary sources, and also the main Sunni schools (madhhab). The next section covers the 
basic law of governance, and the basic laws of banking and financial activities in Saudi 
Arabia. The third section illustrates the authorities responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. A summary is 
provided at the end.  
2.2 Overview of Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is considered the birthplace of Islam and is the home to Islam's two holiest 
shrines, in Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 by King Abdulaziz.  It 
lies in the south-west of Asia, and comprises an area of 2.25 million sq. km, with a 
population of around 27 million, including 8.4 million foreign residents. Saudi Arabia is 
divided administratively into thirteen provinces (mintaqah), and each province is governed by 
a member of the royal family.
23
 Islam is the official religion of Saudi Arabia, Arabic is its 
language, and its capital city is Riyadh. Monarchy is the system of rule in Saudi Arabia;
24
 the 
king’s official title is Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and he fills the roles of both 
prime minister and head of state.
25
  
The constitution of Saudi Arabia is based on Shariah derived from the Quran and the 
Sunnah.
26
 The Quran and the Sunnah are considered the primary sources of Shariah, while 
Islamic scholarly consensus (Ijma) and analogical reasoning by Muslim judges (Qiyas) are 
                                                 
23
 See the official website of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, available at: 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/  [Accessed 16 November 2013]. 
24
 Basic Law of Governance 1992, Art. 1, 5 (A) and 5 (B). 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid., Art. 1. 
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secondary sources. The primary sources of Shariah govern all administrative regulations of 
the State.
27
 In Saudi Arabia, Shariah is interpreted by Islamic judges (qadis) who have been 
influenced by the Hanbali madhhab (school) of Islamic jurisprudence which is applied by 
Saudi courts.
28
  
Under Article 44 of the Basic Law of Governance, the state’s authorities consist of a judicial 
authority, a legislative authority and an executive authority. The King is the ultimate arbiter 
for these authorities.
29
 The Saudi judicial authority consists of the Shariah courts system, the 
Board of Grievances and quasi-judicial committees,
30
 such as the Banking Disputes 
Settlement Committee of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA),
31
 and the 
Commercial Papers Law, and Anti-Commercial Fraud Law, in the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry in Saudi Arabia.
32
 The source for fatwa (religious legal opinion) is derived from 
Shariah, so the courts apply the provisions of Shariah, and whatever laws are not in conflict 
with the Quran and the Sunnah, to cases before them.
33
 
The Basic Law of Governance uses the term ‘regulatory authority’ to cases before them to 
refer to the Saudi legislative authority because God is the ultimate source of legislation.
34
 
Article 67 of the Basic Law of Governance stipulates that the legislative authority shall have 
the jurisdiction of formulating laws in accordance with the principles of Shariah.
35
 In fact, the 
Saudi legislative authority is shared by the King, the Council of Ministers, and the 
Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura).
36
 The Basic Law of Governance states that the King 
presides over the Council of Ministers.
37
 The Majlis al-Shura proposes a draft of a new law 
or an amendment to an enacted law and studies them within the council, and then the Shura 
council’s resolutions are submitted to the king.38 The researcher believes that Majlis al-Shura 
assumes legislative competence in Saudi Arabia because it is considered the sole 
                                                 
27
 Beng Soon Chong & Ming-Hua Liu, ‘Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based’, Science Direct (2009) 
17 (1) 128. 
28
 Hans Visser, Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited  2009) 16.  
29
 Ibid., Art. 44. 
30
 Ibid., Art. 51. 
31
 See the official website of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), available at: 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/ABOUTSAMA/Pages/SAMAHistory.aspx, [Accessed 18 November 2013]. 
32
 See the official website of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, available at: 
http://mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/Pages/default.aspx, [Accessed 18 November 2013]. 
33
 Ibid., Art. 45, 48. 
34
 Ibid., Art. 44. 
35
 Ibid., Art. 67. 
36
 Joseph Kechichian, Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia, (Routledge 2013) 26. 
37
 Ibid., Art. 65. 
38
 Shura Council Law1992, Art. 23. 
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representative of the Saudi people under Article Two and Article Fifteen of the Shura Council 
Law.
39
 However, Article Three of the Shura Council Law stipulates that all members of the 
Shura Council are chosen by the King, and their rights, duties and affairs shall be determined 
by a royal order. This means that none of the members of the Shura Council, not even the 
Speaker, Vice-Speaker, Assistant Speaker or Secretary General are elected by the people of 
Saudi Arabia.  
The Saudi executive branch is concerned with the application of Shariah and the preparation 
of instructions and regulations to ensure that the implementation is issued by the legislature. 
It consists of the King, the Council of Ministers, local governments, ministry subsidiaries, 
and other public, independent and quasi-independent agencies.
40
  
The researcher believes that it is important to activate the principle of the separation of 
powers in Saudi Arabia, and the role of the King is to oversee the application of what comes 
out of the legislative authority. In practice, the King is the ultimate arbiter for all state 
authorities, and he represents the legislative and executive branches because he is the head of 
state and also the prime minister of the Council of Ministers.
41
  
2.3 The Definition of Shariah 
It is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by Shariah because, as mentioned that Saudi 
Arabia derives its authority from Shariah.
42
 It is a set of provisions and rules that govern 
every aspect of a Muslim’s life.43  Mawil Dien states that Shariah is not law, but it covers all 
aspects of the life of an individual Muslim, whether religious, political or economic, and also 
covers transactions and laws. Its provisions are derived from the Quran and the sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad.
44
 
In addition, Shariah has five differing degrees of provisions, as follows:  
“Obligatory (fard or wajib) an obligatory duty, the omission of which is punishable”. 
“Desirable (mandub or mustahab) an action which is rewarded, but the omission of which 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., Art. 2 and 15. 
40
 Ibid., Art. 55, 56, 57 (A. B. C) and 69.  
41
 Ibid., Art. 44 and 55. 
42
 Ibid., Art. 7. 
43
 Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2007) 21; Natalie Schoon, 
Islamic Banking and Finance (Spiramus Press Ltd  2009) 19.  
44
 Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law: from Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice (Edinburgh University 
Press  2004) 35.  
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is not punishable”. “Indifferent (jaiz or mubah) an action which is permitted and to which 
the law is indifferent”. “Undesirable (mukruh) an action which is disapproved of, but 
which is not a punishable offence, though its omission is rewarded”. “Forbidden (haram) 
an action which is absolutely forbidden and punishable”.45 
2.3.1  The Legal Sources of Shariah 
Basically Muslims believe that Shariah regulates all aspects of life, whether political, social, 
economic or personal. Shariah derives from the Quran, the Hadiths, the sayings of the 
righteous Salaf, and the jurisprudence of Islamic clerics, and these define the relationship of 
people to God, to society and to the universe. Shariah determines what may be done and what 
is not permissible. Muslims resort to Shariah to settle disputes among Muslims.
46
 The 
provisions of Shariah are derived from several sources, including primary sources or divine 
sources, and secondary sources or human sources.
47
 Muslims believe that the divine 
commands were given by the divine revelations to Prophet Mohammed. Therefore, all human 
activities must be in accordance with these commands.
48
 
2.3.1.1  The Primary Sources are the Quran and Sunnah 
2.3.1.1.1  The Quran 
The Quran is the most important source for Muslims. It governs the life of a Muslim in all 
aspects and is the main source of legislation.
49
 
“We have sent down to you the Book (the Quran) as an exposition of everything, a 
guidance, a mercy, and glad tidings for those who have submitted themselves (to 
Allâh as Muslims)”.50 
Allah sent the Quran down in the night of Ramadan to the Prophet Mohammed.
51
 The Quran 
is also considered to be the main source of structure in the Islamic banking services. It 
                                                 
45
 Angelo Venardos, Islamic Banking and Finance in South-East Asia: Its Development and Future, (World 
Scientific Publishing Co. Ltd  2005) 27.  
46
 Kabir Hassan and Mervyn Lewis , Handbook of Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited  2007) 
404; Beng Soon Chong & Ming-Hua Liu, ‘Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based’, Science Direct 
(2009) 17 (1) 128.  
47
 Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law from Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice (Edinburgh University 
Press Ltd  2004) 51.  
48
 Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2007) 21. 
49
 Abdur Rahman Doi, Shariah: The Islamic Law (Ta Ha Publishers Ltd  UK 1984) 21.  
50
 See verse 89 of Surah 16 of the Holy Quran. 
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contains the divine injunctions prohibiting usury and interest, and it defines how to write 
commercial contracts and requires the signing of contracts to take place before two 
witnesses.
52
 Allah has mentioned, in Sura Al- Baqarah, Verses 282 of the Quran, about 
writing contracts and the witnesses: 
“O you who have believed, when you contract a debt for a specified term, write it 
down. And let a scribe write [it] between you in justice. Let no scribe refuse to write 
as Allah has taught him. So let him write and let the one who has the obligation 
dictate”.53 
“Get two witnesses out of your own men. And if there are not two men (available), 
then a man and two women, such as you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them 
(two women) errs, the other can remind her. And the witnesses should not refuse 
when they are called (for evidence)”.54 
The Quran is believed by Muslims to be the words of God, who sent it to the Prophet 
Muhammad. It begins with Surat Al-Fatihah, and ends with Surat An-Nas. The Quran is 
divided into 114 chapters, and the chapters are further divided into verses (Ayah).
55
 It was 
recorded during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammed and the prophet explained it to 
others.
56
 
2.3.1.1.2  The Sunnah 
The Sunnah is the second of the primary sources. It was established in Mecca for about 10 
years and after that in Medina for 13 years by the Prophet Muhammad.
57
 Allah talks about 
the Prophet Muhammad in the Holy Book where it says the Messenger of Allah is a good 
example as he helped and gave unique treatment to everyone, and therefore Muslims should 
do as he did.
58
 Muslims believe that God taught the Prophet Muhammad through Gabriel,
59
 
                                                                                                                                                        
51
 Ibid., p. 22.  
52
 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (The Islamic Texts Society 1989) 32-34; 
Abdur Rahman Doi, Shariah: The Islamic Law (Ta Ha Publishers Ltd 1984) 384-385.  
53
 See verse 282 of Surah 2 of the Holy Quran. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Niaz A Shah, Islamic Law and the Law of Armed Conflict: The Conflict in Pakistan (Routledge 2011) 17. 
56
 Abdur Rahman Doi, Shariah: The Islamic Law (Ta Ha Publishers Ltd 1984) 52.   
57
 John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation (Edinburgh University Press 2003) 
10.  
58
 See verse 21of Surah 33 of the Holy Quran. 
59
 See verses 3 and 4 of Surah 53 of the Holy Quran. 
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thus they accept the Sunnah, like the Holy Book (the Quran), because the origin is from 
Allah. The Quran states in this regard: 
“Whatever the Messenger has given you take; and what he has forbidden you refrain 
from. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in penalty”.60 
The Sunnah contains the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and the speeches he made for 
multiple purposes and on different occasions.
61
 The Sunnah is used to explain and interpret 
the verses of the Quran and shows the objectives of the meanings of the Quran and of its 
divine injunctions and prohibitions. In addition, it governs the lives of Muslims in all aspects, 
including, for example, financial transaction contracts.
62
 Prophet Muhammed said: “It is 
forbidden for a person to offer to buy anything for which another person has already made an 
offer”.63 As well as this, Prophet Muhammad forbade the sale of what is not present at the 
time of contract.
64
 
2.3.1.2  The Secondary Sources are Ijma and Qiyas 
2.3.1.2.1  Ijma 
One of the minor sources of Shariah is Ijma. It comes after the Quran and Sunnah, which 
means that it is the third source of legislation in Islam.
65
 Ijma is not a divine revelation like 
the Quran and Sunnah, but it is a rational proof.
66
 Ijma indicates the consensus of opinion and 
agreement between Muslim scholars,
67
 which means that Ijma is a unanimous agreement, but 
the problem of Ijma is that there is not often a consensus among Muslim scholars.  
The concept of Ijma is the unanimous consensus of Muslims scholars on a given issue on a 
particular time, usually as represented by the agreement of the jurists. It has traditionally been 
                                                 
60
 See verse 7of Surah 59 of the Holy Quran. 
61
 Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2006) 28.  
62
 Beng Soon Chong & Ming-Hua Liu, ‘Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based’, Science Direct (2009) 
17 (1) 128; Abdur Rahman Doi, Shariah: The Islamic Law (Ta Ha Publishers Ltd 1984) 45-46. 
63
 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence  (The Islamic Texts Society 1989) 427.  
64
 Ibid., pp. 374-376.  
65
 Abdur Rahman Doi, Shariah: The Islamic Law (Ta Ha Publishers Ltd 1984,) 64.  
66
 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (The Islamic Texts Society 1989). 228.  
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recognised as an independent source of Shariah, along with the Quran, Sunnah and Qiyas, by 
most of the jurists.
68
 In the Quran Allah says: 
“Those who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose affair is 
[determined by] consultation among themselves”.69 
Prophet Muhammed supported the Ijma in the hadith (Sunnah): “My community shall never 
agree on an error”.70 Another hadith Prophet said: “I beseeched Almighty God not to bring 
my community to the point of agreeing on error and he granted me this”.71 
2.3.1.2.2  Qiyas 
Qiyas means comparing one thing with another similar thing. a comparison between two 
things. It started during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammed and it still continues.
72
 
“Qiyas is obtained through the legal and philosophical method of analogy, whereby a 
divine law revealed for a particular situation is applied to another, where some 
common feature exists in both situations”.73 
The concept of the Qiyas is derivation of the law on the analogy of an existing law if the 
basis/rationale of the two are the same. It is considered one of the tools of ijtihad and sources 
of Islamic jurisprudence.
74
  
In addition, there are other sources of Shariah, such as Ijtihad (Self-exertion), Urf (Custom), 
Istislah (Public interest), Istishab (Legal presumption) and Istihsan (Something preferable). 
These previous sources are for personal interpretation to avoid the stagnation and injustice 
that might result from the literal application of Shariah.
75
  
Overall, the differing views have contributed to the development of Islamic jurisprudence so 
that it may be prepared to face any new events, either currently or in the future. For example, 
Islamic banking services which are derived from provisions of Shariah are major sources and 
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secondary sources, as well as Islamic financing contracts which are all items subject to the 
provisions of Islamic Shariah.
76
  
Figure 1.1: Overview of the sources of Shariah  
 
 
Source: A Primer on Islamic Finance (2009). 
2.3.2 Islamic Schools (madhhab) 
Prophet Muhammed spent about 13 years in Medina explaining Islam to people, so during his 
lifetime people did not need to ask anyone else about the teachings of Islam because the 
prophet was the owner of religious authority and he was receiving the divine commands of 
Allah.
77
  
The Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence emerged at the beginning of Islam, especially 
after the death of the Prophet Muhammed in 632.
78
 The main reasons were the spread of 
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Islam and exposure to many new issues, religious and legislative. In addition, due to the 
historical circumstances which were being faced at the time of the beginning of the Islamic 
era, there was an urgent need to resolve emerging issues and to meet the emerging needs of 
the people and answer their questions; hence a group of scholars was formed, and they taught 
people.
79
 
In Islam, there are four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, called madhhab.
80
 Each of these 
schools derives its provisions from the evidence of the primary sources, which are the Quran 
and Sunnah, in accordance with the rules and principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Generally, 
there is agreement among the scholars of the Islamic faith and the primary sources. However, 
there are slightly different views among them in the secondary sources, but these are 
generally accepted as valid from an Islamic point of view.
81
 The four schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence spread widely among Sunnis and became official. The books represent 
jurisprudence and are attributed to the four Imams of the Sunnis, who were (in historical 
order): Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik ibn Anas al-Maliki, Imam Muhammad ibn Idris al-
Shafi’i and Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal.  
2.3.2.1 The Hanafi School (690 –760) 
The Hanafi School is one of the Islamic schools (madhhab). It is the oldest school and also 
the most flexible. It derives its name from the founder of the school, Abu Hanifa an-Nu‘man 
ibn Thābit, known as Abu Hanifa. The doctrine of Imam Abu Hanifa was established in 
Baghdad, Iraq. The Hanafi school of thought derives its jurisprudence primarily from the 
Quran; however, when absolute jurisprudence cannot be derived from the Quran, the Hanafi 
school of thought looks to other distinguished sources such as the Sunnah to support its 
ruling. Where a ruling remains deficient, secondary sources such as Ijma (consensus), Qiyas 
(analogy), ijtihad (Self-exertion), Urf (Custom) and Istihsan (Something preferable) are 
utilised.
82
 The Hanafi School has become well established in India, Iraq, Egypt, the Levant, 
Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. After Abu Hanifa’s death in 760, 
his legal views were preserved by Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani.
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2.3.2.2 The Maliki School (711–795)  
The Maliki School is the second of the four Islamic schools followed by Sunni Muslims to 
this day.
84
 It was founded in Medina by Malik ibn Anas, who died in 795. His full name is 
Malik ibn Anas ibn Malik ibn Abi Amir al- Asbahi al-Yamani. He was completely sincere in 
his quest for knowledge and this made him one of the greatest scholars of Fiqh in the Sunni 
Islamic world.
85
 The Maliki School is similar to the other Schools in the fundamental 
principles of Fiqh, except that the Qiyas was given priority over the weak Sunnah (Hadith) by 
Imam Malik.
86
 The Maliki Madhab is concentrated in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Algeria and Tunisia.
87
 
2.3.2.3 The Shafii School (767–820) 
The Shafii School is the third Sunni school. It derives its name from Imam Shafii who was 
born in 767 in Ghazza, the same year that Imam Abu Hanifa died.
88
 The full name of the 
founder of this School is Muhammed ibn Idris ash-Shafii.
89
 The principles of Imam Shafii 
have been primarily derived from the Quran, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammed and the 
secondary sources which are Ijma “consensus” and the Qiyas “analogy”. Imam Shafii 
rejected Istislah, Istihsan and Ijtihad, preferring Ijma.
90
 The Shafii School comes second only 
to the Hanafi School in terms of followers; it is followed by approximately 29% of the 
Muslims in the world.
91
 There are many countries which follow the Shafii madhhab, such as 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia.
92
 Imam Shafii died in 820 
in Egypt.
93
 
2.3.2.4 The Hanbali School (781–855) 
The Hanbali School is the last of the Sunni schools. This madhhab was founded by Imam 
Ahmad bin Hanbal, who learned from Imam Shafii, and their schools were very similar.
94
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The principles of the Hanbali School were the Quran, Sunnah, Ijma and Qiyas.  Imam 
Ahmad had a different point of view from the other schools over the Qiyas, because he would 
consider the Qiyas in case of necessity. He also accepted the sayings of a single Companion. 
Imam Ahmad supported Ijtihad, but he rejected the opinions of other scholars (Taqlid). The 
Hanbali School is the most conformist of the four schools; however it is also the most flexible 
in most commercial issues. Hanbali spread in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the Hanbali 
madhhab is applied by the Saudi courts.
95
  
At the end of this section on Islamic schools, it is important to mention the opinion of the 
four Imams about the prohibition of riba. All of the Muslim jurists agree that riba is 
prohibited by the Quran and Sunnah, whether as payment or receipt. The prohibition of 
interest is considered the most distinctive feature in Islamic economics.
96
 
2.4 Basic Law of Governance 
The Basic Law of Governance was introduced in 1992 by Royal Order No: A/90 dated 1 
March 1992, when King Fahd approved the reform of the constitutional law.
97
 It is deemed 
the most important constitutional document of legislation for the Council of Ministers Law, 
the Consultative Council Law and the Regional Law.
98
 The Basic Law of Governance is 
divided into nine chapters, consisting of 83 articles to identify the nature, objectives and 
responsibilities of the state, as well as the relationship between the ruler and citizens.
99
 
Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance defines the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a fully 
sovereign Arab Islamic State; its religion is Islam and its constitution is the Quran and the 
Sunnah.
100
 Article 7 reaffirms that the government derives its authority from the Quran and 
the Sunnah, both of which govern all administrative regulations of the state.
101
 The Basic 
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Law confirms that the state's role is to protect the principles of Islam and to enforce its 
Shariah.
102
  
The Basic Law of Governance emphasizes the principles of consultation, justice, and the 
equality of citizens in accordance with Shariah.
103
 It confirms the basic features of the Saudi 
family and the importance of Islamic values, justice, and the unity of the family.
104
 In 
addition, the Basic Law confirms that the State must protect human rights in accordance with 
Shariah, provide security to all its citizens and residents, and guarantee the protection of 
individual freedom from arbitrary arrest and punishment, except under the provisions of the 
Law.
105
 The Basic System obliges the State to provide health care to every citizen, and also to 
guarantee the rights of the citizen and his family in emergencies, sickness, disability, and old 
age.
106
 The State must facilitate the provision of job opportunities to every able person, and 
enact laws that protect the worker and the employer.
107
 
The Basic Law of Governance covers economic affairs in 9 articles. Article 14 defines the 
means of exploiting, protecting, and developing such wealth in the interests of the state, its 
security and economy. This article makes it clear that the government owns all natural 
resources. The State must guarantee the protection of private property, and the maintenance 
of public money. The Basic System obliges the State to take tax (zakat) from the rich and pay 
it to legitimate recipients.
108
  
Hasan argues that Saudi Arabia does not have a modern written constitution but firmly 
adheres to the Quran and the Sunnah as a legal constitution.
109
 Article 1 of the Basic Law of 
Governance supports this argument which emphasises that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a 
fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam and the Book of God and the Sunnah 
(Traditions) of His Messenger are its constitution.
110
 
However, after the Gulf War, King Fahd wanted to establish a system as a constitution to 
regulate the state authorities and identify how to transfer power between the sons of King 
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AbdulAziz and the sons of his sons, and in addition, to protect fundamental human rights in 
accordance with Shariah.
111
 Therefore, King Fahd issued Royal Order No: A/90 dated 1 
March 1992 to fill a legal gap through the Basic Law of Governance.
112
 This means that 
before this Royal Order there was not a written constitution in Saudi Arabia. 
Hence, it can be said that there is a modern written constitution in Saudi Arabia, namely the 
Basic Law of Governance issued in 1992, and this written constitution is based on the Quran 
and the Sunnah. Therefore, there should be no conflict between the Basic Law of Governance 
as the Saudi constitutional law and the principal sources of Shariah, which are the Quran and 
the Sunnah.
113
 
2.5 Basic Laws of Banking and Financial Activities in Saudi Arabia 
The history of banking systems in Saudi Arabia began in the 20th century with the first 
commercial bank, under the name of the Dutch Commercial Company, which was established 
in 1926.
114
 Currently, there are 12 Saudi banks,
115
 and 11 branches of foreign banks that have 
been licensed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) to offer investment services, 
retail and corporate banking, brokerage facilities and derivative transactions, in addition to 
credit cards, ATMs and point-of-sale transactions. Four of these banks are Islamic banks, 
providing Islamic banking and financial services in accordance with the principles of 
Shariah.
116
  
In addition, there is also the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul ), which is considered one of the 
most highly capitalised stock exchanges in the Arab world.
117
 The issuance of sukuk in Saudi 
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Arabia is traded on the Saudi Stock Exchange, and regulated and supervised by the Offer of 
Securities Regulations issued by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA).
118
  
With respect to the insurance industry in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia’s takaful insurance 
industry is considered the largest takaful industry in the world. In 2011, Gross Written 
Premiums (GWP) in the Saudi insurance market reached SR 18.504 billion, up from SR 
16.387 billion in 2010.
119
 The Saudi Arabian insurance industry is regulated and supervised 
by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency under the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control 
Law which was issued by Royal Decree No. M/32 on 01/08/2003.
120
 
2.5.1 The Banking Control Law (BCL)  
The Banking Control Law (BCL), issued under Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 11/6/1966, is 
considered the main legislation to regulate all banking and financial services in Saudi 
Arabia.
121
 This law gives SAMA broad powers to regulate and supervise Saudi banks and to 
safeguard the banking system.
122
 For example, Article 3 of the BCL stipulates that all 
applications to carry on a banking business in Saudi Arabia shall be addressed to SAMA.
123
 
The BCL defines the banking business, confers licensing powers, and determines capital 
adequacy, opening of current accounts, opening of letters of credit, issuance of letters of 
guarantee, payment and collection of cheques, payment orders, promissory notes and similar 
other papers of value, discounting of bills, bills of exchange and other commercial papers, 
foreign exchange transactions and other banking business.
124
 
The BCL does not provide a specific framework for the Islamic banking and financial 
services in its 26 articles. The Islamic banking and financial services are regulated and 
supervised side by side with conventional banking by SAMA under the BCL of 1966.
125
 
According to Hasan, in Saudi Arabia, the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) operate under a 
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strange legal framework because the legal system of Saudi Arabia is actually based on 
Shariah whereas the existing law of the Banking System 1966 is still applicable and it has not 
been amended or repealed to regulate the establishment and the existence of the IFIs.
126
  
2.5.2 The Capital Market Law (CML) 
The Capital Market Law (CML) was issued by Royal Decree No. M/30, dated 31/07/2003, to 
regulate and develop the Saudi financial market through improving the development of 
procedures that would reduce the risks related to securities transactions.
127
 The CML gives 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) broad powers to regulate the issuance of securities, as 
well as to monitor them and dealings in them.
128
 In addition, the CML protects citizens and 
investors in Securities from unfair and unsound practices or practices involving fraud, deceit, 
cheating or manipulation.
129
 The CML seeks to achieve transparency, fairness and efficiency 
in Securities transactions.
130
  
The CML does not provide a specific framework for the issuance of sukuk in its articles. 
Moreover, the CML does not include any mention of Shariah, knowing that the basic system 
in Saudi Arabia is derived from Shariah. Currently, the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is 
regulated and supervised by the CMA under the CML.
131
 According to Al Elsheikh, the 
absence of the legal framework for the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia could generate 
confusion between sukuk, shares, bonds and conventional debt instruments.
132
 
2.5.3 The Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 
The Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law was approved by Royal Decree no.  
M/32 dated 01/08/2003, which set the stage for the legal framework of the cooperative 
insurance companies sector in Saudi Arabia.
133
 Subsequently, its implementing regulations 
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were issued by Ministerial Decision No. 1/596 dated 20/04/2004, to regulate the insurance 
sector.
134
  
The cooperative insurance law and its implementing regulations gave SAMA wide-ranging 
powers, such as the licensing of insurance companies and insurance professionals, the 
regulation and supervision of the insurance sector, and the policing and control of the Saudi 
insurance market.
135
 Therefore, SAMA is considered the regulatory authority for the 
cooperative insurance companies sector in Saudi Arabia. 
The objectives of the law and its implementing regulations are the protection of policyholders 
and shareholders, enhancing the stability of the insurance market, and encouraging fair and 
effective competition in the insurance sector in Saudi Arabia under Article 2 of the 
implementing regulations.
136
  
2.6  Authorities responsible for the regulation and supervision of Islamic Banking and 
Financial Activities in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, there are two authorities responsible for the regulation and supervision of 
Islamic banking and financial activities, cooperative insurance (takaful), and Islamic sukuk. 
These authorities are the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA). 
2.6.1 The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
The SAMA was established under two Royal Decrees, No. 30/4/1/1046 and No. 30/4/1/1047, 
on 4 October 1952 as the central bank of Saudi Arabia.
137
 It is governed by a board of 
directors, which is headed by a Governor, Deputy Governor, and three members, appointed 
by the King under a Royal Decree for terms of 4 years.
138
 The first Board of Directors of 
SAMA was formed in 05/08/1952 under Royal Decree No. 30/4/1/1744, and the first 
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governor of SAMA was George A. Blowers (a U.S. citizen) in 05/08/1952 under Royal 
Decree No. 30/4/1/1743.
139
 
Unlike in Malaysia,
140
 there is no independent central Shariah board in Saudi Arabia to 
regulate and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities. Currently, SAMA regulates 
and supervises Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) that conduct banking and financial 
activities side-by-side with conventional commercial banking businesses under the BCL of 
1966.
141
 It also regulates and supervises the cooperative insurance companies sector under the 
Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies of 2003, and its implementing 
regulations of 2004.
142
  
Article 1 of the Charter of SAMA stipulates that one of the objectives of SAMA is to regulate 
commercial banks and exchange dealers.
143
 The Charter does not mention Islamic banks or 
IFIs in its Articles. It is known that the Islamic financial industry was established in 1963,
144
 
while the Charter was issued by a Royal Decree No.23 dated 15/12/1957,
145
 which means that 
the Charter was established before the start of the Islamic financial industry. However, it was 
assumed that the Saudi government took into account Islamic banks, and Islamic banking and 
financial services, when it issued the Banking Control Law on 11/6/1966. 
There are a number of important functions of SAMA as the central bank of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. These functions include minting and issuing the national currency (the Saudi 
Riyal), in addition to strengthening the currency’s cover; supervising commercial banks and 
exchange dealers including IFIs; supervising cooperative insurance companies and the self-
employment professions relating to insurance activity; supervising finance companies; 
supervising credit information companies; managing the Kingdom’s foreign exchange 
reserves; promoting the growth of the financial system and ensuring its soundness; operating 
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a number of cross-bank electronic financial systems such as tadawul, SPAN, SARIE, 
MAQASA and SADAD.
146
 
2.6.2  The Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The CMA was established under Article 4 of the CML, issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 
dated 2 July 2003, to regulate and develop the capital markets activities in Saudi Arabia. The 
CMA is as an independent authority directly linked with the Prime Minister, and it has 
financial and administrative autonomy. It is governed by a board of five full-time members 
appointed by the King under Royal Decree.
147
  
The functions of the CMA are to regulate and develop the Saudi Capital Market by issuing 
the required regulations and rules for implementing the provisions of CML. In addition, the 
CMA regulates the issuance of Securities and monitors Securities and dealing in Securities 
including the issuance of sukuk. It also regulates and monitors the work and activities of 
parties subject to the control and supervision of the Authority.
148
  
The basic objectives of the CMA are to create an appropriate investment environment 
through issuing required rules and regulations, reinforcing the transparency and disclosure 
standards of all listed companies, boosting confidence, and protecting investors and dealers 
from illegal acts in the market.
149
 The CMA is empowered under Article 5 of the CML to 
issue the required rules and regulations to create a conducive environment for the growth of 
investment activities in Saudi Arabia.
150
  
2.7  Summary 
This chapter provided background information to the Saudi legal structure and Islamic 
banking and financial systems in Saudi Arabia. The chapter clarified exactly what is meant 
by Shariah as a constitution of Saudi Arabia, including the legal sources of Shariah, both the 
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primary sources such the Quran and Sunnah and the secondary sources such as Ijma and 
Qiyas. This section also covered the main Sunni schools (madhhab): the Hanafi School, the 
Maliki School, the Shafii School, and the Hanbali School which is applied by Saudi courts. 
This chapter covered the basic law of governance, and the basic laws of banking and financial 
activities in Saudi Arabia, such as the BCL, the CML, and the Law of Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies. Under these laws, SAMA regulates and supervises 
Islamic financial institutions that conduct banking and financial activities side-by-side with 
conventional commercial banking businesses. It also regulates and supervises the cooperative 
insurance companies sector in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the CMA regulates the issuance of 
Securities and monitors Securities and dealing in Securities including the issuance of sukuk. 
The next chapter will focus on explaining the nature and scope of Islamic finance, by giving 
an overview of its laws and practices. 
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CHAPTER THREE: AN OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on explaining the nature and scope of Islamic finance, while subsequent 
chapters will examine other systems, using a comparative approach. Islamic finance has 
experienced substantial and unexpected growth in recent years: 
151
 it is growing at a rate of 
15% per year.
152
 Currently, the circulating assets of Islamic finance are estimated to be the 
equivalent of US $ 1.4 trillion.
153
 There are more than 500 Islamic financial institutions 
operating in over 75 countries,
154
 including Western countries,
155
 which means it is one of the 
fastest growing financial sectors in the world, particularly in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries, due to the oil boom.
156
  
Islamic finance is a set of financial activities providing many tools and modes of financing 
and investment methods which have become an important part of global banking, and meet 
the needs of customers as they are compliant with Shariah.
157
  Islamic finance offers several 
products and financial activities that are compliant with Shariah, such as Mudaraba, 
Musharaka, Murabaha, Ijara, Bai' bithaman, Ajil, Bai' salam, Istisna', Qardh-al-hasan and 
Tawarruq.
158
 Islamic finance promotes the sharing of risks and profits between parties based 
on the purchase and sale of tangible assets such as real estate, known as Murabaha, which 
means that Islamic finance not only concentrates on the benefits, but provides banking 
services and the practice of finance and investment on the basis of prohibitions of interest 
(riba) in all transactions, as well as socio-economic justice.
159
  
In addition, Islamic banks and Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) have kept pace with 
modern technological developments, providing distinguished banking services and 
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developing methods and banking practices using the latest technology available in the 
world.
160
 
3.2  An Overview of Islamic Finance  
Islamic finance is based on Shariah, which is derived from the Holy Book (Quran), the 
sayings of the prophet Muhammed (Sunnah), the consensus among Muslim scholars (Ijma) 
and analogy (Qiyas).
161
 With the growth of Islam in the world, a need for financial contracts 
governed by Shariah has emerged;
162
 therefore, Islamic financing is growing in many places 
around the world, such as the Middle East, Southern Africa and East Asia. There are some 
countries which have fully Islamic banking systems, such as Sudan and Pakistan, while there 
are other countries, such as Indonesia, Bahrain, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and Malaysia, which 
operate mixed systems; for instance, having both Islamic and western banking systems 
together.
163
 Malaysia is considered the leading country in the area of Islamic finance. 
However, , in that country, Islamic banks operate side by side with conventional banks, and 
in the view of some researchers there is no significant difference between Islamic and 
conventional banking systems. This will be discussed later.
164
 The purpose of Islamic finance 
is to provide methods and forms of finance which conform to Shariah: “Islamic finance 
denotes financial activities that are compliant with Shariah”.165 Therefore, any activities not 
compatible with the provisions of Shariah are forbidden for Muslims.
166
 In the Quran, Allah 
mentions this in Surat An-Nisa, Verse No. 29:  
 
“O you who believe, consume not your goods between you wrongly, unlawfully 
according to the Law, through usury or usurpation, except it be trading (tijāratan, also 
read tijāratun), so that the goods be from trade effected, through mutual agreement, 
through mutual good-will: such [goods] you may consume. And kill not yourselves, 
by committing what leads towards destruction on account of some affiliation, be it in 
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this world or the Hereafter. Surely God is ever Merciful to you, when He forbids you 
such things”.167 
However, Islamic finance is not confined only to Muslims, but is in the interests of the 
community as a whole.  It is also not restricted to particular countries, but has spread in the 
world to include the Western world and especially in Europe such as in Switzerland, 
Luxembourg and Denmark, but the UK is the only European country where Islamic banking 
has become widely used.
168
 In 2008, there were more than 25 Islamic organisations offering 
Islamic products compliant with Shariah in the United Kingdom (UK). The UK is well on its 
way to becoming the largest Islamic financial centre.
169
 
Islamic finance is expanding outside Muslims countries to some non-Muslim countries 
around the world, some of which have granted Islamic banks licences to establish activities 
which comply with Shariah, and the United Kingdom is at the forefront. For instance ‘in 
August 2004, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) approved a banking 
license for the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the country’s first Islamic bank’.170 The first 
Islamic financial institution in Western countries was established in 1978 in Luxembourg. 
Nowadays, it is known as the Islamic Finance House.
171
 
3.3  The Definition of Islamic Finance 
Islamic finance has been defined and described by a number of researchers. According to 
Greuning and Iqbal, the Islamic financial system is founded on the absolute prohibition of the 
payment or receipt of any predetermined, guaranteed rate of return.
172
 This definition is very 
narrow because it focuses on the religious side more than other considerations such as 
economic and investment aspects. Islamic finance has become an international industry and 
has operated side by side with conventional banks either in Muslim or non-Muslim countries. 
In addition, Islamic finance includes more than banking, such as insurance companies, 
securities firms and mutual funds. Therefore, Islamic finance was not founded just to prohibit 
riba, but to offer Islamic alternatives to customers who wanted to receive them, whether they 
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were Muslims or non-Muslims, and currently it has become a financial industry that 
competes globally. 
Another definition, by Andreas Jobst, states that ‘Islamic finance is limited to financial 
relationships involving entrepreneurial investment subject to the moral prohibition of interest 
earnings or usury (riba) and money lending’.173 This definition focuses on the relationship 
between the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) and their customers, as well as on the 
prohibition of riba and lending. In addition to the religious aspects, there are several other 
important aspects, such as ethical and social aspects. Therefore, the prohibition of riba, 
money lending and the relationship between the institutions and their clients in Islamic 
finance are important, but the ultimate objective of Islamic finance is to enhance social 
justice and promotion of human welfare through a strong emphasis on the ethical and moral 
dimensions.
174
  
Siddiqui defines Islamic finance as being based on the principles that exclude interest (riba), 
do not possess major uncertainty (gharar) and do not have gambling-like features (maysir).
175
 
This definition focuses only on three principles of Islamic finance, while a unique feature of 
Islamic finance is profit-and-loss sharing (PLS).
176
  
The definition of Islamic finance adopted in this thesis is the one provided by Abd Jabbar 
,where he says that Islamic finance refers to the provision of financial services on a basis that 
is compliant with Shariah, or more specifically, with the principles and rules of Islamic 
commercial jurisprudence known as fiqh al-muamalat.
177
 This definition focuses on the legal 
aspects more than others. In addition, it determines the principles and rules of Islamic finance 
in general, while the previously mentioned definitions focus on specific principles such as the 
prohibition of riba, gharar and maysir.   
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3.4  The Beginning of Islamic Finance Contracts 
Muslims have been looking for permissible means through Shariah on finance and 
investment because they do not wish to deal with prohibited transactions that involve any 
haram, due to their Islamic environment.
178
  
Hence, the Islamic finance industry has emerged to achieve the desire of many Muslims and 
non-Muslims who wish to obtain such financing without interest. Non-Muslims can also take 
advantage of offers by Islamic banking, such as an Islamic lease or an Islamic stock option.
179
 
Islamic finance contracts were established in the life of the prophet Muhammed 1400 years 
ago.
180
 During that period, Prophet Muhammad taught the people that interest (riba), 
gambling (qimar\maisir) and uncertainty (gharar) are forbidden. He taught the people that 
they should return everything that was kept with them on trust to the original owners.
181
 
The modern experiment in Islamic finance was established in Egypt in 1963 and involved the 
creation of local savings banks. It was founded by Dr. Ahmed al-Najjar in the city of Mit 
Ghamer.
182
   
Before 1963, there were business transactions between people, but without an Islamic finance 
institution; for example, they did not practise usury because they believed that it was 
forbidden.
183
  
In 1973, the most important event in the history of Islamic finance took place, whereby a 
conference of finance ministers was held and they decided to establish the Islamic 
Development Bank, which opened in 1975 in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia.
184
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In 1975, the Dubai Bank opened and became the first Islamic institution to provide Islamic 
financing contracts.
185
 This was followed by many other Islamic banks, and now, even some 
conventional banks in America (such as Citibank) and in Europe (such as HSBC, Barclays 
and UBS Islamic) are playing a vital role in Islamic banking operations.
186
 
Although the Islamic finance is a fairly recent innovation (only four decades old), it has now 
reached the stage where it is meeting challenges and is in competition with other banking 
industries.
187
 
3.5  Distinguishing Features of Islamic Finance 
There are four distinguishing features of Islamic finance. One of the most important ones is 
the adherence to numerous Shariah-related principles in its contracts,
188
 which means that 
any financial returns must comply with Shariah.
189
 In addition, Islamic financial products 
must involve real assets, and in Shariah this is known as legitimising.
190
 However, the 
Islamic system respects other religions because socio-economic justice is central to the 
Islamic way of life.
191
 
Secondly, there is no interest in Islamic financial contracts, only interest-free loans (qard 
hasan).
192
 Interest-bearing contracts are replaced by return-bearing contracts, which often 
take the form of partnerships, whereas the conventional interest-based banking system is 
fixed in advance. This is a fundamental difference between the Islamic and conventional 
banking systems.
193
 Allah pronounces the following on interest in Surat Al-Baqarah: 
“Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one 
stands who is being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, "Trade is 
[just] like interest." But Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest. So 
whoever has received an admonition from his Lord and desists may have what is past, 
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and his affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in interest or usury] - 
those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein”.194 
The third feature is that Islamic finance is not purely commercial. It is multi-purpose and 
there are other considerations: religious, social, ethical and economic.
195
 It provides a range 
of activities not offered by traditional banks, such as the interest-free loan or Qard Hassan. 
This is often used in a charitable context, such as the payment of school fees, wedding costs, 
medical treatment and the purchase of land to build a home.
196
 For example, the bank lends 
someone £600 repayable within 6 months, but without interest. The Quran states in Surat Al-
Baqarah about the Qard Hassan:  
“Who is he that will lend God a loan, by expending his property in the way of God, 
that is good, by expending it for the sake of God, Mighty and Majestic, out of 
pureness of heart, and He will multiply (yudā‘if, also read yuda‘‘if) it for him 
manifold, up to ten or seven hundred times or more”.197 
The activity of the Zakat Fund: Zakat is the third of the five pillars of Islam. It means the 
giving of a specific share of one’s wealth to specific persons. The proceeds of zakat are only 
used for specific purposes under fixed headings – such as helping the poor. Allah mentions in 
the Quran persons who take the proceeds of Zakat.
198
 The Quran states in Surat At-Tawbah: 
“Zakat expenditures are only for the poor and for the needy and for those employed to 
collect [zakat] and for bringing hearts together [for Islam] and for freeing captives [or 
slaves] and for those in debt and for the cause of Allah and for the [stranded] traveler 
- an obligation [imposed] by Allah. And Allah is Knowing and Wise”199. 
Finally, Islamic finance is based on profit-and-loss sharing. This means that the lender bears 
the risk of a venture with the borrower because it is deemed that neither the lender nor the 
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borrower is in control of the success or failure of the venture. This is one of the most 
important distinguishing features between Islamic banking and conventional banking.
200
   
3.6  Islamic Finance Principles  
One of the Islamic commercial rules is freedom to engage in business and financial 
transactions. This is because The Quran states in the Holy Quran: “Allah has permitted 
trade”201 This means that everything is permissible unless it is stipulated by Shariah that it is 
forbidden. Islamic Jurisprudence in commercial transactions focuses on contracts, and 
specifically on what kind of contract is permissible or forbidden.
202
 For example, The Quran 
states after the previous verse: “That is because they say trade is just like interest. But Allah 
has permitted trade and has forbidden interest”.203 Islamic finance contracts are based on 
Shariah.
204
 The basic framework for Islamic finance is a set of rules which seek to develop 
practices that are commensurate with the progress of banking and also in accordance with the 
provisions of Shariah and must stay within the limits of Shariah in all of their deeds and 
actions.
205
 There are several principles in the system of commercial transactions, but the most 
important are the prohibition of riba, qimar or maisir, and gharar. All of these prohibitions 
are based on the rules of legitimacy.
206
  
3.6.1 Prohibition of Usury and Interest (Riba) 
Riba was not something new in the Arabian Peninsula, even at the advent of Islam; the 
system of riba already prevailed there and the entire economy was based on usury. At that 
time, the Quraysh ruled Mecca and controlled the trade, especially between Yemen and 
Syria.
207
 This was lodged as a guarantee and material evidence of a proof of contract.
208
  
The Quran and Hadith use the term riba, translated by Muslim jurists as interest or usury. So 
usury and interest are treated as synonyms for the Arabic word riba, but there are also some 
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other meanings, such as increase, growth, expansion and addition.
209
 Riba literally means 
“excess” and refers to any unjustifiable increase of capital whether through loans or sales.210 
There is also a definition of riba in jurisprudence: the increase over the original wealth 
without trading.
211 For example, riba is a loan with a condition attached that the borrower 
will return the loan to the lender with interest. 
3.6.1.1  Quranic verses that Mention the Prohibition of Usury (Riba): 
The Islamic view on the prohibition of usury and other forms of riba as practices which 
unfairly consume others’ wealth is very clear. The Quran explicitly states in many different 
verses that riba is a serious sin:  
First revelation: from Surah al- Rum: 
“Whatever you give for usury, for increase through the property of people, will not 
increase with Allah. But what you give in zakah, desiring the countenance of Allah - 
those are the multipliers”.212 
Second revelation: in Surah Al-Imran a clear verse prohibiting riba: 
“Oh you who believe, do not exact usury, doubled and multiplied, but fear Allah that 
you may be successful”.213  
Third revelation: from Surah al-Baqara: 
“Those who take riba will not stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands 
who is being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, "Trade is [just] 
like interest." But Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest. So whoever 
has received an admonition from his Lord and desists may have what is past, and his 
affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in interest or usury] - those are 
the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein”.214 
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“Allah deprives riba of all blessing but blesses charity; He loves not the ungrateful 
sinner”.215 
“Oh believers, fear Allah, and give up what is still due to you from riba if you are true 
believers”.216 
“If you do not do so, then take notice of war from Allah and His Messenger. But, if 
you repent, you can have your principal. Neither should you commit injustice nor 
should you be subjected to It”.217  
“And be fearful of the day when you shall be returned to Allah, then everybody shall 
be paid in full what he has earned and they shall not be wronged”.218 
3.6.1.2 A Hadith that Mentions the Concept of Usury (Riba): 
Prophet Muhammad has prohibited riba, whether paying, taking, charging or even acting as a 
witness, and he ordered Muslims to avoid all amounts arising out of usury.
219
 In the 
following, there are some Hadith of the holy Prophet Muhammad about the prohibition of 
riba. The relevant Hadith are:  
From Jabir (Gbpwh): The Prophet (pbuh) cursed the receiver and the payer of 
interest, the one who records it and the witnesses to the transaction, and said: “They 
are all alike in guilt”.220 
The Holy Prophet (pbuh) said: “Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, 
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt like for like, equal for equal, and 
hand to hand; if the commodities differ, then you may sell as you wish, provided that 
the exchange is hand to hand”.221 
It is reported that the Holy Prophet, on his last pilgrimage and in his last address, said, 
“Every form of interest (‘riba’) is cancelled; capital indeed is yours which you shall 
have. Wrong not, and you shall not be wronged.” God has given His injunctions that 
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interest is totally forbidden. I first start with (the amount of) interest (which people 
owe) to ‘Abbas and declare it all cancelled.222  
According to Abu Huraira the Prophet said, “Avoid the seven great destructive sins.” 
Then (the people) asked, “O Allah's Apostle, what are they?” He mentioned the worst 
seven things, and one of them was to eat up usury (riba).  223  
3.6.1.3  View of Islamic Scholars and Muslims about the Prohibition of Usury 
More importantly, there is no difference of opinion among Muslims about the prohibition of 
riba. The traditional view is that it is forbidden. This is because the primary sources of 
Shariah (the Quran and Sunnah) strongly forbid it
224
. Though some scholars say that riba is 
usury, while the majority of them view riba as interest,
225
 all of them are agreed that riba is 
prohibited, either its payment or its receipt, and also either as usury or as interest.
226
  
3.6.1.4 Prohibition of Riba in other Heavenly Religions 
In addition to riba being forbidden in the Islamic religion, it is also prohibited in all revealed 
religions such as Christianity and Judaism. In other words, riba had been forbidden by the 
Jewish and Christian traditions before the Islamic religion. There have never been two views 
about its prohibition in any of these religions.
227
 It can clearly be said that riba is prohibited 
by three heavenly religions.
228
  
3.6.1.5 Why has Shariah Prohibited Riba?  
There are some reasons why the Shariah has prohibited usury. These include the fact that 
usury brings many economic and social disadvantages, such as exploitation, unemployment, 
the spread of transactions that are not real, and a lack of investment.  However, the main 
reason for its prohibition is the achievement of justice; in the other words, to prevent injustice 
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caused by exploitation. Riba involves a transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich, turns 
people away from productive enterprise, encourages a tendency for wealth accumulation to 
be in fewer hands and leads to unjust enrichment, which means that people become selfish. It 
is necessary that those who have wealth should assist those without.
229
 Allah has warned of 
riba, and has also mentioned that usury is injustice, in Surah Al-Baqara from the holy Quran: 
“you who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains due to you of interest, if 
you should be believers and if you do not, then be informed of a war against you from 
Allah and his Messenger, but if you repent, and forgo it, you shall have your principal 
sums, the original amounts, not being unjust, by charging interest, and no injustice 
being done to you, by way of any diminution”.230 
3.6.1.6 The Main Types of Riba 
There are two kinds of usury (riba) in Shariah: riba an-Nasia and riba al-Fadl
231
; these will 
be explained in detail below.  
3.6.1.6.1  Riba an-Nasia (Excess of Delay) 
Riba an-Nasia is also called riba al-Qurudh or riba al-Quran, but Islamic scholars and jurists 
prefer to use the term riba al-Nasia.
232
 This kind of riba was practised in the pre-Islamic 
period in the Arabian Peninsula when it was known as Riba al-Jahiliyya. It was not forbidden 
at that time and was widespread during the time of prophet Muhammed. This kind of riba 
and the other type which will be discussed later are, however, both prohibited under Shariah, 
which strictly prohibits any loans or debts in which an increase accrues to the creditor, and 
also the charging of excess fees for late payments.
233
 Riba an-Nasia applies to loan 
transactions. It is a type of usury that arises due to an exchange not being immediate, with or 
without excess in one of the counter-values. It refers to an increase in the amount of a debt 
owing, due to a delay in payment of the debt or with the passage of time. Riba an-Nasia 
includes interest-based lending; compensation for lending; selling money for profit; or a 
predetermined payment for a loan, which may be a loan of money or a loan of goods, which 
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in modern times is known as money lending.
234
 An example of riba an-Nasia is where a 
creditor lends money to a debtor for a fixed period of time at a determined rate of interest to 
be paid monthly; usually this interest occurs through interest-bearing loans in conventional 
financial transactions.
235
  
In Islam, financial contracts which pay or receive interest are forbidden, so some banks use 
traditional Islamic products; for example, HSBC bank uses modes of Islamic finance such as  
Musharakah and Murabaha contracts.
236
 
Essentially, in Shariah, for a contract to be valid it is necessary for it to be free from interest, 
gambling and uncertainty, as will be explained later.
237
 Therefore, any contract which 
includes one or more of these might be void under the principles of Islamic finance. 
3.6.1.6.2 Riba al-Fadl (Excess of Surplus) 
This type of usury occurs with the payment of an addition by the debtor to the creditor in 
exchange for commodities of the same kind, or the exchange of low quality for better quality 
commodities.
238
 The prophet Muhammed prohibited riba al-Fadl when he said:  “Gold for 
gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, equal for equal, and 
hand to hand; if the commodities differ, then you may sell as you wish.”239 This statement by 
the prophet prohibited riba al-Fadi, especially for the commodities specified above, and also 
salt for salt.   
Riba al-Fadl was prohibited because it could be used as a subterfuge for riba-al-Nasia, and 
the prohibition prevents circumvention of the Shariah as well as risk and uncertainty. Thus in 
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order to avoid this type of riba, the exchange of goods from both sides must be equal and 
instant.
240
 
Overall, there is not a great distance between riba an-Nasia and riba al-Fadl; in fact they are 
almost identical except that riba an-Nasia relates to loan transactions and riba al-Fadl relates 
to exchange transactions. The riba an-Nasia type of usury was used before riba al-Fadl, 
especially in the pre-Islam age. The most important aspect to note is that all modern 
conventional banking transactions fall under the purview of riba an-Nasia because all loan 
transactions in conventional banks carry interest.
241
 
3.6.2  Prohibition of Gambling (Qimar/Maisir) 
Gambling is the wagering of money or something which is gained by games of chance.
242
 It 
refers to easily available wealth. The words Qimar and Maisir are used for this in Arabic 
terminology. Gambling is forbidden by the ethical framework governing Islamic finance.
243
 
There is evidence from the Quranic verses which prohibits gains made from gambling.
244
 For 
example, in Surah al-Baqara Allah says: 
“They ask you about wine and gambling. Say, in them is great sin and yet, some 
benefit for people. But their sin is greater than their benefit”.245  
This prohibition of gambling means that a contract is void if it has an element of qimar or 
maisir because “it involves speculation and an attempt to amass wealth without putting [in] 
any productive effort”.246  In general, as mentioned, Shariah prohibits usury, uncertainty and 
gambling; therefore, gambling is forbidden in Islamic finance products and can affect the 
validity of the contract if it occurs. In Islam, commercial contracts have great importance and  
are mentioned in the Quran many times, using the word Uqud. The word Uqud is an Arabic 
word which literally means “obligation”. Islamic scholars have used Uqud in Islamic 
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contracts.
247
 In the first verse of the Surah Al-Maidah, Allah says: “O you who have believed, 
fulfill all contracts either between you and God and or between you and other people.”248  In 
Shariah, there are seven kinds of contracts,
249
 and these types will be discussed in terms of 
the forms and modes of Islamic finance. 
3.6.3  Prohibition of Uncertainty (Gharar) 
The third major prohibition is gharar. Gharar refers to uncertainty and risk-taking. It means 
“stake” or “chance”, and literally means “hazard”250. It is a type of sale in which uncertainty 
is included, such as the sale of birds or fish before they are caught.
251
 Mustafa Al-Zarqa 
defined gharar as “the sale of probable items whose existence or characteristics are not 
certain, the risky nature of which makes the transaction akin to gambling”. 252 There should 
not be any type of ambiguity that gives rise to speculation and if there are any kinds of 
uncertainty, ambiguity or non-disclosure about a subject matter in a contract, the contract is 
void.
253
 
Gharar is forbidden in Islamic finance contracts.
254
 Games of chance are forbidden by the 
Holy Quran in Surah Al-Maidah, verses 90-91. In addition, the Prophet Muhammed 
prohibited sales through fraudulent means or gharar sales.
255
 Some of examples of 
uncertainty or gharar include:  
1. Making a contract conditional on an unknown period or event. 
2. Selling commodities or goods which the seller is unable to deliver. 
3. Selling commodities on the basis of fraud or incorrect descriptions. 
4. Transferring or assigning a debt without recourse to the seller. 
5. Two sales in one contract where there is a sale and condition together.256 
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In order to avoid gharar in Islamic finance contracts, the contracts should be free from 
excessive uncertainty and the commodity must be defined, deliverable, clearly known to the 
contracting parties and determined.
257
  
3.7  Forms and Modes of Islamic Financing Contracts 
In Islam, there are various contracts (Aqd), such as financial contracts, exchange contracts, 
and contracts pertaining to work. What does Aqd mean in Shariah? Murshid al-Hayran 
defined an Islamic contract (Aqd) as “the conjunction of an offer emanating from one of the 
two contracting parties with the acceptance by the other in a manner that affects the subject 
matter of the contract”.258  
A basic rule of Shariah is that all contracts are respected. Muslims must respect all contracts, 
whether between themselves or between Muslims and non-Muslims. Allah mentions this in 
many places in the Quranic verses, such as in Surat Al-Maidah, Allah says: “O you who have 
believed, fulfil [all] contracts”.259  
In general, contracts are divided into oral and written ones. Oral contracts are those that are 
verbal, not written, while written contracts consist of an agreement presented on a 
handwritten document that has been signed by both the borrower and the lender.
260
 
In Islam, the written contracts are legally binding and easier to enforce than oral contracts. 
The Quran states in Surat Al-Baqarah in the Holy Quran in verse 282: “O you who have 
believed, when you contract a debt for a specified term, write it down. And let a scribe write 
[it] between you in justice”.261  Moreover, Prophet Muhammad wrote contracts and respected 
them.
262
 
In Shariah, there are some essential elements or conditions in order to establish a valid 
contract agreement under Shariah, between either two or more persons. Some of these 
conditions are: 
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1. Offer and acceptance in the contract: An offer is an expression of willingness 
to contract, while acceptance occurs after that. It is important to mention that 
the offer and acceptance must be made in the same meeting and not be 
conditional upon some other factor because a conditional contract is invalid in 
Shariah.  
2. An offer and acceptance must be together in the contract agreement meeting 
and also be made in clear and decisive language.  
3. The subject matter and fundamental components must be lawful.  
4. The contracting parties must have the ability to execute the terms of the 
contract.
263
  
Therefore, Aqd is a combination of an offer and acceptance and it is applied in every act, such 
as in an agency, mortgage, lease, remission of debt, or sale. 
Indeed, the most crucial point of Islamic finance is Aqd (the contract). This is because 
everyone, whether a customer or a bank, needs to conclude a contract in all banking 
transactions, deposit facilities and financing facilities, where such contracts are introduced by 
Islamic banks. Examples, which will be discussed later, include Mudaraba, Musharaka, 
Murabaha, Ijara, Bai bithaman ajil, Bai salam, Istisna, Qardh-al-hasan, Hawala and 
Tawarruq contracts.
264
 
Generally, in Shariah, there are two types of contracts, in relation to validity and legality: 
valid (Sahih) and invalid (Fasid). The validity of any contract in Shariah depends on the 
legality or illegality of its fundamental components (Asl) and subject matter; therefore, it is 
important to mention that all Islamic finance contracts must be in accordance with Shariah in 
order to be valid from a legal standpoint. For example, the majority of Islamic schools 
believe that usury (Riba) and uncertainty (Gharar) are causes of invalidity of a contract.
265
 
Finally, the most important factor in Islamic contracts is that all contracts are valid, except 
what is forbidden in the Quran or Sunnah, or Shariah Board, such as the prohibition of usury, 
which is forbidden in the Quran and also in the Sunnah, so any contracts that include usury 
will be invalid for the reasons stated earlier. 
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3.7.1  Islamic Financing Contracts 
Islamic finance is a set of a unique form of financial contracts such as murabaha, ijara, 
salam, istisnaa, mudaraba and musharaka, which are compatible with the provisions of 
Shariah and its principles.
266
 The most important aims of Islamic finance are socio-economic 
justice and distributive justice, which are free from exploitation of any kind. These are 
important not only from the Islamic point of view, but in all religions.
267
 
In general, Islamic finance contracts are based on the themes of community banking, socially 
responsible investing, and ethical finance, which define the levels of what is permissible or 
forbidden, so can clearly be said that there is a strong relationship between financial ethics 
and Shariah principles. What are financial ethics? Elmelki and Ben Arab define the term as: 
“the branch of Ethics that examines ethical rules and principles within the financial context’, 
and states that ‘financial ethics is a normative discipline, whereby particular ethical standards 
are formulated and then applied”.268 
As mentioned before, riba (interest) is not allowed by Islamic banking, so it is important to 
offer an alternative. Islamic banking offers two types of financial contracts: contracts which 
deal with asset-based financing, such as murabaha, salam, istisna and al-ijarah, and business 
contracts which are based on partnership, such as musharaka and mudarabah.
269
  
Following this introduction, the majority of Islamic finance contracts will be explained, the 
first of which is Murabaha.  
3.7.1.1 Murabaha (Trade with Mark up or Cost Plus Sale)  
The word murabaha in Arabic literally means profit and refers to the sale of a commodity at 
a price that includes a predetermined profit known by both parties. In murabaha, it is 
important that both parties agree to the sale of an asset, either a movable or immovable one, 
at the original cost plus profit. A murabaha contract is the most popular contract used in 
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Islamic financing, about 59% of all the value of Islamic banking products.
270
 This is because 
murabaha is less risky than other financial contracts, such as musharaka and mudaraba, and 
the period of time for payment is agreed in advance between the seller and the buyer. 
Murabaha is based on the principle of incremental cost or cost plus profit of sale.
271
 For 
example, a bank purchases commodities and after that the bank resells them to a buyer at a 
cost plus profit, as agreed between both parties. In other words, if the cost price of a 
commodity equals £800 and the profit margin equals £300, the murabaha price equals £1100.
 
Therefore, it is possible to say that murabaha is divided into two main types: cash murabaha 
and credit murabaha.
272
    
 
Regarding the parties involved, there are three parties in murabaha contracts: the seller or 
receiving party (the Islamic bank) who buys a commodity; the buyer or ordering party (the 
customer of the Islamic bank) who wishes to buy commodities from the seller; and the 
provider or facilitator, between the seller and the buyer.
273
 
This model is called murabaha to the purchase order. After Figure 3.1, the steps in the 
murabaha will be explained. 
Figure 3.1: Overview of the parties in a Murabaha  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The steps in the process of murabaha sale are as follows: 
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The client applies to the Islamic bank requesting murabaha finance, and this request must 
include a certain commodity with a specified price and details. An agreement between two 
parties is signed by the Islamic bank and the client, who enter into a murabaha contract. This 
agreement is not, however, considered the main financing agreement. The client promises the 
bank they will purchase a commodity which they have requested when applying. This type of 
non-binding promise may cause risks in murabaha financing, and these will be discussed 
later. After that, the Islamic bank studies the feasibility of the client’s request and carries out 
a risk assessment as well. In the case of approval, the bank buys the item required from the 
supplier. After the commodity is purchased and possessed by the Islamic bank, it sells it to 
the client as a deferred sale on an agreed-upon price and the client has the right to accept the 
offer or decline it. If the client accepts it, both parties sign the final murabaha contract. The 
delivery of the commodity to the customer takes place, either from the bank or the supplier. It 
is important that the goods are free from defects and delivered within the agreed time. The 
payment of the murabaha price is made by the client on the agreed date, either in one 
transaction or by instalments.
274
 
To highlight the above, an example of murabaha finance follows. If the client (A) wishes to 
buy a car from the Islamic bank (B), first of all, A and B sign an agreement to enter into a 
murabaha sale and this agreement is a primary contract and non-binding. Then A should 
apply to B requesting a car and it is important for A to give B all the specifications and 
details for the car, and B gives a serious promise to purchase the car for which A has given 
the details. After that, if the car is available from B, this means that A and B do not need to 
use a third party supplier (C), otherwise B buys it from C. After the car is bought and 
possessed by B, a final contract between A and B is signed for the agreed price plus a mark-
up, and the payment method is either made in one transaction or in instalments. Finally, A 
receives the car from B. It might be the case that A agrees with C directly and B is only an 
intermediary between them. This method of sale is called murabaha finance.
275
 This type of 
contract is the one most commonly applied in Islamic banks, although there are several types 
of Islamic financing contracts, because murabaha entails less risk than the others. 
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Figure 3.2: Procedures of the murabaha contract 
               
                 Beginning of the procedures          Executor of the procedures       Name of the procedures 
 
 
 Client                              Request  
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Source: Murabaha Financing as Carried out by Islamic Banks between Theory and Practice (2003) 
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Generally, the murabaha contract is permitted by Shariah, because it is a kind of a sale and 
the sale is permitted by the Quranic verses. Allah mentions in Surah Al-Baqara: “Allah has 
permitted trade and has forbidden interest”.276 In Islamic jurisprudence, the sale is an 
exchange of one thing with another thing and both are valued. Therefore, a murabaha 
contract is permitted by Shariah, but its steps must adhere to the Shariah sources, either the 
primary sources of the Quran and Sunnah, or the secondary sources of Ijma and Qiyas.  
There are specific conditions for a murabaha contract, as follows: 
1. The conventional condition is that all activities of murabaha must be compliant with 
Shariah.  
2. The goods must be described and defined and should be real, though not necessarily 
tangible. 
3. The price of the goods and the amount of the seller’s mark-up must be known and 
agreed to by both parties at the time of contracting.  
4. The Islamic bank (seller) is responsible for any damage to the goods before delivery 
to the buyer. 
5. The Islamic bank (seller) must own and possess the goods before reselling them to the 
buyer. 
6. The Islamic bank should add a profit before selling the commodity to the client, in 
order for the contract to be on a cost plus mark-up basis.  
7. The seller must explain all the flaws in the commodities and all aspects relating to the 
commodities, any defects or additional benefits, and the mode of payment to the 
original seller/provider. 
8. The profit should be added by the seller before selling the commodity to the client, in 
order for the contract to become a murabaha one. This involves the original price and 
profit, which was added for the risk and the duration of the repayment.
277
    
Finally, murabaha has been applied in Islamic banks since 1970 and is known as murabaha 
to the purchase orderer.  It is the most commonly practised model in Islamic banks, and is 
permitted by all Sunni schools. As mentioned earlier, the murabaha contract must be between 
two parties or more and it is important to agree on the price and payment method. There are 
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three options for paying the murabaha price: all at once, in instalments, and partly at once 
and partly in instalments. A murabaha contract is not a loan, it is a type of sale, and usually, 
the price of murabaha is a deferred payment.  
There is an issue about compensation. If an Islamic bank buys a commodity for a client after 
the client has promised to buy it, and then the client refuses to buy it, the Islamic bank can 
sell the commodity to someone else and the client pays the difference in price which was lost 
by the bank. Through murabaha, Islamic banks may become involved in the trading of 
goods,  which is a prohibited field for conventional banks.
278
 
3.7.1.2  Musharaka (Partnership or Joint Venture)  
The literal meaning of the word musharaka is ‘sharing’, and it refers to Islamic financing 
contracts which are used by Islamic banks.
279
 Musharaka is a contract whereby the Islamic 
bank and a client agree to combine their financial resources for the establishment or running 
of a business or project, or for undertaking any kind of business activities.
280
 A musharaka 
contract involves a partnership between two parties or more, and it is based on capital at 
work.
281
 Musharaka and mudarabah are very similar in terms of a profit sharing agreement, 
so any profit or loss from the project is shared between the partnership parties.
282
 A 
musharaka contract is not as popular as other Islamic financing contracts,
283
 but it is 
considered one of the most authentic models in Shariah and there are many theoretical forms 
of Islamic banking based on a musharaka contract.
284
 Such a contract is permitted by both the 
Quran and Sunnah and its principles are derived from Shariah. The Quran states in the holy 
Quran: “A lot of partners in business oppress one another, except those who believe and do 
righteous good deeds, and they are few”.285 Evidence of the legality of musharaka from the 
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Sunnah is: In Hadith Qudsi, it was narrated by Abu Huraira that the Prophet Muhammad 
reported that Allah says: 
“I am the third between two partners, as long as they do not betray each other; where 
one of the two betrays the other, I turn against (leave) them’. And Prophet 
Muhammad said: ‘The Hand blessing of Allah is on two partners’ parties as long as 
they do not betray each other”.286  
There are two basic categories of musharaka which can be summarised in the following 
points:
287
 
1. Sharika mulk (property partnership): This means a partnership based on joint 
ownership between two persons or more of a particular property.
288
 
2. Sharika aqd (contractual partnership): This means a partnership based on a 
contractual relationship and profits to be shared, such as a joint commercial 
enterprise.
289
 This kind of musharaka involves five subdivisions: 
i. Sharika al Mufawadah (full authority and obligation or universal partnership): 
This kind of contract refers to sharing everything on an equal basis. It is a 
limited partnership in equal capital contributions, responsibility, and full 
authority on behalf of others.
290
 
ii. Sharikat al-Inan (restricted authority and obligation): This means a limited 
partnership with unequal capital contributions. There is not a share of equal 
responsibility between the partners of Sharikat al-Inan.
291
 It is considered the 
most used type of musharaka in Islamic banking.
292
 
iii. Sharikah al-wujuh (partnership in creditworthiness): A partnership based on 
the creditworthiness of one or both parties in which the ratio of profit and loss 
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is based on the liability borne;
293
 for example, joint credit purchase of 
particular goods and sale at a profit.
294
 
iv. Sharikat al-Abdan (also known as Sharikat al-Taqafful and Sharikat al-mal) 
(partnership in labour or crafts): It means that two persons become partners in 
one company and this company is based on the contribution of human efforts 
and capital;
295
 for example, the partnerships between teachers, medical 
practitioners and transport owners.
296
 
v. Sharikat al-mudaraba (labour partnership): This means an agreement between 
two parties to do business, whereby one of them provides capital and another 
party labour with the objective of making a profit, and it is based on a 
partner’s experience or his skills.297 This type of musharaka contract is 
mentioned in the Holy Quran in Surat Al-Muzzammil: “others travelling 
through the land, seeking of Allah's Bounty”.298 
There are some basic rules of musharaka, which should be fulfilled by both parties. They 
include the following:  
Capability of partners: They must be able to enter into a contract, and also be sane and 
mature. Overall, in a musharaka contract, the liability for both partners is normally 
unlimited.
299
 The contract must take place with the free consent of the parties and without 
deception, duress or misrepresentation.
300
  
Distribution of profit: The main principles of musharaka are profit and loss, and these are 
shared between both parties. In a musharaka contract, it is important to determine the ratio of 
profit for each partner.
301
 Most of the Muslim jurists believe that profits should be distributed 
among the partners in business on the basis of proportions settled by them in advance. Thus 
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in terms of determining the percentage of profits between the partners, it is necessary for 
them to be determined in advance.
302
 
Rules relating to musharaka capital: According to the majority of Muslim jurists, the capital 
invested by each partner must be in the form of liquid assets.
303
 In this respect, it is important 
to mention that the contract of musharaka is based only on money. This means that goods or 
commodities are not allowed in a musharaka contract. However, Imam Malik, who is the 
owner of the second school of Sunna, holds a different view. He said: ‘The liquidity of capital 
is not a condition for the validity of the musharaka contract. That means that commodities are 
permissible in musharaka’.304 
Mutual relationships among partners and musharaka management rules: According to the 
management of business, in a musharaka contract every partner enjoys equal rights in all 
respects and both partners have a right to participate and work; that means that both partners 
may be involved in the management of the business. However, in other contracts, such as 
mudaraba, the owner of capital cannot participate, and in Islamic jurisprudence this is known 
as rabb-ul-mal.
305
 The partners may appoint a managing partner by mutual consent and they 
might agree in advance that one party is a sleeping partner.
306
 
Treatment of profit and loss: In Shariah, it is an essential aspect in a partnership that profit 
and loss are shared between both partners. According to two Islamic schools (Hannifi and 
Hanbali), the ratio of distribution of profit must be agreed upon at the time, otherwise the 
contract will be not valid in Shariah.
 
Regarding profit and loss, there are some rules relating 
to them, one of which is that the basis or ratio should be decided at the beginning of the 
partnership as a sharing profit and allocated in percentages. In the case of loss, both partners 
will have to share the loss in proportion.
307
 
Finally, musharaka involves a mutual contract between two or more parties to participate in 
commercial activities. Musharaka is similar to a mudarabah contract, although there are 
differences between them, which will be discussed after explaining the mudarabah one. 
Profits and losses are shared between both partners, and either or both can undertake the 
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management of the project.  Musharaka involves a venture of limited duration. If any one of 
the partners wishes to terminate the musharaka, while the other partner or partners wish to 
continue with the business, this purpose can be achieved by mutual agreement. There are two 
basic categories of musharaka: Sharika mulk and Sharika aqd. 
3.7.1.3  Mudarabah (Profit and Loss Sharing) 
Mudarabah is a special type of partnership and a kind of Islamic financing contract. A 
mudarabah contract is trust-financing, equity-sharing, trustee profit-sharing and a sleeping 
partnership.
308
 It is based on the principles of profit-loss-sharing. It is an agreement between 
two partners, or more than two: the Islamic bank or a capital provider and an entrepreneur, 
whereby the provider gives money to another for investing in a commercial enterprise. The 
investment comes from the provider, called in Islamic Fiqh books rabb-ul-mal, while the 
management and work is the exclusive responsibility of the other, who is called the mudarib.
 
The mudarib contributes his labour and expertise, while the provider or investor contributes 
his money to investing it in commercial activities that are consistent with the principles of 
Shariah.
309
  A mudarabah contract, like other Islamic financing contracts, is a lawful item of 
trade, so it comes under Shariah and Shariah principles. Therefore there are some cases that 
can make the mudarabah contract void, such as trade in swine or wine.
310
 
The Quran, Sunnah and the consensus permit a mudarabah contract. According to the Quran, 
Allah has permitted mudarabah in many verses of the Holy Quran, as for example in this 
verse in Surat Al-Muzzammil: “others travel through the land, seeking of Allah's Bounty or 
seeking grace of Allah”.311 It is clear from this Quranic verse that such a contract is 
permitted.
312
 Regarding the permission of mudarabah from the Sunnah side, there are a 
number of sayings of the holy Prophet Muhammed about mudarabah as follows: 
Mudarabah contracts offered by the Prophet’s uncle were approved by the Prophet.313 
Abu Musa wanted to remit public money to the Bayt al Mal. He gave the amount to 
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Abdullah bin Umar and his brother, who traded with it. The Caliph’s assembly treated 
it as an ex post facto Mudarabah and took half of the profits earned by the two 
brothers, because the public money in their hands was not the loan.
314
 Caliph Umar 
also used to invest orphans’ property on the basis of mudarabah.315  
There is no difference of view among Islamic jurists about the legitimacy of mudarabah, 
because people might need for this contract either providers of the capital or entrepreneurs. It 
is desirable for the provider to find a person who has good experience to manage the project 
and for an entrepreneur who uses his skills and expertise to invest the capital as agreed.
316
 
According to some studies, there are those who say that there is no difference between a 
mudarabah contract and conventional banking, and this similarity lies in the cost of 
capital.
317
 The importance of this section is that the similarity between mudarabah and 
musharaka involves partnership arrangements, but there are differences between them that 
can be summarised in the following points:  
1. In musharakha all partners invest, while in mudarabah the investment comes from 
rabb-ul-mal.
318
 
2. In a musharaka contract, the partnership is in the profit and also the capital, while the 
partnership in mudarabah is in the profit but not in the capital.
319
 
3. In musharaka, all parties can participate or intervene in the management of the 
business and work for it, while in mudarabah the provider (rab-ul-maal) does not 
participate or intervene in the management of the business or in the daily operations 
of the project.
320
 
4. In musharaka, the profit and loss are shared between the financer and the entrepreneur 
according to the agreed ratio, while in mudarabah the owner of the capital only 
suffers the loss and the entrepreneur loses his provision of labour or his already 
expended labour.
321
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5. In musharaka, the liability of the partners is unlimited, while in mudarabah the 
liability of the provider (rabb-ul-mal) is limited to his investment, unless he has 
permitted the entrepreneur to incur debts on his behalf.
322
 
6. In musharaka, the capital is a joint pool between all the partners, while in mudarabah 
the entrepreneur (mudarib) can earn his share in the profit only, not in the capital, 
because the financer owns the capital.
323
  
Overall, mudarabah is an investment partnership between two or more parties. The first 
partner is called the financer and the second partner is called the entrepreneur, whereby the 
financer provides capital to the entrepreneur to invest it in a business activity. The 
mudarabah contract is based on Shariah principles, but is not limited to Islamic banking. It is 
necessary for the legality of a mudarabah contract that all parties agree on a definite 
proportion of the actual profit at the beginning of the contract. The profit might be equally 
shared between the parties and they can allocate different proportions between them as 
agreed. The original price and the profit should be made known to the second buyer and the 
first buyer must own and possess the goods before he sells them to the second buyer.
324
 
3.7.1.4 Ijara (Leasing Contract)  
Ijarah is a contract under Shariah principles, so it is permitted by Islamic jurists. It is an 
agreement between two parties: the first one is a financial institution or lessor and the second 
is the lessee.
325
 In Arabic terms, the lessor is called mujir, the lessee is called mustajir and the 
rent is called Ijarah.
326
 The Ijarah contract is very similar to an operating leasing contract.
327
 
The Ijarah contract is one of the Islamic financing contracts, which are applied in Islamic 
banks, whereby the Islamic bank buys the asset from the seller, after which the Islamic bank 
rents it to the buyer at an agreed price plus profit for a certain period at a fixed rental 
charge.
328
 The figure below shows how Ijarah works, presenting the steps of Ijarah between 
the bank and supplier and the end of the proceeding notes the lessee (mustajir). 
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Figure 3.3:  How does Ijarah work   
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Source: Islamic Financial Services (2005) 
The term Ijarah in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is used for two different situations and can be 
summarised in the following points: 
The first kind of Ijarah relates to services provided by people. Ijarah means to employ the 
services of a person: a salary is paid to him for his hired services and for agreed 
considerations between the lessor (mujir) and the lessee (mustajir).
329
 There are many 
Quranic verses about this type. For example, Allah mentions the Ijarah, when he explains the 
story between the Prophet Moses and Prophet Shuaib in the Holy Quran in Surat Al-Qasas: 
“Then one of the two women came to him walking with shyness. She said, "Indeed, my 
father invites you that he may reward you for having watered for us". After that, she said: 
"O my father, hire him. Indeed, the best one you can hire is the strong and the 
trustworthy". Then, the Prophet Shuaib asked Prophet Moses: He said, "Indeed, I wish to 
wed you one of these, my two daughters, on [the condition] that you serve me for eight 
years”.330 
The ijarah from Sunnah states that the Prophet Muhammed said: Pay to the worker or the 
lessee (mustajir) his wages before his sweat has dried. In addition, The Prophet also said that 
there are three people who will find him on the Day of Judgement as their enemy. One of 
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these three is: “The man who employs a worker on wages, then takes the full measure of 
work from him, but does not pay him his wages”.331 
The second type of Ijarah contract is related to assets. In this case, Ijarah means selling the 
benefit to transfer the usufruct of a particular property to another person in exchange for a 
fixed price or wage from the lessee (mustajir).
332
 In this kind of Ijarah, it is important to be 
clear that the rules of Ijarah are similar to the rules of sales, because both contracts involve 
transfer of some assets or properties to another.
333
 
In order for an Ijarah contract to be valid, a number of general conditions must be present: 
1. The contract of Ijarah must be capable of being fulfilled and performed.334 
2. The usufruct of the goods should have value. 335 
3. The contracted goods must be lawful according to Shariah. Otherwise, it will be 
unlawful or Haram.
336
 
4. The lessor must be able to deliver the contracted goods on the agreed date and have 
full possession.
337
 
5. The lessor should hand the contracted goods to the lessee as per the agreed 
conditions.
338
  
6. The lessee (mustajir) should be capable of undertaking the job and be physically fit as 
well.
339
 
7. The rent must be specifically fixed for the contracted goods. 
8.  The subject of Ijarah should be specifically known and identified to the lessee 
(mustajir).
340
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After these conditions, it is possible to say that the basic elements of Ijarah are the parties 
(lessor and the lessee), subject matter, rent and period of time.  
There are those who say that Ijarah is similar to conventional leasing while others say there 
are some differences. All opinions will be discussed later in the assignment.
341
 
3.7.1.5  Bai Bithaman ajil (Deferred Payment Sale, Credit Sale) 
Bai bithaman ajil is a contract between two parties. It is a type of Islamic financing contract 
and closely related to the murabaha one. Bai bithaman ajil refers to the sale of goods and 
purchase transaction on a deferred payment basis in a pre-agreed payment period, whereby 
the delivery of goods is immediate and the payment is deferred.
342
 More precisely, many 
people cannot afford to purchase a house on a cash basis; therefore, they will buy the house 
from an Islamic bank and the payment is deferred on credit, and is usually payable by 
monthly instalments.
343
 This contract is used for real property, vehicles, houses and the 
financing of other client goods.
344
 Technically, this contract is based on the activities of 
selling and buying.
345
  
From a legal aspect, bai bithaman ajil is permitted by Shariah because it is a sale, not a loan, 
and the Quran permits the sale. The Quran states in the Holy Quran in Surah Al-Baqara: 
“Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest”.346 Hence, in Islamic principles, profit 
from sale is lawful, while profit from loans, such as usury (riba) is unlawful. In this regard, 
Islamic jurists allow profit in bai bithaman ajil due to deferred payment.
347
 Overall, bai 
bithaman ajil works according to the principles of Shariah and its practical application.
348
 
This contract is known in Islamic jurisprudence as (Fiqh) bai bithaman ajil, while in 
conventional financing it is called a contract of loan between the bank and the client.
349
 
                                                 
341
 Brian Kettell, Islamic Finance in a Nutshell: a Guide for Non-Specialists  (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2010) 55. 
342
 Hij Siti Faridah Abd Jabbar, ‘Sharia-compliant financial instruments: principles and practice’, Company 
Lawyer (2009) 30 (1) 7.  
343
 Saiful Rosly, Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Financial Markets: Islamic Economics, Banking and 
Finance, Investments, Takaful and Financial Planning (Author House 2005) 87. 
344
 Beng Soon Chong & Ming-Hua Liu, ‘Islamic banking: interest-free or interest-based’, Science Direct (2009) 
17 (1)  129.         
345
 Mohd Nasir bin Mohd Yatim, ‘A review on conflicting issues in a deferred payment sale product of a 
Shari’Ah-compliant banking business’, International Journal of Economics and Finance (2009) 1 (2) 256. 
346
 See verse 275 of Surah 2 of the Holy Quran. 
347
 Anjum Siddiqui, ‘Financial contracts: risk and performance of Islamic banking’, Managerial Finance (2008) 
34 (10)  682.  
348
 Saiful Rosly, Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Financial Markets: Islamic Economics, Banking and 
Finance, Investments, Takaful and Financial Planning (Author House 2005) 88.  
349
 Ibid. 
63 
 
Theoretically, there are similarities between bai bithaman ajil (deferred payment sale, credit 
sale) and conventional financing. Two financial systems will be discussed in Chapter four to 
clarify the similarities and differences between the two systems. 
Bai bithaman ajil essentially involves three separate agreements. The first agreement details 
the asset to be acquired and these details are identified by the customer. The second 
agreement applies to when the Islamic bank sells the asset to the customer (buyer). The third  
applies to when the Islamic bank can sell the property in the event of failure to pay by the 
customer.
350
 The figure below depicts the structure of bai bithaman ajil financing. 
Figure 3.4: The Structure of Bai’ Bithaman Ajil (BBA) Financing 
 
 
  
  
 
                                                                                              
 
 
 
Source: Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Financial Markets: Islamic Economics, Banking and 
Finance, Investments, Takaful and Financial Planning (2005) 
 
What are the mechanics of bai bithaman ajil financing?  
1. Client identifies the asset that is to be acquired.  
2. Islamic bank determines the financing period and nature of repayment;. 
3. Islamic bank purchases the assets from the owner on cash basis. 
4. Islamic bank subsequently sells the asset/property to the customer at the original price 
plus the profit margin for a specific period. 
5. Client repays the bank by instalments within the financing period.351 
BBA is very similar to murabaha. However, there are some differences between them; for 
example, in BBA the customer pays for the asset/property on the basis of instalments and the 
Islamic bank does not need to disclose its profit margin to the customer, while in murabaha it 
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is different as the payment might be made all at once or in instalments and the customer is 
informed of the Islamic bank’s profit margin.352 
3.7.1.6  Bai Salam (Forward Selling)  
Bai salam is a contract that is based on a forward sale concept.
353
 Literally, it refers to the 
future. Technically, a bai salam contract refers to an agreement between the Islamic bank 
(seller) and the customer (buyer) whereby the Islamic bank undertakes to supply specific 
goods to the buyer at a future date in exchange for an advanced price fully paid at the time of 
the contract.
354
 In this contract, the price is paid in advance and the supply of goods is 
deferred, while in other contracts such as istisna and murabaha it may be paid in cash or by 
instalments.
355
 The objects of this contract are commodities or goods and cannot be gold, 
silver or currencies. Bai salam is offered by Islamic banking and is one of the important 
contracts applied in Islamic banks, because it is mostly used for the trading of farming 
activities.
356
 In other words, it is applied to agricultural products and to fungible 
manufactured goods.
357
 Therefore, it is used for primary contracts of exchange in Islamic 
commercial law. Legitimately, it is permitted by both the Quran and Sunnah. In the Quran, 
Allah says:  
“O you who believe, when you deal with each other in transactions involving future 
obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing”.358 
In the Hadith both Muslims and Bukhari report that Ibn Abbas says that when the Prophet 
Muhammed came to Madinah,
359
 they were paying one or two years in advance for fruits and 
the prophet says:  
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“Those who pay in advance for anything must do so for a specified measure and 
weight and for a specified time”.360   
There are some mandatory conditions of bai salam, which can be summarised in the 
following points.  
1. In bai salam, it is necessary for the validity of the contract that the buyer pays the 
price in full in advance to the seller at the time of effecting the contract; otherwise the 
contract will be void.
361
 
2. The object of exchange must be fungible, of quality and clearly defined physically 
and quantitatively as to the size, volume and colour.
362
  
3. Bai salam only deals with goods as long as the goods are fungible. Gold and silver are 
not allowed in this contract, because these are regarded as monetary value exchanges, 
while the aim of bai salam is to meet the needs of farmers – who require money in 
order to grow their crops – and of traders for import and export businesses.363 
4. In terms of the delivery of the goods the exact date and place of delivery must be 
specified in the contract, because the time of delivery is an essential part of this 
contract.
364
 
5. It must be ensured that the goods are able to be delivered when they are due.365 
6. The customer (buyer) cannot enjoy ownership rights over the purchased commodities 
before taking possession of them.
366
 
7. The goods of the bai salam contract should remain in the market from the day of the 
contract up to the date of delivery.
367
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3.7.1.7  Istisna (Order to Manufacture)  
Istisna is a contract of sale where the seller is the manufacturer and the customer is the 
purchaser of future manufactured goods.
368
 This kind of contract is offered by Islamic 
financial institutions. The istisna contract was not created by the Islamic banks, but it refers 
to a contract adopted and redrafted by such banks to comply with the provisions of 
Shariah.
369
 The istisna contract is based on the concept of contract manufacturing, whereby 
the seller commits to manufacture the commodities or goods for the buyer, based on agreed 
specifications for the goods given in the contract. To be more precise, a customer gives 
clearly described or identified specifications to a manufacturer for non-existing goods that are 
to be manufactured and then delivered on an agreed future date.
370
 For example, an Islamic 
bank may be asked to finance the construction of buildings such as residential tower blocks, 
villas or schools or to manufacture aircrafts, ships, cars, machines or equipment.
371
 Another 
example is when an Islamic bank finances an aircraft manufacturer to manufacture aircraft 
for Saudi Arabian airlines in accordance with the specifications given by the airline company. 
It should be noted in the previous example that the Islamic bank’s role is as a financier and 
intermediary between two parties and it orders the goods on behalf of the customer. However, 
it may play the role of manufacturer, as in the first example. Generally, the istisna contract is 
useful in aspects of industrial life, such as purchasing equipment from a manufacturer or 
housing from a developer, and is useful for banks wishing to provide finance for 
construction.
372
 
As for the legality of istisna, Shariah permits the istisna contract because, in Shariah, 
everything is lawful unless it is forbidden in the Quran and Sunnah, and it has been legalised 
on the basis of the principle of public interest,
373
 so the istisna contract does not contain 
anything that is prohibited by Shariah.
 374
 In Surat Al-Kahf Allay says: 
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“O Dhul-Qarnayn, indeed Gog and Magog are great corrupters in the land. So may we 
assign for you an expenditure that you might make between us and them a 
barrier?”.375 
With regard to this contract, the renowned contemporary jurist Zuhayli writes: 
“Istisna‘a evolved into Islamic jurisprudence historically due to specific needs in the 
areas of manual work, leather products, shoes, carpentry, etc. However, it has grown 
in the modern era as one of the contracts that make it possible to meet major 
infrastructure and industrial projects such as the building of ships, airplanes and other 
large machinery”.376 
There are some important points regarding the price, delivery and disposal of the subject 
matter, which are summarised below: 
1. In the istisna contract, it is not necessary for the delivery time to be fixed. However, 
the purchaser may fix a maximum time for delivery.
377
 
2. The price must be specified and known, with the consent of the parties involved, to 
avoid ignorance.
378
  
3. For the contract to be valid, it must specify the place of delivery.  
4. It is not necessary in istisna for the bill to be paid in advance. In other words, spot 
payment of the bill is not necessary. The payment can be paid in instalments 
according to the completion stages or at different stages of the project, such as paying 
off a manufacturer at the end of each stage.
379
 
5. The istisna contract may be cancelled by any party by giving a prior notification time 
before starting the manufacturing process, but not after the manufacturer has started 
the work; because it is a moral obligation on the manufacturer to manufacture the 
goods and on the purchaser to respect the contract.
380
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6. Any risk to the goods or assets remains with the seller before delivery, while after 
delivery it transfers to the purchaser.
381
 
7. Istisna contracts are used in high technology industries, which need manufacturing, 
such as the building of locomotives, aircraft and ships.
382
  
8. In istisna, the delivery of the subject matter may take place through constructive 
possession.
383
 
In general, the istisna contract is similar to bai salam. However, there are several points of 
difference between the istisna contract and the bai salam contract, which are summarised 
below.  
1. In the case of istisna, the subject is always something that needs manufacturing, 
building and processing, while the object of bai salam usually involves agricultural 
products.
384
  
2. It is not necessary in istisna for the bill to be paid in full in advance, so it may be paid 
in instalments, while in bai salam, the buyer must pay the bill in full in advance to the 
seller at the time of effecting the contract.
385
 
3. In istisna, the time of delivery is fixed, while in bai salam it is an essential part of the 
sale.
386 
4. The istisna contract can be cancelled at any time by any party by giving a prior 
notification time before starting the manufacturing process, while in bai salam it 
cannot be unilaterally cancelled.
387
 
3.7.1.8  Qardh-al-hasan (Benevolent or Interest Free Loans) 
Generally, as mentioned before, a loan with interest is forbidden by Shariah, and the only 
loan that is permitted in Shariah is called qard hasan. Qard hasan (a benevolent or interest 
free loan) is a loan contract between two parties, the lender and the borrower. 
388
 It is applied 
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in Islamic banks as a social service to help the poor, such as needy students or small farmers, 
so it is considered a kind of gratuitous loan which is given to needy people.
389
 It is returned at 
the end of the agreed period without any interest, compensation, gift or share in the profit or 
loss of the business. Therefore, the receiver of this contract is only required to repay the 
original amount of the loan without interest.
390
 
With regard to the legality of qard hasan, there are many verses in the Holy Quran that 
illustrate this, and also reports from the prophet Muhammed. Allah has permitted and 
encouraged his creatures this kind of contract. For example:   
Surat Taghabun 64, verse 17 of the Quran: “If you lend to Allah a goodly loan (i.e. 
spend in Allah's Cause) He will double it for you, and will forgive you. And Allah is 
most ready to appreciate and to reward, most forbearing”.391 
Surat Al-Muzzammil 73, verse 20 of the Quran: “lend to Allah a goodly loan, and 
whatever good you send before you for yourselves”.392 
Surat Al-Baqarah 2, verse 245 of the Quran: “Who is he that will lend to Allah a 
goodly loan so that He may multiply it to him many times? And it is Allah that 
decreases or increases (your provisions), and unto Him you shall return”.393 
 
Surat Al-Hadid 57, verse 18: “Indeed, the men who practice charity and the women 
who practice charity and [they who] have loaned Allah a goodly loan — it will be 
multiplied for them, and they will have a noble reward”.394 
 
Qard hasan has been mentioned in the Sunnah. Prophet Muhammed says: Whoever relieves a 
believer from a difficulty in this world, Allah will relieve him from his difficulty and Allah 
will facilitate him in this world and world hereafter.
395
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The objectives for qard hasan are as follows: 
1. To help the needy in an attempt to alleviate hardship. 
2. To help the poorer sections of society. 
3. To encourage people to help each other.  
4. To establish a better relationship between the poor and the rich.  
5. To effect the mobilisation of wealth among all people in the society.   
6. To perform a good deed that is encouraged and appreciated by the Almighty Allah 
and His messenger.  
7. To strengthen the national economy.  
8. To help the poor to create new job markets and business ventures by using their 
merits, skills and expertise.  
9. To establish a caring society.   
10. To eradicate the unemployment problem in society.  
11. To remove social and economic discrimination in society.396 
 
Finally, qard hasan is considered the perfect substitute to obtaining a loan without interest 
from Islamic banks. The main purpose of this contract is that it is humanitarian and 
charitable. Qard hasan is supported by both the Quran and Sunnah. 
3.7.1.9  Tawarruq (Monetization of Commodities) 
Tawarruq is one of the distinguished Islamic products to be offered by Islamic financial 
institutions nowadays.
397
 In addition, it is also applied in some conventional banks that have 
Islamic windows
398
 or are Islamised
399
 either in Islamic countries (such as SABB, formerly 
known as the Saudi British Bank in Saudi Arabia, which offers Islamic products by means of 
an Islamic window), or in Western countries (such HSBC Bank in the UK, which does so 
through its window), Such windows are known as Amanah.  The contract is also known as an 
organized tawarruq, which is considered a new contract in the modern Islamic financial 
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industry. The tawarruq contract is suitable for people who wish to obtain money in 
accordance with Shariah, and it usually involves three parties. The first one is an Islamic 
bank, whose role in this contract is that of an intermediary in all the components of this 
transaction. Secondly, there is a client who wishes to obtain money. The last one is a supplier.  
In order to have a tawarruq contract under Shariah, the goods should be sold to a third 
party.
400
  The definition of tawarruq is a contract to obtain money, whereby someone buys a 
commodity on credit, in order to sell it for cash at a lower price to a third party, with the aim 
of obtaining cash, according to Shariah.
401
 For instance, in Saudi Arabia, people buy cars on 
credit, in order to resell them immediately to obtain money, and then invest the money in the 
Saudi stock market. This contract is becoming increasingly popular in Islamic banks in Saudi 
Arabia, because it is very easy to obtain cash.
 402
 
This contract is legally permissible, based on jurisprudence or rulings known as fatwa, which 
are issued by qualified Muslim scholars and also based on the famous rule in Islamic 
transactions, that is, that the origin of things is permissibility. The Quran states in the Holy 
Quran in Surah Al-Baqara: “Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest”.403 
Therefore, the conditions of sale are applicable in the tawarruq contract. Based on this 
evidence, it is permitted to apply the tawarruq contract in Islamic banks or conventional 
banks according to Islamic principles. Due to the nature of this contract, which is similar to 
conventional secured lending, the Islamic banks need to understand that the tawarruq 
contract should be used where necessary to avoid interest, especially when the client’s 
intention is not to purchase goods, but merely to obtain money.
404
 In general, Islamic banks 
can adopt any financial contracts that do not conflict with Islamic principles of law, so the 
tawarruq contract is one of the Islamic financing contracts that are adopted by Islamic banks.  
In this contract, there is only one agreement between all parties; however, in some other 
financial contracts there are two agreements such as the Islamic murabaha contract, which 
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has two agreements: the primary agreement and the final one.  At the primary agreement 
stage, both parties have the right to cancel the contract.
405
 
Tawarruq is favoured by both financial institutions and customers. This is for several 
reasons. Firstly, tawarruq is permitted by Islamic scholars. Secondly, it is an easy way to 
obtain money, especially for people who want to avoid riba; for example, in Saudi Arabia, a 
client can obtain money through a tawarruq contract from an Islamic bank within a few hours 
and the final reason is that there is no high risk factor is this contract.
406
   
In order for this contract to be valid, there are several conditions under Shariah, as follows:  
1. Avoiding riba. This condition is the classic one for all Islamic financing contracts.407 
2. Ownership of the commodities, whereby the seller must own the goods before he 
offers them to the buyer.
408
 
3. Goods are specified, whereby the seller explains the details of the goods to the buyer, 
when the buyer does not see them.
409
 
4. Possession of commodities, whereby the seller is able to deliver them at the agreed 
time.
410
 
5. Details of payment. It is important to mention the manner of payment, whether in one 
payment or by instalments in the contract.
411
 
Finally, there are some transactions steps for deposit products and financing based on the 
concept of tawarruq as follows: 
 
1. The client applies the financing product based on the tawarruq contract to 
Islamic bank. 
2. The Islamic bank buys the commodities, which have been identified by the 
client.
412
 
3. The Islamic bank sells the goods to the customer on deferred payment.413 
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4. The client asks the Islamic bank to sell the goods in the market. The role of the 
Islamic bank here is as an agent of the client.
414
 
5. The Islamic bank sells the commodities to a third party for cash, and then 
gives the cash (wariq) from the sale of the goods to the client.
415
 
3.8  Risks of Islamic Finance 
Islamic banks, like conventional banks, face a number of risks in their banking operations, 
but there is a slightly different application between them, due to the nature of Shariah 
principles, which are applied in all Islamic financing contracts.
416
 It is obvious that the 
principles of Shariah differ from the principles of the capitalist system which are applied in 
conventional banks. For instance, riba is forbidden by Shariah, while it is allowed in 
conventional banks. Therefore, Islamic financing contracts do not offer the products of 
conventional banks or establish riba windows, due to religious restrictions, while the 
conventional banks can offer Islamic financing products or establish Islamic subsidiaries 
simultaneously with their own products through Islamic windows.
417
 Consequently, it is 
possible to say that there are two types of risks in Islamic banks. The first type consists of 
risks that are similar to those faced by conventional banks. Other risks for Islamic banks 
involve unique risk characteristics, such as the asset and liability.
418
 This type of risk is due to 
the nature of Shariah, which governs all Islamic banking operations. There are several kinds 
of risks in Islamic financial contracts, such as credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk and 
operational risk,
419
 as explained below. 
3.8.1  Credit Risk  
Credit risk means the risk of losing a financial reward stemming from a borrower's failure to 
repay a loan or the borrower’s failure to meet a contractual obligation within a specified time 
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limit.
420
 In other words, this type of risk is related to the ability of a debtor to repay at the 
time appointed for repayment according to the contract.
421
 Credit risk is the most common 
source of risk faced by banks, both Islamic and conventional ones.
422
 For instance, in the 
contract, if the borrower defaults on his loan commitments, it leads to a loss for the creditor 
as a result of the counterparty’s delay in payment and, consequently, it becomes a risk for the 
bank. In order to manage credit risk, therefore, there are three types of policies. Firstly, to 
reduce the credit risk through examining concentration, lending to connected parties and 
diversification. Secondly, to ensure that banks have the ability to absorb loan losses. Finally, 
to measure the risk by classifying the assets that carry the risk.
423
 Conventional banks face 
credit risk in almost all of their operations, because in every case the relationship between the 
banks and debtors is that of a debtor and a creditor. Therefore, if the borrower has delayed 
payment of the obligation, the bank adds interest as a result of the delay, while this interest is 
prohibited by Shariah. In addition, Islamic banks have very little experience of the fight 
against risk compared to conventional banks; therefore, the credit risk in Islamic banks is 
higher than that in conventional banks.
424
 
 In Islamic banking activity, credit risk and exposure arise in connection with the following: 
In the murabaha contract, an Islamic bank delivers the goods or assets before receiving 
payment; for instance, if a customer wants to buy a car from an Islamic bank, based on using 
a murabaha contract. After the application request, the Islamic bank purchases the car based 
on the client’s promise to buy. After buying the car from the provider, the customer has the 
right to refuse the delivery of the purchased car.
425
 In this case, the Islamic bank is exposed to 
credit risk as a result of the counterparty’s delay in payment. 
In musharaka and mudarabah contracts, when the capital involved in one of these contracts 
is employed in a deferred sale, which is what takes place in most mudarabah, the owner of 
the capital, an Islamic bank, faces an indirect credit risk. In other words, non-payment of the 
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share of the Islamic bank by the entrepreneur when it is due causes credit risk for Islamic 
banks.
426
 These contracts are considered the highest credit risk in Islamic bank operations.
427
  
In the salam contract, there are two ways to face credit risk. The first way is represented as a 
delivery risk where commodities are not delivered at the agreed time or the goods supplied 
are not as contractually specified or are not according to the seller’s/customer’s 
specifications, after payment is made. In this case Islamic banks are exposed to credit risk 
through the salam contract. The second way is that the salam contract gives rise to a 
commodity debt rather than a cash debt. Both ways expose Islamic banks to credit risk.
 428
  
In the istisna contract, an Islamic bank faces credit risk if the sub-contractor fails to meet the 
specifications, the quality standards are not as agreed on with the customer, the supplier 
defaults in providing the goods at the specified time or the quality is not as contractually 
specified. In this contract, Islamic banks make advance payment for goods that it will receive 
on a future date and this is a risk for the bank.
429
  
3.8.2  Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk is defined as the potential loss to Islamic financial contracts arising from their 
inability either to meet their obligations or to fund increases in assets as they fall, without 
incurring unacceptable costs or losses.
430
 It is considered one of the major causes of bank 
failure or bankruptcy. However, it plays an essential role in mitigating the expected and 
unexpected balance sheet fluctuations and providing funds for growth.
431
 With regard to the 
nature of liquidity risk, it is closely linked to the nature of banking assets and liabilities.
432
 In 
general, liquidity occurs when the depositors decide to redeem their deposits but the banks 
cannot afford it or when the banks decide to terminate the loans but the borrowers cannot 
afford it.
433
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There are two types of liquidity risk: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk. Funding 
liquidity risk is defined as the risk that a firm will not be able to efficiently meet both 
expected and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs without affecting 
either daily operations or the financial condition of the firm.
434
 Market liquidity risk, 
however, is the risk that a firm cannot easily offset or eliminate a position at the market 
price.
435
 
Islamic banks in their present financial contracts carry huge debts as bank assets and face 
higher risks compared to conventional banks; therefore, liquidity risk in Islamic financial 
contracts may be more severe than in conventional banks, for the following reasons: 
1. Islamic banks cannot borrow money based on interest to cover their needs for 
liquidity when necessary, due to Islamic religious restrictions, which forbid riba.
436
 
2. Islamic banks cannot sell the debt initially, due to the involvement of gharar and 
riba.
437
 
3. It is the central bank’s role to be a lender of last resort for Islamic banks, as is the case 
with conventional banks.
438
  
4. Most of the deposits in Islamic banks are in current accounts.439  
5. The financial development in Islamic banks is slow; consequently, Islamic banks are 
not able to raise funds quickly from the markets.
440
 
3.8.3  Market Risk 
Market risk is defined as the potential for losses due to unfavourable movements in market 
prices, such as interest rates, commodity prices, exchange rates and other economic and 
financial variables such as stock prices or housing starts. Consequently, there are four 
standard market risk factors: interest rates, stock prices, foreign exchange rates and goods 
prices.
441
 This kind of risk is also very important, because commodities will not be sold at 
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prices that may not cover costs; so it is important to focus on this type to avoid financial 
risks. Islamic banks are exposed to a higher market risk than conventional banks, due to some 
of the effects, such as the asset-backed nature of their finance instruments.
442
 This risk arises 
in many Islamic financial contracts, such as in the following: 
Murabaha: the murabaha contract is exposed to market risk due to the duration of the 
contract. The nature of the murabaha contract is such that the mark-up is fixed for the 
duration of the contract. Therefore, if the benchmark rate changes, the interest rates on these 
fixed income contracts cannot be adjusted.
443
 
Salam: this contract is exposed to market risk due to price fluctuations for goods. If the 
Islamic banks fail to deliver the items, they will need to purchase the same at a higher price 
from the market to meet their obligations.
444
 
Ijarah: in the ijarah contract a lessor is exposed to market risk on the residual value of the 
leased asset in the terms of the lease, which may be lower than the agreed-upon price or rent 
or if the lessee terminates the lease earlier (by defaulting, during the duration of the 
contract.)
445
   
Foreign exchange: this is exposed to market risk due to its fluctuations and the foreign 
currency receivables and payables. In other words, it means exchange of money in one 
country for money in another.
446
 
3.8.4  Operational Risk 
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from the inadequacy or failure of 
internal events (those related to people and systems) or of external events. In addition, it 
includes the risk of failure of technology, systems and analytical models. This risk is 
considered part of the integrated risk.
447
 Operational risk is a recent addition to the list of 
risks faced by Islamic banks, so operational risk may be high for Islamic banks for several 
reasons. 
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The cancellation risk in some Islamic financial contracts is non-binding, such as in murabaha 
and istisna contracts.
448
 There is a shortage of qualified professionals to conduct Islamic 
financial operations.
449
 Due to the different nature of the business, the environment, certain 
practices and competition for Islamic banks, there are some programmes such as computer 
software that may not be appropriate for Islamic banks. This leads to system risks for 
developing and using informational technologies in Islamic banks.
450
 There may be a failure 
to comply with Shariah requirements, which may have an impact on the income of the 
Islamic banks.
451
 There may be a lack of standardised practices by the Shariah boards in 
different jurisdictions, which causes Islamic banks to be exposed to operational risk.
452
 There 
is an inadequate internal control system in Islamic banks to detect and manage potential 
problems in operational processes.
453
 
Islamic banks are exposed to operational risk in some of their forms and these risks differ 
depending on the types of Islamic financing. For instance, operational risk in murabaha and 
ijarah contracts is low, while in istisna and mudarabah contracts it is high.
454
    
To sum up, it could be said that Islamic banks are just as exposed to financial risks in their 
present contracts as conventional banks are, but the nature of the risks faced by Islamic banks 
is complex and difficult to mitigate, for several reasons. The first reason is that, unlike in 
conventional banks, given the trading-based instruments and equity financing, there are 
significant market risks along with credit risks in Islamic banking. Secondly, risks 
intermingle and change from one kind to another at different stages of a transaction. For 
instance, trade-based contracts such as murabaha, salam and istisna and ijarah leasing are 
exposed to both credit and market risks. For example, during the transaction period of a 
salam contract, the bank is exposed to credit risk and at the conclusion of the contract it is 
exposed to commodity price risk. The third reason is because of rigidities and deficiencies in 
the infrastructure, institutions and instruments. For instance, there are objections to the use of 
foreign exchange futures to hedge against foreign exchange risk and there are no Shariah-
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compatible short-term securities for liquidity risk management in most jurisdictions.
455
 In 
addition, the risks in Islamic financing contracts depend fundamentally on the type of 
contracts used, the subject matter of the contracts and the way they are traded. For example, 
risks in murabaha and ijarah contracts are lower than risks in istisna and mudarabah 
contracts. In general, the risks in Islamic financial contracts may be higher than in 
conventional finance.  
3.9 Islamic Finance in Malaysia 
The development of the Islamic banking and financial industry in Malaysia involved several 
phases beginning in 1983. These developments were also facilitated by the passing of several 
laws aimed specifically at the regulation of Islamic banking and financial activities such as 
the Islamic Banking Act of 1983, which was replaced by the Islamic Financial Services Act 
in May 2013, the Takaful Act of 1984, the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1989, 
the Securities Commission Act of 1993, the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007, the 
Development Financial Institutions Act 2002 and the Central Bank of Malaysia Act of 2009. 
Under sub-s 16B (1) of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 (before the new Act 701 was 
amended in 2009), the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC) was 
established in 1997 as the highest Shariah authority in Islamic finance in Malaysia.
456
  
The SAC has been granted the authority for the ascertainment of Shariah for the purposes of 
Islamic banking business, Islamic financial business, takaful business, Islamic development 
financial business, or any other business, which is based on the principles of Shariah and is 
supervised and regulated by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). As the reference body and 
advisor to BNM on Shariah matters, the SAC is also responsible for validating all Islamic 
banking and takaful products to ensure their compatibility with Shariah principles. In 
addition, it advises BNM on any Shariah issue relating to Islamic financial business or 
transactions of Bank Negara Malaysia as well as other related entities.
457
 
In the recent Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, the role and functions of the SAC was 
further reinforced whereby the SAC was accorded the status of the sole authoritative body on 
Shariah matters pertaining to Islamic banking, Islamic finance and takaful. While the rulings 
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of the SAC shall prevail over any contradictory ruling given by a Shariah committee 
constituted in Malaysia, the court and arbitrator are also required to refer to the rulings of the 
SAC for any proceedings relating to Islamic financial business and such rulings shall be 
binding. Under the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, any ruling made by the SAC shall be 
binding on Islamic financial institutions, the court and arbitrator.
458
 The SAC consists of 
prominent Shariah scholars, jurists and market practitioners, whose members are qualified 
individuals and have vast experience in banking, finance, economics, law and the application 
of Shariah, particularly in the areas of Islamic economics and finance.
459
 
In Malaysia, the central financial authorities are the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia, and 
the Securities Commission. At the individual level of the Islamic financial institutions, there 
is the Shariah Board committee. The SAC of Bank Negara Malaysia covers all contracts 
under Islamic banking and takaful whereas the SAC of the Securities Commission covers 
contracts applied in the Islamic Capital Markets. The Shariah standards followed are those of 
the SAC of Bank Negara Malaysia and of the Securities Commission, which themselves are 
influenced by both the Shariah standards of the AAOIFI and the Islamic Fiqh Academy.
460
 
In Malaysia, the establishment of the Shariah Committee (SC) is a statutory requirement to 
all banks which offer Islamic banking products pursuant to section 3 (5) (b) of the Islamic 
Banking Act of 1983 for Islamic banks, and section 124 (7) of the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act of 1989 for the Islamic banking scheme bank. The main objective of the 
establishment of the SC is to advise the Islamic financial institutions on any Shariah matter 
and also to ensure compliance with the basic principles of Shariah. Section 3 (5) (b) of  the 
Islamic Banking Act of 1983 states that the BNM shall not recommend the grant of a licence, 
and the Minister shall not grant a licence, unless he is satisfied that there is, in the articles of 
association of the bank concerned, provision for the establishment of a Shariah board.
461
 
The BNM has issued the BNM/GPS 1 to regulate the governance of SC of Islamic financial 
institutions. It has also issued the Guidelines on the Disclosure of Reports and Financial 
Statements of Islamic Banks known as BNM/GPS8-i. The BNM/GPS1 consists of 10 parts 
with 24 sections and one appendix. The contents include objectives, the scope of application, 
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the establishment of the SC, membership, restrictions, duties and responsibilities of the SC 
and Islamic financial institutions, the reporting structure, effective date and secretariat of the 
SAC. IFIs had to comply with the guidelines by 1st April 2005 and the dateline was extended 
to a development financial institution prescribed under the Development Financial 
Institutions Act 2002 which followed? the Islamic Banking Scheme until 1st September 
2005.
462
 
The objective of BNM/GPS 1 is to set out the rules, regulations and procedures in the 
establishment of the SC, to define the role, scope of duties and responsibilities of the SC and 
to define the relationship and working arrangements between the SC and the SAC. The 
BNM/GPS1 shall only be applicable to an Islamic bank licenced under the Islamic Banking 
Act of 1983, a financial institution licenced under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
of 1989 which participates in the Islamic Banking Scheme, a development financial 
institution prescribed under the Development Financial Institutions Act 2002 which follows 
an? Islamic Banking Scheme; and a takaful operator registered under the Takaful Act 
1984.
463
 
Therefore, Malaysia is considered one of the most advanced Islamic finance industries in the 
world due to a number of laws and regulations that have been issued by the Government of 
Malaysia to regulate and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities including takaful. 
In addition, an independent body called the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara 
Malaysia was established in order to verify that all products of Islamic banking, finance and 
takaful comply with the provisions of Shariah. In addition, the SAC is also responsible for 
the legal interpretations of Shariah, and its interpretations are considered binding for Islamic 
financial institutions in Malaysia.
464
 As a result of the existing regulatory and supervisory 
framework of Islamic banking and financial activities including takaful in Malaysia, it has 
become the indisputable global hub for Islamic finance, particularly in the field of sukuk 
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where it is the world's largest sukuk market with a number of Malaysia’s sukuk issues of? 
68.9%, or USD 62 billion of the total global outstanding sukuk at the end of 2007.
465
   
Despite the growth and development of the Islamic banking and finance industry including 
Islamic insurance (takaful) and the Islamic Capital Market in Malaysia, there are some legal 
obstacles facing this industry. The main legal obstacle is that the nature of disputes of Islamic 
banking and finance are applied to civil courts. In Malaysia, Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) operate in the environment where the legislative framework consists of mixed 
jurisdictions and mixed legal systems namely Shariah and common law.
466
 According to 
Hasan, the principles of common law are applied in civil court matters and disputes including 
Islamic Banking disputes, while Islamic law is only applicable in Shariah courts to govern 
disputes involving family matters and the law of inheritance.
467
 In Malaysia, Islamic banking 
disputes are applied to civil courts instead of Shariah courts so are considered under the item 
"finance" under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.
468
 In addition, 
Article 121 of the Federal Constitution provides unequivocally that the civil court has 
jurisdiction over Shariah matters with regards to mercantile, Islamic banking, business and 
commercial issues.
469
 The following example shows that the court applies the common law 
principles and did not reference the applicable underlying Shariah principles in Islamic 
finance disputes. 
The facts of the case of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (the plaintiff) v Adnan Omar (the 
defendant) is that the plaintiff granted the defendant a loan of RM 583,000, secured upon a 
charge over a certain parcel of land. The plaintiff granted this facility under the Islamic Bai 
Bithaman Ajil (BBA) loan scheme which in effect involved the execution of three 
simultaneous transactions between the parties, namely (1) the sale of the subject property by 
the defendant to the plaintiff for RM 265,000 which was duly paid by the plaintiff (2) the 
plaintiff reselling the same to the defendant for RM 583,000 payable in 180 installments and 
(3) the defendant executing a charge over the land as security for the said debt of RM 
583,000. The defendant defaulted in his payments and the plaintiff accordingly filed an 
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originating summons under the Rules of the High Court 1980. The High Court held that the 
defendant was bound to pay the whole amount of the selling price based on the grounds that 
he knew the terms of the contract and knowingly entered into the agreement. In this respect, 
the court applied the classic common law interpretational approach where the parties are 
bound by the terms and conditions of the contract. The court did not look further into the 
issue as to whether the Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA) facility involved an element not approved 
by the Shariah as stipulated under the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 1989.
470
  
However, there is an initiative which has been formulated by the Central Bank of Malaysia 
with the cooperation of the judicial civil body to set up a special High Court in the 
Commercial Division of the civil court system known as the Muamalah bench to deal 
exclusively with IFIs and any disputes arising under Islamic Banking.
471
  
Overall, Malaysia is considered to be the world's most important Islamic finance centre due 
to a strong legal and Shariah framework for Islamic finance. Therefore, it is possible to 
transfer the unique Malaysian experience in the field of Islamic finance to Saudi Arabia for 
several reasons. First, Malaysia has issued a series of laws and regulations to regulate all 
operations of Islamic finance in Malaysia, whereas, in Saudi Arabia there are no specific laws 
governing Islamic finance products. Secondly, Malaysia established the Shariah Advisory 
Council of Bank Negara Malaysia as the highest Shariah authority in Islamic finance in 
Malaysia to ensure that all operations of IFIs are in compliance with Shariah. On the 
contrary, in Saudi Arabia, there is no independent central Shariah board to regulate and 
supervise IFIs and as a result, IFIs are free to adopt their own Shariah governance. In 
addition, Bank Negara Malaysia has issued uniform Shariah standards for the Islamic 
financial industry as well as it adopted AAOIFI's standards and guidelines for the Islamic 
financial industry. The Saudi central bank (SAMA) did not issue such standards and 
guidelines that regulate the Islamic banking business in Saudi Arabia nor did they adopt the 
standards issued by international bodies specialising in the field of Islamic finance such as the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). Therefore, the researcher believes that the transfer 
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of the Malaysian experience in the field of Islamic finance to Saudi Arabia would have a 
positive impact on the development of the legal structure of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia.  
3.10   Challenges of Islamic Finance 
Islamic finance has evolved and expanded in a fast-changing and dynamic international 
environment. In the context of a more challenging and competitive environment, issues of 
financial stability, viability and competitiveness are paramount.
472
 It has also made 
substantial progress over the last three decades after the establishment of the first Islamic 
bank (Dubai Islamic Bank) in 1975. The number of institutions offering Shariah-compliant 
services has risen, as has the number of conventional banks that have opened Islamic banking 
windows as banks have rushed to satisfy the appetite of investors and consumers for Shariah-
compliant products to finance assets from cars and houses to aircraft and project finance. The 
total volume of assets that all these institutions manage has risen rapidly and so has the 
international acceptance of Islamic finance.
473
 It could be said that the results and health 
growth of the Islamic financial industry compared to those of the conventional banking 
industry during the recent global economic crisis that commenced in 2007 are clear evidence 
that the rules and principles representing the foundation of Islamic banks are solid and 
valid.
474
 The soundness and viability of Islamic finance as a form of financial intermediation 
are premised on the fundamental requirement that Islamic financial transactions be supported 
by an underlying productive activity. There is always, therefore, a close link between 
financial and productive flows. A financial transaction must be accompanied by genuine 
trade or lease-based and business-related transactions wherein interest is eliminated and 
profits or rentals are the economic rewards. Alternatively, an Islamic financial institution may 
provide financing for a venture by becoming a joint partner based on a pre-specified profit 
sharing arrangement. In addition, Islamic finance also sets explicit restrictions on unethical 
and speculative financial activities.
475
 However, the Islamic financial industry is still in its 
formative stage and faces a number of challenges that need to be addressed to enable it to 
continue its rapid expansion without facing any serious crisis and, thereby, acquire greater 
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respectability and a much greater share of the international financial market.
476
 These 
important challenges facing the Islamic banking industry are identified as follows.   
The first challenge is the lack of standard interpretations of the same issue due to the 
multiplicity of Shariah boards and different opinions of Islamic scholars in relation to each 
bank. This in turn leads to a lack of homogeneity for some products on the one hand, and to 
uncertainty on the part of clients as to whether a product developed in one jurisdiction is 
Shariah-compliant in a neighbouring jurisdiction. This difference of opinion among Muslim 
scholars is known as ijtihad in Shariah. In addition, Islamic finance laws and regulatory 
practices vary across countries and, therefore, this challenge is the most important one for 
Islamic banking.
477
 For instance, Shariah boards in Islamic banks usually ask four questions 
in relation to any given transaction: Do the terms of the transaction comply with Shariah 
law? Is this the best investment for the client? Does the investment produce value for the 
client and for the community or society in which the client is active? As an asset manager, is 
this a transaction in which the banker as an individual would be prepared to invest his own 
money? 
If the answer to any of these four questions is no, the proposed transaction will usually be 
rejected. Consequently, it is important to stress that Islamic finance is based on the principles 
of Shariah in all practices, in order to ensure the integrity and credibility of the Islamic 
banking industry.
478
 
The second challenge is developing benchmarks. Islamic financial institutions require 
benchmarks for the pricing of goods and services and for determining sharing ratios for the 
distribution of profit among the partners of joint ventures. For the time being, conventional 
benchmarks are being used by IFIs in almost all jurisdictions, whereas these benchmarks are 
not easily available in Islamic banks.
479
   
Thirdly, the conventional banking sector is supported and regulated by the central bank. For 
instance, the central bank supports commercial banks by giving them discount rates on loans, 
and it also regulates commercial banks. In contrast, Islamic banks do not receive support 
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from central banks in their countries.
480
 Islamic banks also need some facility akin to the 
lender-of-last resort, which is available to conventional banks, to overcome liquidity crises 
when these occur suddenly as the result of unforeseen circumstances.
481
  
Fourthly, Islamic financial institutions are challenged to offer a better customer service that 
matches international standards and also to invest in effective technology, such as using the 
internet to create new distribution channels to reach more customers. Such concepts as 
quality and creating value for customers are central to the success of banks entering the 
Islamic market today.
482
 
Fifthly, proponents of Islamic finance are concerned about the current environment and 
future regulatory regimes in terms of the treatment of conventional banks versus the 
treatment of Islamic banks. Separate supervision and regulation of Islamic banks have yet to 
take hold in most countries; only Kuwait and Bahrain operate separate regulatory regimes for 
the sector at this time. In most markets, Islamic banks follow the standards set by local 
regulators for conventional banks, even if those standards are not always appropriate for 
Islamic institutions.
483
 
Sixthly, Islamic banks suffer from a shortage of skilled and well-trained professionals, which 
limits their ability to compete and expand their market share. The industry needs new talent 
and needs to retrain conventional bankers in the practices of Islamic banking.
484
 
Seventhly, discipline and transparency are serious issues of concern in Islamic banks. Despite 
the requirement of disclosure to promote transparency and market discipline issued by the 
Islamic Financial Services Board in 2007, it appears that the majority of banks are not 
adhering to it.
485
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Finally, Islamic financial institutions need to increase investment in research and 
development, including products and mechanisms related to risk management.
486
 
To sum up, despite the many challenges facing the Islamic finance industry at the present 
time, the future looks promising indeed.
487
 There is no doubt that Islamic financial 
institutions have firmly established a solid foundation in international financial transactions. 
Currently, there are more than 500 Islamic banks and institutions in 75 countries in the world 
and the assets of Islamic financial institutions have reached 7500 billion dollars.
488
 
3.11 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the body of knowledge concerning Islamic finance laws, 
principles, distinguishing features, contracting forms, risks and challenges from an Islamic 
point of view. It has highlighted the main question of this research through a review of 
Islamic financial contracting forms, which are applied in Islamic banks or through Islamic 
windows in conventional banks. It has also reviewed the practice of Islamic finance in 
Malaysia, its legal system, its strengths and weaknesses and how to transfer the Malaysian 
experience to Saudi Arabia.  
This chapter concluded by explaining that Islamic finance is based on principles of Shariah, 
and involves the sharing of profits and losses. Islamic finance includes a set of financial 
contracts which are compatible with Shariah principles. Shariah derives its provisions from 
the Holy Quran and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad. In addition to the Quran and Sunnah, 
there are also secondary sources, namely Ijma and Qiyas. Islamic financial contracts are 
offered by Islamic banks and the Islamic banking windows in conventional banks. The major 
financial principles of Shariah are the prohibitions on interest (riba), either riba an-Nasia or 
riba al-Fadl; gambling (qimar/maisir) and uncertainty (gharar). 
After the above comprehensive review of the literature on Islamic financial contracting 
forms, the researcher will investigate three types of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia; namely, 
Islamic bonds (sukuk), Islamic insurance (takaful) and Islamic financial derivatives, as he 
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believes that examining only one type does not adequately reflect the legal aspect of Islamic 
financing contracts in the kingdom, due to the multiplicity of its laws and regulatory bodies. 
Thus, the three types mentioned above have different laws and regulations, as well as 
different supervisory authorities. In addition, they have a multiplicity of quasi-judicial 
committees to address banking matters. Therefore, sukuk, takaful and Islamic financial 
derivatives will be described in greater detail in separate chapters, in order to investigate 
whether these three types of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia are compatible with the 
principles of Shariah. 
The regulatory framework of sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter, which will also examine whether the current uses of sukuk provided by the 
CMA are compatible with the principles of Shariah. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUKUK ISSUANCE AND ITS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
IN SAUDI ARABIA 
4.1  Introduction  
This chapter aims to give a comprehensive and critical review of sukuk issuance in Saudi 
Arabia, and the extent to which the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is consistent with 
Shariah requirements. The chapter is divided into a number of sections. Accordingly, the first 
section of this chapter begins with an examination of sukuk in general, and includes the 
concept of sukuk, its basic principles, common types of it, and a critical analysis of the most 
important differences between sukuk and conventional bonds. The second section provides a 
critical analysis of how sukuk work in Saudi Arabia, presenting the regulatory framework of 
the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia, and the legal challenges from the Shariah point of view, 
and providing recommendations to overcome these challenges. A summary is provided at the 
end of the chapter. 
4.2  The Concept of Islamic Bonds (Sukuk)  
The term sukuk is a plural Arabic name for Islamic financial certificates and is equivalent to a 
bond. The singular of this term is sakk. The term sukuk was used in Muslim societies during 
the Middle Ages, and refers to ‘papers’, which are undertaken for financial obligations 
originating from trade and other commercial activities. However, the concept of sukuk has 
undergone profound changes with regard to its conventional structure. In terms of market 
parlance, sukuk refers to negotiable financial instruments which do not consist of elements 
that have been prohibited in Islam.
489
  
In May 2003, sukuk was defined officially by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) as certificates of equal value, which represent an 
undivided pro-rate ownership of underlying assets, and the sakk can be freely traded at par 
premium or discount. In Islamic finance, sukuk represents a ‘capital market corollary to a 
singular lender’.490 It refers to the bonds which are in compliance with Shariah principles. 
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Due to Islamic religious beliefs, charging or paying interest (riba) as a source of earning 
profits is considered immoral. This belief has made it mandatory for financial institutions to 
earn a profit on the basis of real economic activity. Shariah law also prohibits investment in a 
number of sectors including alcohol, gambling and armaments, excessive uncertain trade 
contracts (gharar), tobacco, trading in debt contracts at discount, and gambling and chance-
based games (qimar).
491
 This is because of the lessons of the Quran. Therefore, in Muslim-
populated countries, a traditional debt market cannot flourish, as conventional bonds 
represent interest-based funding. 
The law prohibits ‘enrichment of trade from debt’ and ‘interest on loans’. Therefore, the sale 
of accounts receivables is not compatible with Shariah law, as it does not involves real assets. 
However, the law permits securitisation of non-financial assets, such as ijarah assets and bai’ 
salam assets, and underlying assets pool within a mudarabah or a musharakah structure. It is 
permitted to securitise ijarah, as in this case, the underlying assets are the real collateralised 
ijarah and generate cash flows from lease payments. It is quite common to create a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) in an ijarah financing system, which can be used to issue a sukuk-al-
ijarah or ijarah certificate to investors. The SPV (lessor) leases to a particular company 
(lessee) and this company utilises the assets in its production.
492
  
The lessor SPV receives a periodic payment by the lessee company and the lessor provides a 
portion of the payment to the suppliers. The certificate holders also receive a portion of the 
proceeds as a predetermined return on investment. The sum of the periodic rental payments 
from which the return is secured is agreed between both parties, which are the lessor SPV and 
the lessee company; this is why the certificate is capable of giving its holder a predetermined 
rate on investment. However, the return on investment is low, because the sukuk al-ijarah 
fund is a low-risk fund with a minimum risk of capital loss.
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4.3  An Overview of the Sukuk Market  
In 1990, Malaysia became the first country to issue sukuk, with a small amount of (Ringgit 
Malaysia RM120 million) (U.S. $30 million) by Shell Malaysia. Over a decade and a half, 
the capital raised through sukuk has increased manifoldly. In 2004, it was U.S. $6.7 billion, 
whereas in the first six months of 2005, the total reached U.S. $6.2 billion. It is worth 
emphasising here that in the year 2007, about $10.43 billion of sukuk was listed on the Dubai 
International Financial Exchange (DIFX), which was the highest of any exchange 
worldwide.
494
  
An impressive rise in the amount of sukuk was observed during the year 2006-2007, when the 
global market value of sukuk reached $51.5 billion in 2007; this figure was up by 90% 
compared to 2006. The data indicate that there had been a tremendous increase in the global 
sukuk market, and according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this boost was 
expected to build up an impetus in the days ahead. The volume of sukuk issued worldwide 
was equal to $47 billion in 2007, which was 73% up from the figure of 2006. The volume of 
capital rose through sukuk in the Middle East, particularly in the countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC); it reached $53 billion from $38 billion in 2007. The total 
number of sukuk issued worldwide also saw a significant rise, reaching 207 in 2007, as 
compared to 199 in 2006 and 89 in 2005.
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4.4  Differences between Sukuk and Conventional Bonds 
Sukuk bonds are differentiated from conventional bonds on the basis of contract legitimacy 
and Shariah-compliances.
496
 There are no such differences in terms of financial perspectives. 
The similarity of sukuk with conventional bonds has made it very popular in the conventional 
finance industry. Sukuk and conventional debt instruments share many common features, 
especially asset-backed bonds. When it comes to rating, default clauses, and coupon 
payments, Cakir and Raei see sukuk as parallel to conventional bonds.
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In the case of the bond, there is a contractual debt obligation under which the issuer is obliged 
to pay a certain interest on a specified date. On the other hand, sukuk enables the bondholder 
to claim an undivided beneficial ownership in the underlying assets. Sukuk holders are 
entitled to share the profits generated through underlying assets with regard to their 
contribution.
498
 This can be expressed as one of the major distinctions between sukuk and 
conventional bonds. 
The following differences have been identified by Thomas and Adam
499
 between sukuk and 
conventional fixed income products: 
a) The Issue of Ownership 
The ownership of sukuk is consistent with the laws of Shariah, and symbolises an ownership 
which is characterised by originating the cash flows/revenues for funding those projects that 
add genuine value to the economy, and therefore, the community. In terms of their characters 
and application, the underlying assets must show compliance with Shariah laws. The values 
of underlying assets are not subject to appreciation or depreciation of market values, until the 
end of the investment cycle. This form of financing is quite helpful in highlighting the 
importance of genuine assets and assists in minimising the extent of speculation. However, in 
the case of standard conventional bonds, the authorised borrowers owe the debt to the bond 
holders, and are contractually obliged to repay the amount of the principal along with interest 
on maturity.
500
 
As regards the principles of Islam, this scenario of the bond is a case of social and economic 
exploitation. The ownership of a bond is not supported by the value of the underlying assets; 
rather it is solely supported by the creditworthiness of the issuers. Moreover, the minimal 
transparency associated with bonds is considered an unhealthy practice which intensifies the 
volatility in the capital market. In Islam, those sources are considered unethical and 
exploitative which ensure the return of interest as well as principal.
501
 According to Justice 
Taqi Usmani, a noted Shariah scholar, bond-holders in conventional financial institutions are 
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nothing more than sponsors of enterprise, and the interest charged on their loans can be 
described as a percentage pegged to the price of interest in the market. It is worth noticing 
here that a bond can be issued for a wide range of projects, irrespective of its compliance with 
Shariah law.
502
  
b) The Risk/Return Issues  
There is a natural tendency by investors to try to minimise their risks, while maximising their 
return. In this regard, the inherent quality of Islamic finance, which promotes a profit-loss 
sharing purpose on underlying assets, rather than interest on principal, can be described as the 
basis of participatory and cooperative joint ventures. Due to the high volatility in return, 
many investors perceive that bonds are a conservative source of investment. However, the 
overall return with regard to a bond is subject to many financial variables including interest 
risks and downturn in the bond prices.
503
 
Moreover, the absence of collateral and risk of defaulters are considered to be major risks 
associated with bonds. When these issues are compared with sukuk, it can easily be observed 
that in terms of risk/return structures, sukuk are broadly analogous to bonds. It has been 
argued by Usmani
504
 that sukuk are indistinguishable from bonds in terms of their return from 
the projects, on the basis of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) benchmark. The 
inclusion of mandatory underlying assets to reduce risk exposure makes a better risk profile 
in the case of sukuk than in that of bonds.
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The most important difference between sukuk and conventional bonds can be identified with 
regard to the future flow of money. In the case of conventional bonds, investors are assured a 
fixed rate of return or interest at the maturity of bond.  This can be illustrated by an example: 
an investor who subscribes for bonds worth about £1000 at the rate of 10% will be given the 
benefits of £100 until the maturity. In other words, the methods for calculating profit for 
sukuk and conventional bonds are the same, except that sukuk ensures the benefits on 
underlying assets rather than on future cash flows. The financial structure of sukuk is based 
upon the exchange of those assets that have been approved with a few scales, instead of the 
exchange of money with the certificates alone. The sukuk-based transactions thus enable 
investors to receive profits with regard to their investments.
506
  
The second major difference can be recognised in terms of financial situations where a bond 
issuer cannot repay the debt and interest to the investors; in these financial circumstances, a 
bond holder may lose his/her investment, as the contractual obligations of a bond do not 
guarantee the security of recovering the principal investment. In the case of sukuk, investors 
can claim some of their investment through collateral to the sukuk contract. In addition to 
this, it ensures that in the case of money raised from investors which has been used to buy a 
property, the benefits of the assets are distributed among the investors.
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Table 4.1 Islamic Sukuk versus Conventional Bonds  
Conventional Bonds Islamic Sukuk 
From the issuer’s point of view, it represents 
a debt obligation to the investors.  
It represents stakes of ownership in 
underlying assets.  
Regardless of the compliance with Islamic 
and non-Islamic purposes, bonds can be 
issued.  
The issuance of Sukuk must be consistent 
with Islamic financial laws.  
It establishes a relationship which can be 
characterised as that of lender/borrower, with 
the purpose of earning money on money.  
The contractual obligations of Sukuk are 
permissible Islamic contracts and reflect the 
characteristics of undertaking business 
between the Sukuk holders and the 
originator. 
It enables fixed or variable rates of interest 
on investments. 
The tangible assets or services of Sukuk 
represent legal/beneficial interest in projects.  
The sale of a bond is equivalent to a sale of 
debt.  
It enables the sale of a share from the 
underlying assets.  
The creditworthiness of the bond holder is 
the most important factor in the issuance of 
conventional bonds, and bond holders do not 
rely directly on specific assets.  
The value of Sukuk prices are driven by and 
dependent upon fluctuations of market in 
terms of appreciation and depreciation of the 
market value of the underlying assets.  
 
Source: An Overview of Islamic Sukuk Bonds (2009).  
4.5  Common Types of Sukuk 
There are different types of sukuk, which can be arranged and ordered in the form of different 
financial transactions. Conventional bonds involve assurance about the repayment of a loan, 
while sukuk offer a mechanism of partial ownership under a financial obligation (known as 
sukuk murabaha), business (sukuk al musharaka), investment (sukuk al istithmar), project 
(sukuk al istisna), and asset (sukuk al ijarah).
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4.5.1 Ijarah Sukuk 
Ijarah sukuk constitute the financial arrangement for durable assets associated with an ijarah 
contract, which includes securities having equal value. They constitute the framework of 
leased assets and do not establish an association among sukuk holders and any company. 
They are freely tradable at par, premium, or discount in both primary and secondary markets 
as determined by market forces. A total of three parties are involved in ijarah sukuk, namely 
the originator or beneficiary, the SPV (special purpose vehicle) and sukuk holders (investors).  
It is essential for the terms of agreement to be clearly defined in an ijarah contract.
509
  
The structure of ijarah sukuk involves the following steps. The originator delivers the assets 
to the SPV on a specified and defined purchase price. Sukuk certificates are issued by the 
SPV for raising funds, which are handed to the originator. With a pre-defined time, the SPV 
and originator enters into a lease agreement in which the originator acts as lessee by giving 
back the assets. Regular rental amounts are received by the SPV from the originator, which 
are dispersed to the sukuk holders. The SPV sells back the assets on maturity at their pre-
defined value.
510
 
An example of ijarah sukuk is Qatar Global Sukuk.  In October 2003, the Qatar Global sukuk 
were introduced into the market, with a value of $700 million, and were redeemable in the 
year 2010. The securities were distributed at a minimum value of $10,000 with a maturity 
period of 7 years. Returns on investment have been variable under these securities; these are 
evaluated in terms of dollar funds London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and 40 basis 
points annually. Returns are included as rents on real inherent assets (leased piece of land).
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Figure 4.1 The Structure of Ijarah Sukuk 
 
Source: An Overview of Islamic Sukuk Bonds (2009). 
4.5.2 Musharakah Sukuk 
Musharakah sukuk are issued in the market for the mobilisation of funds, so as to facilitate 
the establishment of new projects, make improvements in existing projects and finance the  
activities of business (with certificate holders as owners). These are documents with equal 
value, which are considered to be negotiable instruments that can be traded in secondary 
markets. Under this mechanism, the originator and SPV participate to form an agreement 
which is based on a specific period (5 to 7 years) and a pre-defined profit-sharing ratio. 
Musharakah shares are purchased by the corporation at regular intervals from the SPV. The 
corporation contributes its assets to the agreement and sukuk proceeds are contributed by the 
SPV. The corporation acts as the key agent for the development of land with the funds 
available from the musharakah, so as to sell them on obtaining fixed amount of fees and a 
variable incentive fee. Profits obtained from this mechanism are disseminated among the 
sukuk holders. In a musharakah, by the end of the specified period, there are no shares with 
SPV.
512
 
An example of musharakah sukuk is the Emirates sukuk. They were issued by Wings FZCO 
at a value of approximately $550 million at the rate of 75 basis points on LIBOR, having a 
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maturity of 7 years. The key objective for the musharakah was to establish a new 
headquarters and engineering centre in Dubai. Regular payments for sukuk certificates were 
made from the rental money obtained from the musharakah.
513
 
Figure 4.2 The Structure of Musharakah Sukuk 
 
 
Source: Sukuk Issuance in Saudi Arabia: Recent Trends and Positive Expectations (2012) 
4.5.3  Mudarabah Sukuk 
Mudarabah sukuk, as described by the AAOIFI, refers to a certificate issued in the holder’s 
name and represents the units owned by the holder in the mudarabah equity. The holders of 
the certificate are known as Rabbul Maal and the returns of shares in the mudarabah equity 
depend upon the ownership of shares.
514
 
A formal conclusion of a legally created mudarabah contract forms the basis of the 
mudarabah sukuk. It includes the labour and capital provided by both parties, while the 
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division of profit between the parties is predefined. The mudarabah sukuk enable their holder 
to obtain his capital, as and when the sukuk are submitted, and also to collect a fixed 
proportion of profits declared in the issuance publication. The prime purpose of issuing sukuk 
is to provide monetary support to a finance-generating project or any activity distinct from 
the general business activities. The profit generated from these separate business activities is 
distributed according to the agreed percentage. The contract may specify the proportion of the 
company’s earnings that are to be given to the sukuk holders in order to return their 
investments in instalments. It may also mention sukuk that are to be retired in the future, 
along with their market price.
515
 
Mudarabah sukuk are a significant method of investment, aimed at raising funds. They refer 
to a document that is given to the holder against the amount of funds paid to the owner of the 
project. However, sukuk do not entitle their owner to make claims with respect to any annual 
interest. In other words, mudarabah sukuk can be regarded as shares with varied returns, 
accumulated periodically, in accordance with the profits of the project. It is essential for the 
mudarabah sukuk to entitle their owner or holder to shares, as specified in the sukuk. The 
holder of the sukuk is entitled to various rights determined by Shariah at the time of forming 
the mudarabah sukuk with respect to mortgage, sale, succession, and gifts. Subscription for 
the mudarabah sukuk implies approval on behalf of the issuer and an offer on behalf of the 
investor. It is necessary for the mudharabah contract to be in accordance with the Shariah.
516
 
 
The sukuk holder has the right to sell or transfer his ownership in the securities market on the 
expiration of a certain pre-determined time period from the time of subscription.
517
 However, 
the sale of sukuk must comply with the following conditions. Trading of sukuk involving the 
transfer of mudarabah capital in terms of money should be in accordance with the rules of 
exchange of money (Sarf). If the mudarabah capital is in the form of debt, the transfer should 
be in accordance with the principles of Islamic debt trading. If the mudarabah capital is in the 
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form of money, debt, benefits or assets, trade should be conducted according to the market 
price determined by mutual consent.
518
 
An example of mudarabah sukuk is the National Bonds Corporation and the Saudi Hollandi 
Bank. The National Bonds mudarabah is an open-ended investment fund, developed by the 
National Bonds Corporation. The bonds represent the funds that have been collected from the 
bond holders. These funds are held, managed and invested by the National Bonds 
Corporation as mudarib, in compliance with Shariah principles. A National Bond does not 
represent any specific interest of the holder in any division of the mudarabah assets. 
However, it does represent the holder's undivided share and entitlement to a part of the 
distributable profits in the mudarabah assets.  
The National Bonds Corporation acts as an investment manager and manages the mudarabah 
assets for the investors or bond holders. The bond holders do not have the right to take part in 
the supervision of the mudarabah assets. The profits that are to be distributed are divided in 
the ratio of 80:20; and on the basis of a feasibility study, 60% of the mudarabah assets are to 
be invested in the pre-decided new projects and 40% in other investments, according to the 
rules of Shariah.  
Development projects and infrastructure constitute 60% of the mudarabah assets, while 
shares, portfolios and funds constitute the remaining 40%. The profits projected for the 
former part of the investments range from 15% to 25% per annum, while the latter part are 
from 4% to 6% per annum. The overall investment of the National Bonds mudarabah capital 
would be intended to achieve a 15% rate of return per annum. The distribution of profits in 
the 80:20 ratio between the National Bonds Corporation and the bond holders would result in 
a 3% rate of profit for the bond holders.
519
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Figure 4.3  The Structure of Mudarabah Sukuk 
 
Source: Sukuk Issuance in Saudi Arabia: Recent Trends and Positive Expectations (2012) 
4.5.4 Murabaha Sukuk 
Murabaha sukuk is circulated in the market for the mobilisation of funds, so as to facilitate 
the trading of products (with certificate holders as owners). These are certificates with equal 
value, whose issuer is a supplier to the murabaha community.  The key subscribers are the 
purchasers of the offered financial product. The funds gained from the subscribed 
contribution are recognised as its cost.
520
 The sukuk holders possess the right to the selling 
price of the murabaha commodity. A non-negotiable monetary debt receivable symbolises 
the murabaha sukuk, which has to be obtained from the client at the murabaha price.  The 
below-mentioned steps indicate its structure:  
The SPV and borrower enter into a contract on mutual agreement. Sukuk are issued by the 
SPV to investors on receiving the proceeds. The SPV purchases a murabaha commodity from 
the supplier on the basis of the options available on the spot. The SPV sells the commodity to 
the purchaser for the spot price and a profit margin, which can be paid in the form of 
instalments.  Investors obtain profits by recovering the selling price.
521
  
An example of murabaha sukuk is the Arcapita Bank. It issued multicurrency sukuk known as 
FIRSAN by following the murabaha structure on the basis of instalments from 2003 to 2005 
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of $100 million (in 2003), $75 million (in 2004), and $801 million (in 2005). It held the sukuk 
for 5 years with an estimated price of 175 basis points and LIBOR (3 months).
522
 
Figure 4.4  The Structure of Murabaha Sukuk 
 
Source: Sukuk Issuance in Saudi Arabia: Recent Trends and Positive Expectations (2012) 
4.5.5 Salam Sukuk 
Salam sukuk is circulated in the market for the mobilisation of funds, so as to deliver the 
goods (with certificate holders as owners). These are certificates with equal value, whose 
issuer is the supplier of goods (covered under salam). Key subscribers are purchasers of the 
offered goods. The funds gained from the subscribed contribution of goods are recognised as 
its cost (salam capital). The certificate holders possess the right to the selling price of the 
salam goods. Despite this, it is non-tradable and is recognised as a receivable. Shariah 
obligations of salam such as quality, quantity, place of asset deliverance are applicable to 
salam sukuk.
523
 
Prior to maturity, the purchased goods are not sold off again. These transactions have a 
relative magnitude that is equal to exchange of debt, which makes them less appealing to 
investors. Therefore, they are purchased by an investor in the case where the estimated price 
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of a commodity is expected to reach a higher level by the time of maturity. In order to source 
the purchases and commodity, the SPV guarantees the agreement with an originator. On the 
part of the sukuk holders, the originator purchases the commodity and resells it in order to 
make a profit from the investment. The below-mentioned steps indicate the structure of salam 
sukuk: 
SPV obtains the proceeds of the sukuk and provides them to the investors. The proceeds are 
handed over to the originator, who is responsible for selling the commodity by using a 
forward contract. The commodities are received by the SPV from the originator. The 
originator resells the commodities in order to make a profit. The sales proceeds from the 
commodity are received by the sukuk holders.
524
 
An example of salam sukuk is the Bahrain Monetary Agency Salam Sukuk. Aluminium was 
specified to be a fundamental asset of the salam sukuk contract with the government of 
Bahrain.
525
 The Bahrain Islamic Bank (BIB) was assigned the responsibility of managing the 
contract with other banks and guaranteeing the deal as a syndicate authority. At the same 
time, the buyer appoints the Government of Bahrain as an agent to market the appropriate 
quantity at the time of delivery through its channels of distribution. In addition to this, the 
Government of Bahrain provides an additional undertaking to the representative BIB to 
market the aluminum at a price that will provide a return to salam security holders equivalent 
to those available through other conventional short-term money market instruments.
526
   
Figure 4.5  The structure of Salam Sukuk 
 
Source: Sukuk Issuance in Saudi Arabia: Recent Trends and Positive Expectations (2012) 
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4.5.6 Istisna Sukuk 
Istisna sukuk is circulated in the market for the mobilisation of funds, so as to produce 
products (with certificate holders as owners). These are certificates with equal value, whose 
issuer is the supplier. The key subscribers are the purchasers of the offered financial product, 
and the funds gained from the subscribed contribution are recognised as its cost.
527
 
The certificate holders possess the right to the selling price of the Istisna certificates. It is an 
important financial tool for managing the financing arrangements of large infrastructure 
projects. It facilitates financial intermediation on the basis of giving permission to the 
contractor for participation in another Istisna contract. Therefore, financial institutions can 
opt for guaranteeing a contract on a deferred price by subcontracting the authentic structure to 
a specified firm.
528
  
The following steps are used for issuing istisna sukuk: For raising funds to meet the financial 
requirements of a project, sukuk certificates are issued by the SPV. Proceeds collected from 
the issuance of the sukuk are delivered to the contractor and used for future projects. The SPV 
takes the title to the assets. The project is rented or traded to the final purchaser, who pays 
monthly installations or make a deferred lump-sum payment when the project is completed to 
the SPV. Returns obtained from this issuance are disseminated within the group of sukuk 
holders.
529
 
This example illustrates the structure of istisna sukuk. Under the guarantee of the National 
Central Cooling Company, in 2004 Tabreed offered global corporate sukuk of 5 years which 
were based on a fixed coupon rate of 5.5%. The offer included a combined arrangement of 
ijarah Istisna and ijarah Mawasufah fi al Dhimmah (forward leasing contracts). It was 
introduced in the market for the elimination of active debt of approximately US $ 136 million 
and the expansion of financial arrangements. 
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The Durrat sukuk financed the reclamation and infrastructure for the initial stage of a broader 
US $ 1 billion world class residential and leisure destination known as 'Durrat Al Bahrain', 
currently the Kingdom of Bahrain's largest residential development project. The return on the 
sukuk is 125 basis points over 3 months LIBOR payable quarterly, with the sukuk having an 
overall tenure of 5 years and an option for early redemption. 
The proceeds collected were utilised for establishing the project on the basis of agreements 
considering istisna. On completion of the individual istisna, the contractor delivered it to the 
issuer, who was responsible for notifying the company undertaking the project (as per the 
ijarah agreement).
530
 
Figure 4.6  The Structure of Istisna Sukuk 
 
Source: Sukuk Issuance in Saudi Arabia: Recent Trends and Positive Expectations (2012) 
4.5.7  The Hybrid Sukuk 
As an effective mode of investment and raising funds, the issue and trading of sukuk plays a 
vital role in fulfilling the diverse requirements of the investors. Therefore, the hybrid sukuk or 
mixed-assets sukuk have been introduced in the market. The inherent combination of assets 
considered in the hybrid sukuk can include receivables based on murabaha, ijarah and istisna 
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financing options. Hybrid sukuk are comprised of a set of assets taken from different 
categories, which should include at least 51% of the tradable assets.
531
 
The structure of the hybrid sukuk involves the following steps. The assets and Murabaha 
deals should be transferred by the Islamic finance instigator to the SPV. The certificates of 
participation are issued by the SPV to the holders of the sukuk on receiving the funds, which 
are further utilised by the Islamic finance instigator. The pool of assets is purchased by the 
Islamic finance instigator for a specific period of time from the SPV. Returns from the 
invested assets are obtained by the investors in the form of fixed payments.
532
     
The first hybrid sukuk were issued by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 2009, and 
were comprised of a set of assets (Ijarah contracts 65.8%, Murabaha receivables 30.73%, and 
Istisna 3.4%). With the aim of obtaining assured rating and marketability in the international 
market, the issuance of hybrid sukuk necessitated a guarantee from IDB. 
Solidarity Trust Services Limited (STSL) also issued hybrid sukuk of US $ 400 million. In 
this issue, ICD (the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector) remained 
engaged as an intermediary for buying the assets from IDB and trading them to STSL. The 
overall return on the investment was measured at the rate of 3.625 per annum for a fixed 
payment that was planned to be disseminated twice in a year and paid off by the month of 
August in 2008.
533
 
4.6 The Regulatory Framework of Sukuk in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, where the sukuk market is new and immature, the first issuance of sukuk was 
in 2004 on behalf of HANCO Rent-A-Car. The product was named the Caravan sukuk, and 
structured on an ijarah basis for three years.
534
 The researcher believes that this delay in the 
issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia was due to the lack of an independent body governing the 
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issuance of securities. In 2003, the Saudi government established the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) as a separate regulatory body under Article 4 of the CML in accordance 
with Royal Decree No. (M/30) dated 2 July 2003 to regulate and develop capital market 
activities in Saudi Arabia.
535
  
Although there is no specific framework for the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia, the CMA 
regulates and monitors the issuance of sukuk side-by-side with the issuance of shares and debt 
instruments under the CMA Listing Rules and the CMA Offer of Securities Regulations. The 
Listing Rules were issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority pursuant to its 
Resolution Number 3-11-2004 dated 4 October 2004 based on the Capital Market Law issued 
by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2 July 2003, amended by a Resolution of the Board of the 
Capital Market Authority Number 1-36-2012 dated 25 November 2012.
536
 The Offer of 
Securities Regulations were issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority pursuant to 
its Resolution Number 2-11-2004 dated 4 October 2004 based on the Capital Market Law 
issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2 July 2003, amended by Resolution of the Board of 
the Capital Market Authority Number 1-28-2008 dated 18 August 2008.
537
 Therefore, the 
Listing Rules and the Offer of Securities Regulations are the regulatory measures that control 
the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia.
538
  
The researcher found that all Saudi securities laws and regulations, such as the CML, Listing 
Rules and the Offer of Securities Regulations did not mention Shariah or Islamic bonds 
(sukuk) in their articles even though Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance in Saudi 
Arabia stipulates that the Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Holy Quran and 
the Sunnah.
539
 In this regard, Hasan says that despite 15 sukuk issuances from 2000 to 2008 
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and huge Islamic mutual funds in Saudi Arabia, there is no single piece of legislation 
specifically regulating the implementation of Islamic sukuk in Saudi Arabia.
540
 
Therefore, there remain some regulatory difficulties between the CMA and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry concerning the issuance of sukuk. This is due to the fact that the 
Offers of Securities Regulations do not refer specifically to sukuk, and therefore they must be 
defined as debt instruments even though Shariah-compliant sukuk do not create a debt 
obligation on the issuer.
541
  
4.7  Critiques and Recommendations of Current Sukuk Issuance Practice in Saudi 
Arabia 
After reviewing the present regulation and supervision of sukuk, it is clear that the issuance of 
sukuk in Saudi Arabia is suffering from heavy regulation and supervision drawbacks, which 
need to be identified in order to resolve the problems of regulation and insufficiency of 
supervision. The researcher believes that there are two major drawbacks regarding the 
issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia from both the regulatory and supervisory aspects. The 
researcher will provide appropriate recommendations and suggestions for overcoming these 
drawbacks. 
One of the major drawbacks is the absence of a legislative and regulatory structure for sukuk 
issuance in Saudi Arabia. According to Al-Elsheikh & Tanega, the financial regulations in 
Saudi Arabia do not include specific rules for the issuance of sukuk.
542
 They argue that most 
of the articles in the Offers of Securities Regulations and the Listing Rules mention financial 
instruments as securities in general or refer to debt instruments (bonds) or stocks in some 
cases.
543
 They conclude that the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is not being regulated, 
issued or operationalised from within a framework that takes account of the nature of sukuk 
as distinct from conventional debt instruments, which means that sukuk in Saudi Arabia are 
issued as debt instruments.
544
 This argument is supported by Hasan, where he says that there 
is no single legislation specifically regulating the implementation of sukuk issuance, even 
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though there were 15 sukuk issuances in 2000–2008 and huge Islamic mutual funds in Saudi 
Arabia.
545
  
Although there are differences between sukuk and conventional bonds, the Offers of 
Securities Regulations and the Listing Rules do not provide a clear distinction between sukuk 
and stocks, nor between sukuk and conventional bonds, thus possibly generating confusion 
between sukuk, bonds and shares.
546
 Moreover, Al-Elsheikh & Tanega believe that the 
current regulations of securities issuance in Saudi Arabia do not provide an efficient 
mechanism for setting up and maintaining transaction-specific special purpose companies. 
This creates considerable obstacles, thereby hindering investors’ ability to gain access to 
capital markets.
547
 Sheikh Taqi Usmani (chairman of the AAOIFI Shariah Board) has argued 
that most of the sukuk, especially those with a musharaka or mudaraba structure, are not 
lawful from a Shariah perspective because the assets in the sukuk may be shares of 
companies that do not confer true ownership but which merely offer sukuk holders a right to 
returns.
548
  
The key solution to the absence of a legislative and regulatory structure for sukuk issuance in 
Saudi Arabia would be to extend the present regulations in order to cover a wider range of 
financial investment instruments, such as sukuk, through the issuance of a new regulations
.549
 
The Board of the Capital Market Authority is the authority responsible for issuing such 
regulations, including in relation to Islamic bonds. When issuing new regulations concerning 
sukuk issuance, there are some essential points that must be considered by the Board of the 
Capital Market Authority:  
The first is that any legislative and regulatory framework for sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia 
must comply with the provisions and principles of Shariah. Article 1 of the Basic Law of 
Governance in Saudi Arabia endorses this where it stipulates that the constitution of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Holy Quran and the Sunnah.
550
 Therefore, any new 
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regulations of sukuk must take into account the principles of Shariah (the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah) so that there is no conflict with the Basic Law of Governance in Saudi Arabia, which 
derives its authority from the provisions of Shariah. 
The second point is that the new regulations of sukuk must be confirmed and approved by a 
Shariah Committee whose members are appointed by the proposed Saudi Shariah Advisory 
Council (SSAC) in order to ensure that the new regulations of sukuk comply with the 
principles of Shariah. The current financial regulations in Saudi Arabia which cover the 
issuance of shares and debt instruments do not consider sukuk because of the absence of a 
Shariah Committee or Shariah Adviser.
551
 Currently, there is no independent central Shariah 
board to regulate and supervise Islamic banking activities and also to appoint a Shariah 
Committee like the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) in Malaysia. However, a Shariah 
Committee or Shariah Adviser could be appointed by the CMA until the establishment of an 
independent body called the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council (SSAC). 
The final point is that the CMA should adopt standards and guidelines that are published by 
international and regional institutions such as International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), 
AAOIFI, and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) for the issuance of sukuk. For 
example, in 2008, the Shariah Board of AAOIFI has issued six recommendations on how 
sukuk should be structured, which dealt with matters of ownership, repurchasing and 
compliance. Although these standards are not binding, some countries such as Malaysia 
consider them. The Malaysian Shariah Advisory Board of the Securities Commission and 
Bank Negara Malaysia’s Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) encompasses the opinions adhered 
to by the AAOIFI.
552
 In addition, the CMA should consider resolutions and recommendations 
of the Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), and the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi 
Arabia regarding the issuance of sukuk. 
Another major criticism is the absence of a central Shariah supervisory board. According to 
Al-Elsheikh & Tanega, the absence of such a board that specialises in Islamic finance is 
considered one of the major issues facing the Islamic financial sector in Saudi Arabia, as it 
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could lead to declining public trust in securities that are provided as Islamic products.
553
 
These authors argue that although some IFIs have their own Shariah supervisory boards and 
follow the principles and guidelines that are published by international and regional 
institutions such as the IIFM, AAOIFI, and the IFSB, it is necessary to establish a central 
Shariah supervisory board to enforce its decisions and to create general guidelines and rules 
that should be taken into consideration by IFIs and the CMA in Saudi Arabia.
554
  
This absence of a central Shariah supervisory board raises the probability of conflict in 
opinions (fatwas) between Islamic scholars about the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia. 
These differing opinions between Islamic scholars may result in significant damage to the 
issuer of sukuk in addition to a loss of confidence among investors.
555
 An example of this 
conflict is the initial public offering of the Yanbu National Petrochemical Company 
(YANSAB) where the opinions of Islamic scholars are divided into two groups with different 
points of view. These differences of opinion arose because the company borrowed money 
from a conventional bank with an interest rate. The first opinion is represented by the opinion 
of Dr Yusuf Alshubaili, who stated that the main activities of the company were Shariah 
compliant and that contributing to YANSAB’s initial public offering (IPO) was permitted 
even if the company was involved in non-Shariah-compliant activities such as borrowing 
small amounts of money from conventional banks. The other opinion is represented by Dr 
Yusuf Alahmad, who adopted the view that contributing to the IPO of the company was not 
permitted, due to the involvement of the company in a non-Shariah-compliant activity.
556
  
The researcher recommends the establishment of a Shariah Advisory in the CMA called the 
Securities Commission Shariah Advisory Council (SCSAC) to regulate and supervise the 
issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia. The SCSAC is appointed by the CMA and the proposed 
Saudi Shariah Advisory Council (SSAC). For more details about how to establish an 
independent central Shariah board, and how to enact laws and regulations related to Islamic 
finance in Saudi Arabia, the researcher will provide a proposed legislative and regulatory 
framework for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia, including the issuance of sukuk. 
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This will be covered at the end of Chapter Six (Derivatives in Islamic Finance and their 
Applications in Saudi Arabia). 
Regarding the securities disputes, the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes 
(CRSD) is the body responsible for looking into such disputes, under the Regulating 
Procedures for Resolution of Securities Disputes, issued by the Board of the Capital Market 
Authority under Resolution No. (1-4-2011) dated 23/01/2011.
557
 Although the issuance of 
sukuk in Saudi Arabia is regulated and supervised by the CMA, the Regulating Procedures 
for Resolution of Securities Disputes do not mention anything about the resolution of sukuk 
issuance disputes.
558
  
The researcher recommends currently amending the present Regulating Procedures for 
Resolution of Securities Disputes to cover disputes of sukuk issuance until specialised 
commercial courts can be established to look into commercial issues including the issuance 
of sukuk. These courts should take the opinion of the proposed SSAC in the Islamic banking 
and finance issues in order to avoid any conflict of opinion between them. The researcher will 
deal with this in more depth in Chapter Six.  
Therefore, the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is regulated and supervised by the CMA 
under the Offers of Securities Regulations and the Listing Rules without any legislative and 
regulatory frameworks of sukuk issuance, and also without standards and guidelines on the  
Shariah governance system. They are also issued without obtaining the approval of the 
Shariah board because there is no Shariah board in the CMA in Saudi Arabia.  
In contrast, in Malaysia, the issuance of sukuk is regulated by the Securities Commission 
Malaysia under section 212 of the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007,
559
 and Guidelines 
on Sukuk are issued by the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) under Section 377 of the 
Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 (CMSA).
560
 Sukuk issuance is regulated through the 
framework provided under the Islamic Securities Guidelines (Sukuk Guidelines). The 
structure of sukuk is based on the specific contract of exchange of Shariah-compliant assets, 
and it must be confirmed and approved by an independent Shariah Adviser who is appointed 
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by the Securities Commission Malaysia or a Shariah Committee attached to a financial 
institution that operates Islamic banking activities approved by Bank Negara Malaysia.
561
 
4.8 Summary  
This chapter has provided a comprehensive and critical review of sukuk issuance in Saudi 
Arabia, including its concept, mechanism, principles, practices and models as an Islamic 
alternative to conventional bonds. This chapter has also examined whether the current uses of 
sukuk provided by the CMA are compatible with the principles of Shariah. The research 
question of this chapter has discussed to what extent the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is 
consistent with Shariah requirements.  
 
The issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is regulated and supervised by the CMA side-by-side 
with the issuance of shares and debt instruments under the Offers of Securities Regulations 
and the Listing Rules. The researcher found that the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is not 
consistent with Shariah requirements. This is due to the lack of legislative and regulatory 
framework of sukuk issuance, and also there are no standards and guidelines on the Shariah 
governance system for institutions offering Islamic financial services. In addition, there is no 
independent central Shariah board to regulate and supervise the issuance of sukuk in Saudi 
Arabia, and also there are no specialised commercial courts to look into sukuk issues in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
The researcher recommended amending the present regulations for the offering and issuance 
of securities in Saudi Arabia in order to cover a wider range of financial investment 
instruments, such as sukuk. The researcher also recommended the establishment a Shariah 
Advisory Council in the CMA called the Securities Commission Shariah Advisory Council 
(SCSAC) to regulate and supervise the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia. The SCSAC would 
be appointed by the proposed SSAC to ensure that the issuance of sukuk is in compliance 
with Shariah principles.  
 
The researcher recommended adopting standards and guidelines that are published by 
international and regional institutions such as AAOIFI, IFSB and IIFM until the 
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establishment of the proposed SSAC. The researcher also recommended amending the 
present Regulating Procedures for Resolution of Securities Disputes to cover disputes of 
sukuk issuance until specialised commercial courts are established to look into commercial 
issues including the issuance of sukuk. The researcher recommended transferring the 
Malaysian experience in the field of sukuk to Saudi Arabia with some modifications that are 
commensurate with the nature of the Saudi regime. 
 
The next chapter will provide a critical analysis of the current Islamic insurance (takaful) 
applications in Saudi Arabia. The chapter will focus on the problems and challenges of 
takaful in Saudi Arabia from a legal point of view. The next chapter will also examine 
whether the law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies is compatible with the 
principles of Shariah. Finally, it will offer possible solutions to these problems. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ISLAMIC INSURANCE (TAKAFUL) IN SAUDI ARABIA: 
PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to give a comprehensive and critical review of takaful applications in Saudi 
Arabia, and the extent to which Saudi insurance law is consistent with Shariah. The chapter 
is divided into a number of sections. The first section provides an overview of takaful; the 
next section offers the basic principles of takaful. The third section covers the regulation and 
supervision of takaful insurance. Models of takaful, the differences between it and 
conventional insurance and the prohibition of conventional insurance are covered in section 
four. The next section examines takaful challenges in Saudi Arabia and provides solutions to 
meet those challenges. This section also gives a critical analysis of the law of supervision of 
cooperative insurance companies in Saudi Arabia, and their implementing regulations, and 
examines whether Saudi insurance law is consistent with Islamic Shariah as a constitution for 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Finally, a summary is provided. 
5.2  Background of Takaful 
The Islamic alternative to conventional insurance is Islamic insurance (takaful), which is 
based on the idea of shared responsibility, social solidarity, mutual cooperation or assistance, 
and brotherhood, and provides for mutual financial security and assistance to safeguard 
participants or members against a defined risk.
562
 Takaful is considered to be an agreement or 
contract among participants (policyholders) to jointly indemnify the loss or damage that may 
be inflicted upon any of them, out of the fund to which they donate collectively. In other 
words, members contribute money into a pooling system in order to guarantee one another 
against loss or damage. So, if one of the policyholders has to be paid a claim, this is paid out 
of the combined pool of the policyholders’ contributions.563 In a takaful contract, there are 
four parties involved: the participant, the operator, the insured and the beneficiary.
564
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The term takaful is mentioned in Section 2 of the Malaysian Takaful Act 1984
565
 as “a 
scheme based on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual assistance which provides for mutual 
financial aid and assistance to the participants in case of need whereby the participants 
mutually agree to contribute for that purpose”,566 while the Saudi system employs the term 
‘cooperative insurance’ in Article 1 of the Law on the Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies.
567
 Article 1 stipulates that insurance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be 
undertaken through registered insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner as 
provided in the Article establishing the National Company for Cooperative Insurance 
promulgated by Royal Decree M/5 dated 7/02/5891, and in accordance with the principles of 
Islamic Shariah.
568
  
According to Manjoo, takaful is not a new concept for Islamic commercial law, which means 
that there were some similar practices in early Islamic Arabic society.
569
 He adds that takaful 
comes from the concept of Aqilah
570
 (pooling of resources), and Al-Dayyah
571
 (substitute 
penalty) which prevailed in Arabia during the time of the Prophet Mohammed, and even 
before, whereby members of a tribe would participate in sharing the burden of paying any 
compensation that arose when one of its members committed an offence which demanded 
pecuniary compensation.
572
 In other words, the takaful system in the past was intended to 
distribute concentrated risk from a single individual to the tribe or family.
573
  
According to Taylor, the roots of takaful were derived from the first constitution in Medinah 
of 622, when tribes agreed on some kinds of insurance, such as social insurance, relying upon 
practices such as al-diyah and al-aqila (wergild or blood-money to rescue an accused in 
accidental killings), fidyah (ransom of prisoners of war) and cooperative schemes to aid the 
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needy, ill and poor.
574
 However, there are some different structures between the ancient 
practices of social insurance and the current takaful system. For example, the tribe or family 
was the legislator, and all members of the tribe or family paid against a defined risk without 
their choice, while the current system of takaful is organised by insurance companies under 
the principles of Shariah. 
With respect to the legitimacy of Islamic insurance (takaful), there is no clear evidence from 
the Quran or Sunnah explicitly indicating the legality of takaful insurance. However, there 
are some connotations from the Quran, social and commercial practices of Prophet 
Mohammed, Qiyas (comparative arguments), and Ijma (the agreement of the whole Islamic 
world on an issue) which are considered the basis of the legitimacy of the Islamic insurance 
practices at the present time.
575
 For example, the Quran and Sunnah have stipulated the 
concept of mutual cooperation in many places. The Quran states to this effect: 
“And co-operate ye with one another in righteousness and piety, and do not co- 
operate in sin and aggression”.576 
The Prophet Muhammad said:  
“The believers, in their affection, mercy and sympathy to each other, are like the 
body: if one of its organs suffer and complains, the entire body responds with 
insomnia and fever”.577 
Some conferences have been held by contemporary Muslim jurists to discuss conventional 
insurance. Most of them believe that conventional insurance is prohibited by Shariah because 
it includes elements of usury (riba), uncertainty (gharar), and gambling (maisir). However, 
Muslim scholars have reached some resolutions about this issue through a series of such 
conferences, held since 1976,
578
 as below:  
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a. The First Conference on Islamic Economics, Mecca, 1976: Conventional insurance as 
practised today does not comply with the spirit of Shariah and does not fulfil the 
requirements which might render it permissible.
579
 
b. 10th Conference of Prominent Muslim Scholars, Saudi Arabia, 1977: Confirmed by 
consensus of opinion that conventional insurance in all its types is not permissible, 
whether it is life insurance or general insurance (on property).
580
 
c. The Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jeddah, 1985: Confirmed that conventional insurance is 
forbidden due to the uncertainties (gharar). In this conference, the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy issued three resolutions or decisions. The first resolution is that a 
commercial insurance policy with fixed-premium companies that deal in commercial 
insurance with an element of uncertainty (gharar) invalidates any contract. Therefore, 
all forms of commercial insurance, whether for self, for merchandise or otherwise are 
forbidden by Shariah. The second decision is that the Islamic alternative to 
conventional insurance is takaful, which is based on the idea of social solidarity, 
cooperation and donation, as well as re-insurance, which is considered permissible 
because it operates on the basis of cooperative insurance. The third one is that the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy calls on Islamic countries to establish mutual cooperative 
institutions for insurance and reinsurance as well.
581
  
Based on the above conferences and discussions, it is clear that conventional insurance is 
forbidden in Shariah because, as mentioned earlier, of the elements of usury (riba), 
uncertainty (gharar), and gambling (maisir). The Islamic alternative to conventional 
insurance is takaful, which is based on the idea of social solidarity (Tabaru), cooperation 
(Taawun) and joint indemnification of losses of the members.
582
 Thus, takaful is permitted by 
the consensus or agreement of the Muslim community (Ijma), which is considered a 
secondary source of Shariah, because it is a contemporary issue, and not mentioned in the 
Quran and Sunnah. 
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According to Ayub, the main objective of the takaful system is mutual help rather than 
earning profit or any windfall gains, as in the case of conventional insurance,583 while Hassan 
thinks that the basic objective of takaful is to provide risk management protection for 
individuals and business enterprises in Islamically acceptable ways.584 Kabir's view is that the 
main purpose of takaful is to bring equity to all members of society, especially the poor and 
those with special needs,585 which means that profit earning is not the main purpose of takaful 
under Shariah, but rather the aim is to help others who face risks and share misfortunes. 
Therefore, the payment of a premium by policyholders is to assist those of them who need 
financial security and it is regarded as a donation contract. 586 In contrast, Hussain and Pasha 
believe that the purpose of conventional insurance is to protect the risk-averse from suffering 
the full cost of those actions on the part of nature which affect them unfavourably.
587
 These 
essential points of takaful are applied in all its forms, such as general takaful or family takaful 
(an alternative to life insurance) where all members agree to help each other out with their 
contributions if any one of them faces any catastrophe or incurs any defined loss.588 
The first takaful company was established in Sudan in 1979, under the name Islamic 
Insurance Co. Ltd. This company was able to distribute profits to its shareholders at the rate 
of 5% in 1979, 8% in 1980 and 10% in 1981. Following the success of this insurance 
company in Sudan, other Islamic insurance (takaful) companies were established in Islamic 
and in non-Islamic countries.
589
 Currently, there are over 60 companies offering takaful 
services in 24 countries around the world.
590
 For example, in Saudi Arabia, the first 
cooperative insurance company was established in 1980, also under the name of Islamic 
Insurance Co. Ltd, by the Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan); after that, Malaysia started a takaful 
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business in 1984, and then in Pakistan the first Islamic insurance company was established in 
2004.
591
  
The takaful industry has been growing at a rate of 10–20% p.a., compared to the global 
average growth of the insurance industry which is 5% p.a.
592
 In Saudi Arabia, according to 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), in 2011 Gross Written Premiums (GWP) in 
the Saudi insurance market reached SR 18.504 billion, up from SR 16.387 billion in 2010. 
This represents an increase of 12.9%, compared to a 12% growth rate in 2010.
593
 Currently, 
Saudi Arabia’s takaful insurance industry is considered the largest such industry in the 
world.
594
 Regarding the future of the takaful industry, Syed Umar Farooq  estimates that the 
global takaful industry will grow by 20% and reach US$ 10–15 billion within the next 
decade.
595
  
Takaful services are available to meet the needs of all sectors of the economy, both at 
individual and corporate levels, to cater for the short- and long-term financial needs of 
various groups in society.  Takaful business has also been developed in Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia, Bahrain and UAE.
596
 
5.3 The Basic Principles of Takaful  
The general principles of takaful are the same as those of Islamic finance, which is, as 
mentioned earlier, the prohibition of usury (riba), uncertainty (gharar), and gambling 
(maisir), but takaful as a contract of mutual insurance is based on the principles of mutual 
cooperation (taawun) and donation (tabaru), cooperative risk-sharing, mutual responsibility, 
mutual protection, and solidarity among groups of participants. These principles may be 
combined in each takaful contract in different ways.
597
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5.3.1  Mutual Cooperation and Donation  
The basic principles of takaful are based on mutual cooperation (taawun) and donation 
(tabaru), where the risk is shared collectively and voluntarily by participants. Under these 
principles, policyholders cooperate among themselves for their common good, where every 
policyholder contributes a certain proportion of the full amount of his/her subscription to help 
those that need assistance as tabaru. According to Redzuan, Rahman and Aidid, the majority 
opinion by many contemporary Islamic jurists and scholars is that, for an insurance system to 
be acceptable by Shariah, it must be based on the principles of mutual cooperation (taawun) 
and donation (tabaru).
598
 In other words, the contribution or premium made by the participant 
is put into two accounts. One of them is treated as being for charitable donations according to 
the principles of tabaru. The other is an investment account that follows the principles of 
mudarabah (profit and loss sharing).
599
 
5.3.2 Cooperative Risk-Sharing 
One of the main principles of takaful is cooperative risk-sharing. Under this principle, 
policyholders contribute to the money pool and receive help from that pool through the funds 
coming from other members when a risk becomes a reality. In the takaful system, the risk is a 
shared responsibility among the members of the fund, whereas in conventional insurance, the 
risk is transferred from one party to another.
600
 
5.3.3  Mutual Responsibility 
Takaful is based on mutual assistance among the members of the fund, where each member is 
responsible for alleviating the misfortunes of the other members.  Each member of a takaful 
fund shares the risks of all the other members. Put another way, the risks are shared among 
all the members, and every member’s risks become the mutual responsibility of all the other 
members.
601
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5.3.4 Mutual Protection 
Another important principle of takaful is mutual protection among the participants. Each 
member participates in protecting all the other members against loss or damage. This 
principle was practised during the life of the Prophet Muhammad.
602
 
5.3.5  Solidarity among Participants 
Under this principle, people who choose to contribute to a takaful fund are sharing common 
interests (the desire to protect themselves and all the other members from harm deriving from 
loss or damages) and common responsibilities (losses are divided and liabilities spread 
according to the community pooling system), and therefore, no members derive an advantage 
at a cost to others.
603
 
5.4 The Regulation and Supervision of Takaful Insurance 
In the niche sector, it is exciting to see the growth and development of the insurance sector. 
As compared to the traditional market, the demand and supply for insurance protection in 
terms of consumption of insurance per person or the contribution of the industry to the GDP, 
is comparatively less than in the market of developed insurance. It predominantly focuses on 
the policyholder’s interest protection and the conformity of the insurer in accordance with 
Shariah. The interest of the policy holder is secured mainly in terms of the contribution of the 
life insurance premium, need for protection of income and property in non-life insurance, and 
sharing of profits fairly in both classes of insurance.
604
 
The market for insurance requires more measures of supervision for lasting and firmness of 
growth of takaful insurance. A number of governments understand the requirements and have 
introduced an Act for takaful insurance and the regulations associated with it (Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, Qatar and Jordan). Lack of regulation was the reason for the 
meagre coverage of the operation of the activities of takaful insurance in many other 
countries, despite the imposition of the act of takaful insurance. The blame for the lack of 
regulation can be classified into two reasons. First, in many countries, takaful is still in its 
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infancy and traditional insurance companies are its opponents. To administer takaful 
insurance, the regulators may need to widen the existing laws for insurance and 
regulations.
605
 
Second, the ultimate legislature of Pakistan is Shariah;
606
 it is also the constitutional law of 
Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan and in most Islamic countries Shariah is also the supreme 
law.
607
 Since all matters of business are tied up with the law of Islam, there is less need for 
these countries to have a special set of laws and regulations governing insurance. In these 
countries, takaful insurance must be guided according to Islamic principles. In Islamic 
societies, Shariah can also be used to resolve the conflicts between Muslim businesses and 
the individual, a practice seen in selected countries populated with Muslims such as 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.
608
  
The issue of maturity of the market and competitiveness arises in many countries where both 
the traditional and takaful insurer exist. The law of Shariah binds the takaful insurers mainly 
in the context of sharing of profit, areas of investment and designing of the product. In life 
insurance operations, these types of limitations are clearly visible. The domestic markets of 
many countries have turned to liberalisation and privatisation by their respective 
governments. For example, the local market of Saudi Arabia was privatised in the early 
2000s, permitting 100 per cent foreign equity ownership of local insurance firms. Full foreign 
ownership of insurance and re-insurance companies was also allowed by Jordan.  As a result, 
the Middle East insurance market has become more competitive and is likely to see the 
insolvency of incompetent companies.
609
 
In Saudi Arabia, the SAMA is considered the primary regulator of the Saudi Arabian 
insurance market under the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, 
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promulgated by Royal Decree (M/32) dated 31 July 2003.
610
 SAMA also directs the 
cooperative insurance companies in distributing 10% of the net surplus of the insurance 
surplus to policyholders directly or in the form of a reduction in premiums for the following 
year. The remaining 90% of the net surplus is transferred to the shareholders. SAMA has also 
mandated all insurance companies (existing and new) to obtain a licence by March 2008 to 
underwrite their business or exit the market. Notably, to obtain a licence, a company must be 
established as a joint stock company, and invest at least 20% of policyholder funds in 
government bonds and 20% in bonds issued by Saudi-authorised banks.
611
 
There are some other related issues in addition to the regulation and administration of takaful. 
The issues are capital and solvency regulation, market entry regulation, market conduct 
regulation, corporate governance and investment regulation. 
5.4.1 Regulation for Market Entry 
The market size differs from country to country. The difference in market size is replicated in 
terms of the presence of weak market entry and regulation of capital. Usually, countries 
having strong government support tend to have large takaful insurance firms. The firms in 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and UAE are larger, compared to those located in the less careful 
market.  
Examination of the insurance Acts of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran, as well as the Takaful 
Act 1984 of Malaysia, reveals that none of them are using a needs test to control access to the 
market. They use minimum market entry capital like others, which differs according to 
market conditions. Here the question arises as to whether the domestic market of the takaful 
is large enough for the insurers to generate high profits and cover their expenses related to 
operations, and generate profits for their policyholders too, and this has become an issue for 
the insurer. What the reasonable solution is? The reasonable solution to this problem would 
lead to growth in the size of takaful insurance firms through various methods such as mergers 
and acquisitions; in other countries it will also lead to the extension of the business to the 
takaful markets. The takaful insurers need more opportunities for generating more revenues 
and for expanding risk and investment portfolios, as regionalisation and internationalisation 
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are difficult and complex. Unless and until the insurer’s present and original ideas can 
maintain financial and operational soundness in addition, the privatisation and liberalisation 
of the domestic market will not be very significant.
612
 
5.4.2 Regulation of Capital and Solvency 
There are two types of funds managed by takaful companies, one for the policy holder and 
the other for the shareholder. There may also be a requirement to divide the funds of the 
policy holder into special and individual accounts in the life insurance sector. The insurer will 
be barred from combining the revenue sources by the separation of the funds and accounts 
and will also be forbidden to use one fund or account to cover any deficit in other accounts.
613
 
The capital of the insurer plays a very important role in the takaful business. The capital is the 
money the insurer obtains at the beginning without any interest from the investors; the 
investors in return want a part of the insurer’s operating profits. The capital is used as an 
interest-free line of credit by the insurer for the policy holder for the year in which it 
experiences underwriting losses. The capital is used as a guiding force against the instability 
of the insurance operations. Takaful insurers, like all other insurance companies, are sensitive 
to instability in pricing as well as the market, and the economic and political environment, all 
of which affect the underwriting performance of the insurer whether individually or in 
aggregate form.
614
 
5.4.3 Regulation of Investment 
The compliance of the insurer with Shariah probably the most pressurising part, in the 
context of investment. The guidelines of Shariah state that takaful firms invest their funds in 
bonds issued by the government agencies, in time deposits and in shares or funds, including 
the shares of Islamic companies. The investor can invest in non-Islamic companies and 
government investment corporations, whichever goods and services are termed halal. The 
guidelines do not allow the investor to invest in any lines that are incompatible, such as 
alcohol manufacturing, production of pork, conventional financial services, manufacturing of 
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weapons, the tobacco industry, and entertainment such as hotels, casinos and the music 
industry. The key factor that affects insurance companies is the investment performance. 
Conventional investments are broader in size than takaful investments. This clearly shows 
that there is a vast scope for the development of investment for insurers and for other 
financial institutions.
615
  
The Islamic investment market is witnessing several developments: halal investment is being 
supported by Malaysia and the country is popular for this; the bank Negara Malaysia, the 
central bank of the country, issues directions regularly via the Shariah Advisory Council of 
the Securities Commission on such types of investment. The takaful insurance firms and 
Muslim investors in the country and outside the country can invest in up to approximately 
500 listed companies on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange. This is the result of efforts made 
by the central bank and the Shariah advisory council. Other Shariah comprising investments 
have been identified by takaful insurance firms with the aid of the central bank. For example, 
policy holders associated with Takaful Malaysia have an option to invest their savings in 
individual holding accounts of Takaful Malaysia, the Islamic bank, for a period covering 
from one month to 60 months.
616
 
In takaful fund investment, conflict between the principal and the agency may be present. On 
one side, takaful operators are expected to exercise prudence in making investment decisions 
and not to subject their policyholders’ funds to potentially high return and high risk 
situations. On the other side, the holder of the policy encourages a high return on 
investments. The same applies to the shareholders and insurance agents because their share of 
the profit is directly related to the performance of the insurer's investment. This matter was 
not given due importance by any of the regulators, other than the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors and the Islamic Financial Services Board in the form of a joint issue 
report.
617
 
5.4.4  Conduct of Market and Corporate Governance 
In takaful insurance, corporate governance and market conduct are the most effectively and 
efficiently regulated areas. The conduct of business and the decision making is done by the 
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takaful insurers in accordance with the law of Shariah. This is a matter of ethical guidelines 
and strict, even rigid, moral standards. In accordance with the law or by their own wish, the 
creation of the Shariah board may include one or more policyholder as a member. It is 
suggested that these members should give the right to the policyholder to check their business 
books and let them know how the sharing of profit can be done. Many takaful insurance 
companies still need to build up their self-regulatory practices for the improvement and 
development of operational soundness and solvency in terms of finance.
618
 
5.5  Why Conventional Insurance is Prohibited and Unacceptable in Shariah 
It is important to understand that Islam is not against the concept of insurance itself but 
against the basis of the operation of conventional insurance methods, which does not comply 
with the spirit of Shariah and does not fulfil the requirements which might render it 
permissible.
619
 For instance, in conventional insurance, the premium paid by the participant 
to the conventional insurance companies is owned by the companies in exchange for bearing 
all expected risks of the participant.
620
 According to Syed Ibn-Abdin, it is not in accordance 
with Shariah for a trader to pay the amount of premium to the insurance company so that he 
may be indemnified.
621
 From the viewpoint of Shariah, the basic objection to conventional 
insurance is that it is effectively a gamble upon the incidence of the contingency insured 
against, because the interests of both parties are diametrically opposed, and neither party 
knows whether their respective rights and liabilities can be enforced until the occurrence of 
the insured events.
622
  
Contemporary Muslim jurists have discussed conventional insurance in a series of 
discussions held since 1976. For example, the First Conference on Islamic Economy, Mecca, 
1976, confirmed that conventional insurance as practised today does not comply with the 
spirit of Shariah. In Saudi Arabia, the 10th Conference of Prominent Muslim Scholars, 1977, 
confirmed that conventional insurance in all its types is not permissible, whether it is life 
insurance or general insurance (on property). The Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jeddah, 1985, 
issued a fatwa declaring that conventional insurance is prohibited due to the uncertainties 
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(gharar).
623
 In Malaysia, the Malaysian National Fatwa Committee issued a fatwa that 
conventional insurance is prohibited (haram) due to the presence of elements of excessive 
uncertainty (gharar), interest (riba), and gambling (maisir).
624
  
Most contemporary Muslim jurists have decided that conventional insurance is not allowed in 
Islam mainly because it contains the above-mentioned elements, and the invalid transfer of 
risk from the insured to the insurer. In addition, it contains an element of temptation and the 
possibility of cheating, and is therefore incompatible with the natural and ethical methods of 
earning money.
625
 
Based on the above, it could be said that the main reason for the prohibition of conventional 
insurance is that the conventional insurance contract contains objectionable elements such as 
gharar, riba and maisir. Therefore, it should be stressed that the prohibition does not apply to 
the goals and objectives of insurance but rather to the way the contract is formulated.
626
 The 
question that arises here is, how does conventional insurance involve the elements of gharar, 
riba and maisir? 
In the legal terminology of jurists, gharar is the sale of a thing which is not present at hand or 
is not known or a sale involving a hazard in which one does not know whether it will come to 
be or not, such as the sale of a fish in water, or a bird in the air.
627
 According to Muhammad 
Ayub, gharar means uncertainty about the subject matter and the price and also the rights and 
liabilities of parties in commutative contracts.
628
 In other words, gharar involves the 
uncertainty of terms resulting in deception or a lack of clear conditions and terms.
629
 
Therefore, there is no clarity about payment as promised, and also no clarity in the insurance 
                                                 
623
 Akhtarzaite binti Abdulaziz, ‘Al-Dharai and Maqasid al-Shariah: a case study of Islamic insurance’, 
Intellectual Discourse (2010) 18 (2) 272; Asif Ahmed Qureshi, ‘Analyzing the shariah compliant issues 
currently faced by Islamic Insurance’, Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business (2011)  
3 (5) 280. 
624
 Sheila Nu Htay, Mohamed Arif, Younes Soualhi, Hanna Rabittah Zaharin and Ibrahim Shaugee, Accounting, 
Auditing and Governance for Takaful Operations (John Wiley & Sons 2012) 5. 
625
 Akhtarzaite binti Abdulaziz, ‘Al-Dharai and Maqasid al-Shariah: a case study of Islamic insurance’, 
Intellectual Discourse (2010) 18 (2) 272; Asif Ahmed Qureshi, ‘Analyzing the shariah compliant issues 
currently faced by Islamic Insurance’, Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business (2011)  
3 (5) 280. 
626
 Renat I. Bekkin, ‘Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation’, Arab Law Quarterly [2007]  
21, p. 21. 
627
 Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons Ltd (2007) 58. 
628
 Ibid, p. 419. 
629
 Asif Ahmed Qureshi, ‘Analyzing the shariah compliant issues currently faced by Islamic Insurance’, 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business (2011) 3 (5) 281. 
129 
 
contract about how much should be paid at the time of payment.
630
 Gharar is found if the 
liability of any of the parties to a contract is uncertain or contingent; in other words, delivery 
of one of the exchange items is not in the control of any party or the payment from one side is 
uncertain.
631
 In general, there should not be the sort of ambiguity that gives rise to 
speculation.
632
  
Gharar is involved in conventional insurance as a policyholder enters into a business deal in 
which his liability and the right both remain contingent. He loses the amount given as 
premium if the event of insurance does not occur, as in the case of general insurance. The 
insurer (company) does not know how much he will owe to the insured. In many cases, an 
insured also does not know how much he will pay ultimately to the insurer. In life policies, a 
policyholder has generally to lose all the premiums that he has paid if he cancels his policy 
within the first two or three years of the contract.
633
 Wan Ahmad concludes that conventional 
insurance does carry excessive gharar because the subject matter exchanged in the contract is 
money, and money is a kind of buying and selling contract, thus exposing the contract to 
conditions or requirements of reasonableness.
634
 Hij Abd Jabbar believes that conventional 
insurance is prohibited because there is uncertainty in the subject matter; for example, in 
whether the compensation in case of loss will be made or not.
635
 According to Mher Hussain 
and Ahmad Pasha, gharar can exist in insurance in four forms: in the existence, in the results 
of the exchange, in the contract period and finally in the outcome.
636
 
Conventional insurance involves riba both directly and indirectly in its investment activities: 
the direct involvement of riba is an excess on one side in the case of exchange between the 
amount of premiums and the sum insured,
637
 for example, if a claim is not made in non-life 
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policies, the insurance company keeps almost the whole amount.
638
 While investment in 
interest-based businesses by the insurer refers to the indirect involvement of the policyholder 
in riba-based transactions, such as putting insurance funds in riba/interest-bearing 
instruments such as bond and loans.
639
 In addition, the presence of riba in conventional 
insurance contracts is through lending and borrowing funds/investment at a fixed interest 
rate.
640
  
Maisir literally means gambling.
641
 According to Faizal Manjoo, maisir is defined as risking 
or betting on a thing of economic value in a game of chance with the hope of obtaining 
more.
642
 Another definition, given by Muhammad Ayub, is that maisir means wishing for 
something valuable with ease and without paying an equivalent compensation (iwad) for it or 
without working for it, or without undertaking any liability against it, by way of a game of 
chance.
643
 In gambling, one party is always hoping for a gain at the cost of another person 
losing.
644
 According to Mubbsher Khan, maisir in insurance is when policyholders invest a 
small amount of premium with the hope of gaining a large profit, but sometimes due to losses 
they lose the premium they have invested and the claims may be higher than the 
contributions.
645
 In this case, the company would probably be in deficit. However, the 
policyholder would lose the money paid for the premium if the insured event does not occur. 
Here, gambling is playing its role.
646
 Maisir is completely banned by Islam; in the Holy 
Quran, Allah has clearly declared maisir unlawful and there is no relaxation on this.
647
 
References from the Holy Quran in this regard are: 
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“O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, sacrificing to stones and 
divination by arrows, are abominable actions of Satan; so abstain from them, that you 
may prosper”.648  
 “Satan intends to excite enmity and hatred among you with intoxicants and gambling, 
and hinder you from the remembrance of Allah, and from prayer; will ye not then 
abstain?”649  
 “They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say: ‘In them is great sin and some 
benefits for people; but the sin is greater than the benefits”.650  
According to Humayon Dar and Umar Moghu, the nature of insurance includes an element of 
maisir because the policyholders are held to be betting a premium on the condition that the 
insurer will make payment (indemnity) contingent upon the circumstance of a specified 
event. On the other hand, the insured does not receive anything back from their premium if 
the insured event does not happen at all.
651
 For example, when the policyholder does not 
make any claim during the stipulated period, the insurance operator may obtain all the profit 
while the policyholder may not obtain any profit at all. The loss of premiums by the 
policyholder on abolition of contract will only be a burden to the policyholder. Furthermore, 
only a proportional refund will be made if any termination of contract is done by the 
insurance company.
652
  
On the basis of the above discussion, it would seem that there are similarities between the 
conventional insurance contract and gambling. According to Abdul Wahab:  
“There are similarities between maisir and the conventional insurance contract. The 
amount insured is paid back to the insurer when certain events occur. If the event 
never occurs, the insurance company keeps the premium. It’s like putting money in a 
pot and rolling the dice, the lucky winner takes the pot. In the case of conventional 
insurance companies, they play the role of the “House” and the insuree plays the role 
of the gambler by placing a bet. The gain for the “House” is always certain, while the 
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gain for the better is doubtful; the person may gain or lose. Overall, the “House” is 
against the gamblers, and the insurance company is against the insured, the “House” 
and the insurance company are always winners”.653 
5.6 Differences between Takaful and Conventional Insurance 
The difference between takaful and conventional insurance rests on the nature of the contract, 
and in the way the risk is assessed and handled, as well as how the takaful fund is managed. 
Further differences are also present in the relationship between the operator (in conventional 
insurance known as the 'insurer') and the participant (in conventional insurance this is the 
'insured' or the 'assured').
654
  
Regarding the nature of their contracts, while in conventional insurance the contract is based 
on the principles of exchange such as sale and purchase between the insurer and the insured, 
the Takaful contract is based on the principles of mutual cooperation and donation.
655
 On the 
basis of these principles, there is a difference in the contractual relationship between the 
policyholders, and also between the takaful operator and the policyholders. For example, in 
takaful, the relationship between the policyholders is that takaful members (policyholders) 
jointly own the funds in accordance with their contributions and undertake to mutually 
protect each other on the basis of gift.
656
 In conventional insurance, however, there is no 
relationship between the policyholders though they pay into the same insurance fund.
657
  
Another example is about the relationship between the company or insurer in conventional 
insurance and the takaful operator in Islamic insurance, and the policyholders. In takaful, 
there are two types of relationships. Firstly, under the takaful wakalah model, the takaful 
operator acts as an agent on behalf of the participants to manage the takaful operations, and 
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receives a salary for this service,
658
 while in the mudarabah contract, the takaful operator 
may play the role of mudrib or entrepreneur.
659
 Under this model, the takaful operator and its 
policyholders share profits and losses based on the rate at which the Shariah committee 
agrees. The takaful operator is not responsible for any loss unless the loss stems from the 
company’s own negligence or misconduct.660  In conventional insurance, however, according 
to Mubbsher, the relationship between insurer and insured is a seller–purchaser relationship 
or one-to-one relationship.
661
  
With regard to the legality of the investment from the point of view of Shariah, takaful funds 
must be invested in Shariah-compliant investment, while conventional insurance funds may 
be invested in both Shariah and non Shariah-compliant investment.
662
 This is one of the 
fundamental differences between Islamic and conventional insurance. In this regard, 
according to Mher and Ahmad, the distinction between the conventional and takaful 
insurance is more visible with respect to investment of funds.
663
 While insurance companies 
invest their funds in interest-based avenues, takaful companies invest funds in interest-free 
avenues and undertake only Shariah compliant business, and the profits are distributed in 
accordance with pre-agreed profit-sharing ratios in the takaful contract.
664
  
According to Mher and Ahmad, takaful companies face additional risks as compared to 
conventional insurance because conventional insurance companies invest large amounts in 
fixed income securities on their balance sheet in order to minimise the risks and the 
variability associated with the equity.
665
  
Under a takaful contract, the policyholder has the right to know how their money is used and 
how the surrender value is calculated, and takaful policyholders must be certain that neither 
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returns nor funds paid out in claim settlements originate from unlawful means such as 
investments in stocks of companies producing non-halal goods; while in conventional 
insurance the policyholder has no right to know about this.
666
 In addition, policyholders have 
the right to know how profits from different investments are divided among the participants 
under the takaful contract, while under the conventional system there is no hard and fast rule 
for profit distribution, it totally depends on company management.
667
 
The legal position concerning termination of the insurance contract differs between Islamic 
and conventional insurance. In Islamic takaful, if the policyholder decides to terminate a 
policy in a manner that is not provided under the terms of the contract, premiums are 
refundable along with any corresponding surrender value, less administrative fees.
668
 The 
legal aspect of this issue is that Islam does not allow the forfeiture of the premium, wholly or 
partly, as the amount of premium is considered to be a loan by the insured to the insurer. 
Therefore, there is no forfeiture of contributions in a takaful contract, and these contributions 
are distributed among the participant in the form of surplus; while in a conventional insurance 
contract, there is a clause that the insurer can forfeit the premium amount that is paid by the 
policy holders under certain circumstances.
669
 
In risk assessment and handling, under conventional insurance the insurance is a risk transfer 
mechanism whereby the risk is transferred from the insurance company (the insurer) to the 
policy holder (the insured) in consideration of the insurance premium paid by the insured; 
while in takaful, there is no transfer of risk from participants to the takaful operator. Risks are 
shared among participants under a mutual guarantee scheme or takaful scheme.
670
  
According to the wakalah model, the takaful operator acts as a wakeel (agent) on behalf of 
participants to manage the takaful fund whereby the operator receives contributions, pays 
claims, and arranges re-takaful and all other necessary actions related to the takaful 
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business.
671
 In this case, the takaful operator is considered an employee and receives a salary 
(wakala fee) for services.
672
 So the takaful operator is not undertaking risk; the risk is 
however distributed among the participants who have agreed to jointly assume the risk.
673
 On 
the principles of mudarabah/musharakah, the takaful operator should share in the profit.
674
 In 
this case, the takaful operator invests the savings and investment contribution, the 
participant’s account, and the profit is shared between the member and the takaful operator 
according to a pre-agreed ratio;
675
 while in conventional insurance, the agent in the policy is 
paid out of the paid-premiums of the policyholder.
676
  
On the basis of takaful principles, it is clear that takaful differs from conventional insurance, 
because the nature of the principles of takaful is different from that of conventional insurance 
as well as all the operations in takaful being in line with the Shariah principles. For example, 
the operation of takaful is based on the principle of the mudarabah model ,which is profit and 
loss sharing techniques, an alternative to interest (riba) in conventional insurance.
677
  
5.7 Models of Takaful  
Various models of takaful have been adopted in different Muslim countries. The three main 
operational models used in the takaful industry are the mudarabah model, wakala model and 
hybrid model.
678
  
5.7.1  The Mudarabah Model 
Mudarabah is an Islamic contract between two parties: the capital provider (the takaful 
participants) and the takaful company (the takaful operator and shareholders) where one party 
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contributes funds and another acts as entrepreneur.
679
 In takaful practice, the takaful operator 
manages the takaful operations in return for a share of the surplus on underwriting and a 
share of the profit from investment. Under this model, the profit is shared between the capital 
provider and the takaful operator according to the ratio agreed by both parties,
680
 while loss is 
borne entirely by the capital provider or the financier.
681
 According to Ayub, in mudarabah, 
the financier bears the loss while the entrepreneur loses his already expended labour.
682
 In the 
event of loss, the shareholder provides a loan (qard hassan) to meet the deficit. This qard 
hassan is repaid by the policyholders in times of profit.
683
 According to Mher and Ahmad, 
the sharing of profit and loss between the operator and participant based on the mudarabah 
model is determined in advance and judged on the basis of the company’s developmental 
stage and earnings. The sharing ratio for each year is approved by the Shariah committee on 
an advance basis.
684
  
Figure 5.1 How the mudarabah model works  
 
 
 
Source: Islamic Finance For Dummies (2012). 
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5.7.2  The Wakala Model 
In Islam, wakala means a contract in which one entity works as an agent for another.
685
 In the 
case of a wakala-based takaful product, the takaful operator acts as an agent (wakeel) of the 
participants in managing the takaful fund in return for a defined fee.
686
 Under the wakala 
model, the surplus of the policyholders’ funds and investments are distributed back to the 
participants only, based on the premise that the funds actually belong to the participants.
687
 
According to Mher and Ahmad, the participants pay the wakala fee from contributions that 
cover the total operator expenses of the business and operator salaries. The wakala fee is 
determined by the Shariah Advisory Board of the company on a one-year advance basis. To 
provide an incentive to the operator for good governance, a management fee is paid as per the 
level of performance.
688
 
Figure 5.2  How the Wakala model works  
 
 
 
Source: Islamic Finance for Dummies (2012). 
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5.7.3  The Hybrid Model  
This model combines elements of the mudarabah and wakala models, by utilising two funds. 
One fund is for the shareholders, and the other is for participants.
689
 In this model, the 
mudarabah contract is applied for investment activities where the takaful operator acts as the 
fund manager for managing investments and shares the profit for the investment of the 
takaful fund, while the wakala contract is used for underwriting activities where the takaful 
operator acts as the agent for the fund management and receives a fee for underwriting the 
fund.
690
  
According to Julian Burling and Kevin Lazarus, the underwriting activities are performed 
using the wakala model, with the agent receiving a fee from each participant for the work 
performed. This fee is often a percentage of the contributions made by the participant.
691
 
This model has proven to be the most successful, having been adopted widely in the Middle 
East, and is recommended by the AAOIFI.
692
 
Figure 5.3  How the Hybrid model works 
 
 
Source: Islamic Finance For Dummies (2012). 
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In all three takaful models, the fund money must be invested in Shariah-compliant 
investment vehicles such as sukuk bonds, equities and property.
693
  
5.8  Takaful Challenges and Solutions 
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has become the leader in the Arab market in the field of takaful 
insurance and joint leader in the world with the Malaysian market. However, the takaful 
insurance industry in Saudi Arabia faces many obstacles and challenges which may represent 
an obstacle to the progress of this industry. These challenges are described as follows: 
5.8.1 Incompatibility between the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies and its Implementing Regulations 
The law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies was issued by Royal Decree No. 
M/32 on 01/08/2003, and its implementing regulations were issued by the Ministerial 
Decision No. 1/596 on 20/04/2004. Article 1 of this law and its implementing regulations 
stipulates that: “insurance companies [should] operat[e] in a cooperative manner in 
accordance with the principles of Islamic Shariah”694, but, in fact, there are multiple 
violations of the Decree in the implementing regulations themselves, resulting in cooperative 
insurance in Saudi Arabia being described as commercial and not cooperative. These 
violations are as follows: 
The implementing regulations of the law controlling cooperative insurance companies did not 
explain the facts of cooperative insurance and controls, to avoid confusion and interference 
with commercial insurance. This problem made the judiciary in Saudi Arabia see that takaful 
insurance companies have the purpose and objectives of profitability, just as commercial 
insurance has. This made the insurance companies take legal measures to address this 
problem. One of these legal measures is increasing the conditions and controls that reduce the 
power of the judiciary. For example, when drafting the insurance policy, jurists benefit from 
the principle “complementary legal rules” which allows the parties to define the rights and 
obligations.  
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The other solution is to resort to arbitration as an alternative to the problems of the Saudi 
judiciary that apply to Shariah. Although the right to arbitration is stipulated in the takaful 
insurance policy documents, the means of arbitration are still not applicable in Saudi Arabia, 
and the reason for this is due to the weakness of the culture of arbitration in Saudi society. In 
addition, the beliefs of jurists and lawyers that the Saudi judiciary may marginalise arbitration 
and not recognise it makes resorting to arbitration a legal risk, and this may impose financial 
burdens on takaful insurance companies. 
Article (70-2/e) stipulates that: “10% of the net surplus shall be distributed to the 
policyholders directly, or in the form of reduction in premiums for the next year. The 
remaining 90% of the net surplus shall be transferred to the shareholders’ income 
statement”.695 This is a commutative contract on surplus which makes the cooperative 
insurance commercial; even though it is intended to be a cooperative insurance, the surplus 
must be in favour of the insured where the surplus returns to them or is transferred to a 
special reserve account with insurance operations, or transferred for the next few years to 
reduce the premiums that will be taken from the insured. 
Article (1) of the implementing regulations defines the function of insurance as “transfer 
[ring] the burden of risk from the insured to the insurer, and compensat[ing] those who are 
exposed to damage or loss by the insurer”. It also defines the contribution (premium) as the 
“amount offered by the insured to the insurer in exchange for the insurer’s acceptance to 
indemnify the insured for loss / damages resulting directly from a covered risk”. The 
insurance policy is defined by the same article as “a legal document/contract issued to the 
insured by the insurer setting out the terms of the contract to indemnify the insured for loss 
and damages covered by the policy against a premium paid by the insured”. The insurer is 
defined by Article (1) of the implementing regulations as “an insurance company that accepts 
insurance contracts directly from insured(s)”.696 
All of these definitions confirm that the concept of cooperative insurance in Saudi Arabia is 
considered to be commercial insurance and not cooperative, because insurance companies in 
Saudi Arabia charge insurance premiums in exchange for their commitment to compensation. 
This makes the cooperative insurance commutative rather than cooperative, whereas the goal 
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of cooperative insurance is solidarity and cooperation, managing takaful funds on behalf of 
the participants, and receiving a salary (wakala fee) for this service.  
Article (61-1) of the implementing regulations stipulates that “if such investment policy was 
not approved by SAMA, the company shall adhere to the investment standards in Table (1), 
provided that investments outside the Kingdom shall not exceed 20% of the total investment 
and in accordance with Article (59-2)”.697 The problem here is that some of these investment 
receptacles or investment types contradict Shariah because they include interest (riba), 
which, as mentioned, is forbidden in Islam. Some of these investment receptacles are Saudi 
Government Bonds 20% minimum, Foreign Government Bonds (Zone A) 5% maximum, 
Bonds Issued by Domestic Companies 5% maximum, and Bonds Issued by Foreign 
Companies 5% maximum.
698
  
Article (3-3) of the implementing regulations approved the practice of protection and savings 
insurance. This practice is regarded as life insurance, which is prohibited by the Council of 
Senior Scholars in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (considered the highest religious body in the 
Kingdom) because it includes lack of knowledge, uncertainty and unlawful taking of others’ 
money.
699
 The Council of Senior Scholars believes that life insurance is a form of 
commercial insurance. Fatwa no. 14839 stipulates that: “life insurance is a form of 
commercial insurance, and it is prohibited because it includes lack of knowledge, uncertainty 
and unlawful taking of others' money”.700  
Article (42) of the implementing regulations identifies re-insurance controls, and does not 
specify that this should be re-insurance with the cooperative insurance companies, but opens 
the way for re-insurance with all companies, including commercial insurance companies.  
To address the above issues, I would recommend establishing an independent central Shariah 
board in Saudi Arabia, including a research centre specialising in the takaful insurance 
industry. This board of Shariah would benefit from some international institutions accredited 
in the field of Islamic economics and finance, such as the Accounting and Auditing 
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Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the Islamic International 
Foundation for Economics & Finance (IIFEF), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the 
Council of Senior Scholars in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Encyclopedia of Islamic 
Economics and Finance.  
The researcher believes that it is of paramount importance to have an Islamic Insurance Act 
in Saudi Arabia as in Malaysia, and one which takes the multiplicity of Islamic schools into 
account. The researcher also believes that the law of supervision of cooperative insurance 
companies and its implementing regulations need to be amended by specialist members in 
Shariah and Islamic economics as well, in order to be compatible with the principles of 
Shariah.  
5.8.2  Ineffectiveness of “Participants’ Body (PB)” in Takaful Companies 
The nature of takaful companies is based on the existence of two separate accounts: the 
Participants’ Account (PA), legally known as the Participants’ Body (PB), and the 
Shareholders’ Account (SA), legally known as the Shareholders’ Body (SB).  
In the contract of insurance, takaful insurance companies assume the management of 
insurance operations and investment funds on behalf of the participants in return for a 
specific share of the return on investment of these funds as a speculator (mudarib) or a fixed 
amount in advance as an agent (wakeel), or both, as in the hybrid model.  
One of the challenges facing the takaful industry in Saudi Arabia is the absence of a real role 
of the Participants Body. It is known that the SB (shareholders / owners of the company) act 
in many financial and insurance interests on behalf of the participants and also the PB, while 
the real role of the participants’ entity is still absent. The reason is that the participants are the 
weaker party in the equation, and the analysis is that the interests of participants are under the 
tutelage and decisions of the SB, who are represented by the Board of Directors appointed by 
the shareholders, which works to protect the interests of shareholders in the first place. 
For more clarification a number of questions are posed here, which should enable the reader 
to understand this challenge: 
1. What will happen in the case of shareholders’ interests conflicting with the interests 
of participants?  
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2. Who determines the system used in the financial relationship in a takaful company, 
wakala or mudarabah? 
3. Who determines the amount of the agency fee (wakalah) in the agency system in 
order to avoid any over-charging when determining the fee?  
4. Who determines how to calculate the surplus? What is the basis of the distribution? 
When is it distributed? Will it be distributed in cash or go forward to the next year? 
5. Who determines the position of previous rights of participants who did not renew 
their participation? 
To address these issues, the researcher recommends: 
Establishing a real legal entity known as the Participants’ Body (PB), stipulated in the 
Memorandum of Association, and issuing a regulation for this entity approved by the Board 
of Directors; 
Representation of participants on the Board of Directors of the company, having the right of  
correction, particularly in the adoption of various investment and insurance plans, and 
policies of calculating the insurance and distribution of the surplus to the participants, and 
setting conditions and controls for the representatives;  
Holding a General Assembly for participants where they have the right of reservation on the 
performance of the Board of Directors, and demanding change in the event of proven 
incapacity or incompetence. In addition, attending the meeting of the General Assembly of 
the shareholders. 
5.8.3  Challenges Facing the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
The Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) plays a significant role in the success of Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), especially in giving Fatwa (Shariah opinion) resolutions and 
Islamic rulings on the correctness of transactions and their validity according to the Shariah 
parameters and rules on financial transactions. In addition, the Shariah Board is also 
responsible for the duties of Shariah supervisory (SS) to ensure Shariah compliance in all the 
Islamic banks’ operations and activities. However, this role still faces some obstacles that 
prevent its arrival at a high degree of effectiveness and impact, and these challenges include: 
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5.8.3.1  Ineffectiveness of some Shariah Boards (SBs)  
The existence of the SSB in IFIs contributes to further assurance to the participants and 
shareholders to ensure compliance with Islamic Shariah principles in all takaful operations. 
However, the practice of some of the takaful insurance companies confirms that there is a 
weakness in the field audit and inspection by the SSB of the takaful operations, whereby it is 
possible that senior management or employees of takaful companies commit some violations 
of Shariah principles, all of which are either intentionally or unintentionally hidden from the 
eyes of the SSB, and sometimes this might be a motive for evasion of legal restrictions and 
controls that may be imposed by SSB on the takaful companies. These violations of Shariah 
principles are because the Shariah supervisory system is inadequate. For example, in some 
IFIs including takaful companies, the SSB convenes approximately twelve meetings 
annually, an average of one meeting each month. However, in the researcher's view, one 
meeting each month is not enough to ensure those takaful operations are complying with 
Islamic Shariah principles. 
To address this challenge, the allocation of an internal and external Shariah audit committee 
in each takaful company, of no fewer than three members, should be appointed by the SSB to 
inspect, audit and review previous and subsequent takaful operations through daily reports 
sent to the SSB, in order to verify whether takaful companies operate within the constraints of 
Shariah law. This programme includes all operations, account shareholders and participants. 
In addition, the SSB should be allowed to attend the meetings of the Board of Directors and 
look at all its resolutions. The researcher recommends that the SSB must be independent, so 
as not to be subject to conflicts of interest. 
5.8.3.2  Weakness of Technical and Vocational Rehabilitation for some Shariah Boards 
Weak technical and vocational rehabilitation for some Shariah bodies reflects negatively on 
the ability to issue a fatwa in its true form. An example of weakness of rehabilitation is the 
inability of some Shariah bodies to inspect, audit and review the financial data of takaful 
operations. 
The recommendation to meet this challenge is the establishment of a specialised scientific 
centre in the Islamic takaful insurance industry to work to support the legitimate and non-
legitimate scientific aspects of this young industry, such that this centre can work on the 
establishment of a training centre specialising in the insurance industry, and can draw up 
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special training projects for the insurance industry. This centre could also offer specialised 
courses related to the rehabilitation of the members of the Shariah bodies in takaful 
companies and grant them specialist certifications.  
The researcher recommends that a member of the Fatwa and SSB should hold a PhD in the 
field of Islamic finance and have experience in Islamic financial transactions to be able to 
understand contemporary issues and also to attempt to create new contracts to compete with 
conventional insurance and be compatible with Shariah. Members of the SSB should also 
know the English language in order to draft, inspect, audit and review contracts written in 
English. 
5.8.3.3  The absence of Shariah Supervisory Systems 
Some Islamic financial institutions are still not interested in finding a system of Shariah 
Supervisory Systems that defines the criteria that should exist for the various departments of 
financial institutions to follow and not exceed. The existence of clear standards in IFIs makes 
it easier for employees to adhere to them and also makes it easier for the SSB to follow up the 
implementation of those standards.  
The researcher wishes to acknowledge here the role and the great effort of the Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) in order to prepare the 
legal standards for Islamic financial institutions in general and takaful companies in 
particular. 
5.8.3.4  Multiplicity of Shariah Boards and Judgements 
According to Dr. Sahar Nasr, the most important challenge in the area of regulation and 
supervision is the multiplicity of Shariah boards and judgements because it impedes the 
homogeneity for some products on the one hand, and creates uncertainty for participants and 
shareholders about whether Islamic insurance products are Shariah-compliant on the other 
hand. While the cooperative insurance industry in Saudi Arabia is becoming increasingly 
internationalised, it remains a collection of segmented, weakly coordinated local operations. 
Therefore, there is a need for an effort to be made to resolve or at least mitigate the 
146 
 
uncertainty regarding the acceptance of Shariah rulings. This entails more cooperation on the 
part of Shariah Supervisory Boards (SSB).
701
  
The researcher recommends that the Saudi government should set up an independent central 
Shariah board instead of the SAMA, and give it all the necessary authorisation for overseeing 
all areas of the financial system including Shariah bodies in takaful companies, and for 
redrafting all articles of the Law on the Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies so 
as to render it compatible with the principles of Shariah. 
Each member of the SSBs in Islamic financial institutions shall be selected by the central 
Shariah board instead of by Islamic financial institutions. The central Shariah board can 
gather with AAOIFI and Council of Senior Scholars (also known as the Senior Council of 
Ulema) to devise solutions to any takaful issues that may arise in the Saudi insurance sector. 
5.9  Summary 
This chapter has provided a background of the takaful industry, its inception, concept and 
mechanism, principles, practices and models as an alternative product to conventional 
insurance. The research question of this chapter has discussed how Saudi insurance law is 
consistent with Shariah. This chapter has analysed the principles and practices of takaful, the 
difference between takaful and conventional insurance, and the regulation and supervision of 
takaful insurance. The last section analysed the obstacles and challenges of takaful in Saudi 
Arabia, and their solutions.  
The chapter has criticised the law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies in Saudi 
Arabia, and its implementing regulations, from the perspective of Islamic Shariah Law, and 
found that there are some articles that do not comply with Islamic Shariah Law, such as 
Articles (1), (70-2/e), (61-1), (59-2), (3-3), and (42) of the implementing regulations. The 
researcher believes that the law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies in Saudi 
Arabia and its implementing regulations needs to be amended by specialist members in 
Shariah and Islamic economics as well in order to be compatible with the principles of 
Shariah.  
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The researcher recommended in this chapter establishing an independent central Shariah 
board in Saudi Arabia instead of SAMA, and give it all the necessary authorisation for 
overseeing all areas of the financial system including Shariah bodies in takaful companies, 
and for the redrafting of all articles of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies so as to render it compatible with the principles of Shariah. 
The next chapter will focus on derivatives in Islamic finance and their applications in Saudi 
Arabia. It will also conduct a comprehensive and critical review of Islamic derivatives as an 
alternative to conventional derivatives in Saudi Arabia, and examine whether the current uses 
of accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance are compatible with the 
principles of Shariah. A proposed legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking 
and finance including Islamic financial derivatives in Saudi Arabia will be provided at the 
end of this next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DERIVATIVES IN ISLAMIC FINANCE AND THEIR 
APPLICATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
6.1  Introduction 
The first financial derivatives emerged in Chicago in the early 1970s in response to 
increasing interest rates, exchange rates and volatile prices.
702
 In the three decades before the 
credit crunch of 2008 and the global financial crisis, financial derivatives contracts grew 
rapidly to constitute a major component of the United States’ financial system.703 However, 
despite their demonstrable importance for financial sector development, derivatives are few 
and far between in countries where capital market transactions are governed by Shariah law, 
such as Saudi Arabia.
704
  
The aim of this chapter is to give a comprehensive and critical review of Islamic derivatives 
as an alternative to conventional derivatives in Saudi Arabia, and examine whether the 
current uses of accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance are 
compatible with the principles of Shariah. The chapter is divided into a number of sections. 
The first section will give background material on financial derivatives contracts and their 
legality from an Islamic point of view. The next section will offer a critical and comparative 
analysis of the principles and practices of financial derivatives. The third section will give a 
critical analysis of how Islamic financial derivatives work in Saudi Arabia. A proposed 
legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance including Islamic 
financial derivatives in Saudi Arabia will be covered in section four. The section after that 
will examine the legal challenges in applying the proposed framework for Islamic banking 
and finance in Saudi Arabia, and provide solutions to meet those challenges. A summary will 
be provided at the end. 
6.2  Overview  
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), financial derivatives are financial 
contracts whose values/prices depend on the prices of underlying assets (often simply known 
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as the underlying).
705
  For example, the changing value of a crude oil futures contract 
depends primarily on the upward or downward movement of oil prices.
706
  These contracts 
are legally binding agreements, made on the trading screen of stock exchanges, to buy or sell 
an asset in the future. The underlying asset can be a share, index, interest rate, bond, rupee 
dollar exchange rate, crude oil, sugar, soybean, coffee, cotton or whatever else is being 
traded.
707
 
Financial derivatives contracts are settled at a future date, and therefore no financial 
derivatives contracts are performed in the present market.
708
 Under paragraph 6 (b) of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement No. 133: a derivative requires 
either no initial net investment or a smaller initial net investment than would be required for 
other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in 
market factors.
709
  The values of financial derivatives (gains and losses) are dependent on the 
prices of the underlying assets.
710
 Financial derivatives are financial agreements that are 
binding on both parties.  
The basic purpose of derivatives is to create a mechanism to transfer risk from one party or 
firm that wants to avoid risk to another that is willing to absorb the risk. In this practice, one 
party’s loss is always another party’s gain.711 This practice is prohibited in Shariah because it 
involves speculative activities that can equate to gambling (maisir), and therefore run 
contrary to the principles of Shariah, as will be explained later.
712
  The Islamic alternative to 
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conventional derivatives is Islamic financial derivatives, which is based on a mechanism of 
equitable risk-sharing and underlying transactions in tangible assets.
713
 
6.3 Types of Financial Derivatives 
According to Gupta, there are bewilderingly complex varieties of derivatives already in 
existence, and the markets are continuously innovating newer ones, and therefore it is 
difficult to classify financial derivatives, due to the complexity of their nature.
714
 This chapter 
will focus on the most commonly used financial derivatives contracts: forwards, futures, 
options and swaps.  
6.3.1 Forward Contracts 
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to buy or sell a specific amount of an 
asset to be delivered at a pre-agreed date in the future.
715
  The purpose of a forward contract 
is to avoid price uncertainty and lock in a price for a future transaction.
716
  In a forward 
contract, no initial payment is required. This kind of contract can be used for either hedging 
or speculation.
717
  
According to classical jurists of all the Islamic schools of jurisprudence, conventional 
forward contracts are forbidden in Shariah, based on a Prophetic tradition. They argue that 
although the price to be paid in the future is known, the future quality of the specified object 
of sale is unknown, which is a source of uncertainty and ignorance conducive to disputation. 
The second reason is that the practices of conventional forward contracts are essentially the 
exchange of one debt for another debt or bai-al-kali-bi-al-kali or bai-al-dayn-bi-al-dayn.
718
 In 
this practice, both the delivery of goods and payment are being made at a future date, which 
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means that this practice breaches the Shariah principle of ‘do not sell what you do not 
own’.719  
Therefore, the evidence for the prohibition of conventional forward contracts is based on a 
Prophetic tradition where the Prophet Muhammed forbade the sale of debt for debt or bai-al-
kali-bi-al-kali or bai-al-dayn-bi-al-dayn.
720
 As a consequence of this hadith, conventional 
forward contracts are unlawful in Shariah as long as both the price payment and delivery of 
sale object are stipulated as future liabilities. 
6.3.2 Futures Contracts 
A futures contract is a standardised contract between two parties to buy or sell a fixed 
quantity of a commodity or an underlying financial instrument (such as a group of stocks) at a 
specified price during a particular delivery month.
721
 For example, on 15 September 2013, 
dealers on the London Futures and Options Exchange would pay 250.49 pounds sterling for 
the delivery of two tons of corn at the end of December. While the futures contract specifies 
that an exchange will take place in the future, the purpose of the futures exchange is to 
minimise the risk of default by either party.
722
  
Fundamentally, futures contracts are similar to forward contracts;
723
 however, according to 
Aswath Damodaran, there are three major differences between futures and forward 
contracts.
724
 First, futures contracts are traded on exchanges, whereas forward contracts are 
not. Consequently, futures contracts are much more liquid, and there is no default or credit 
risk. However, this advantage has to be offset against the fact that futures contracts are 
standardised and cannot be adapted to meet the firm’s precise needs. Second, futures 
contracts require both parties (buyer and seller) to settle differences on a daily basis rather 
than waiting for expiration of the contract. Thus, if a firm buys a futures contract for oil, and 
oil prices go down, the firm is obliged to pay the seller of the contract the difference. Because 
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futures contracts are settled at the end of each day, they are converted into a sequence of one-
day forward contracts. This can have an effect on their pricing. Third, when a futures contract 
is bought or sold, the parties are required to put up a percentage of the price of the contract at 
a “margin”. This operates as a performance bond, ensuring there is no default risk.725 
Item 5/1/2 of AAOIFI Shariah Standards No: 20 states that conventional futures contracts are 
not permitted either through their formation or their trading because they involve gharar 
(uncertainty) in the future delivery of the underlying asset.
726
 According to David Jonsson, 
any contractual speculation on future or conditional contracts is forbidden.
727
 Moreover, 
according to Resolution No. 63(1/7) of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, conventional 
futures contracts are prohibited because they involve uncertainty and the exchange of one 
debt for another debt or bai-al-kali-bi-al-kali or bai-al-dayn-bi-al-dayn.
728
  
6.3.3  Options Contracts 
An option is a contract to buy or sell an underlying asset at a specified price on or before a 
specified date.
729
  For example, if IBM is selling at $120 and an investor has the option to buy 
a share at $100 (the strike price), this option must be worth at least $20, the difference 
between the price at which one can buy IBM ($100) through the option contract and the price 
at which one could sell it in the open market ($120). Such an option is said to be in-the-
money. If the market price of IBM is equal to the strike price, then this option would be at-
the-money. If the market price of IBM is below the strike price, the option would be out-of-
the money.
730
 
An option contract gives the buyer the right to sell or the right to buy.
731
 Based on this 
principle, option contracts are classified into two broad categories: call option and put option. 
A call option gives the holder the right to buy an underlying asset by a certain date for a 
certain price. The seller is under an obligation to fulfil the contract and is paid a price of this 
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which is called “the call option premium” or “call option price”. A put option gives the 
holder the right to sell an underlying asset by a certain date for a certain price. The buyer is 
under an obligation to fulfil the contract and is paid a price for this, which is called “the put 
option premium” or “put option price”.732  
The purpose of an option contract is to provide the offeree with time to evaluate the main 
contract offer.
733
 Options are used for hedging, risk management, speculation or 
investment.
734
 With regard to the legitimacy of option contracts in Shariah, option contracts 
are forbidden in Shariah. According to Resolution No. 63(1/7) of the International Islamic 
Fiqh Academy, option contracts are not permissible because they involve interest (riba), 
gambling and pure games of chance (maysir), uncertainty (gharar) and the exchange of one 
debt for another debt or bai-al-kali-bi-al-kali or bai-al-dayn-bi-al-dayn.
735
 
6.3.4  Swaps Contracts 
Swaps are contractual arrangements between two parties who agree to exchange, over time 
and according to predetermined rules, streams of payment of the same amount of 
indebtedness.
736
  The basic idea behind swaps is that the parties involved obtain access to 
markets at better terms than would be available to each one of them individually.
737
 Swaps 
objectives are stated to include hedging of financial risks, reducing financing costs, 
conducting large-scale operations for more and more profit, access to new markets and, 
mostly, undertaking speculative activities to maximise gains.
738
  
Under Section 901(f) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, a swap agreement was amended to include numerous types of financial swaps 
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commonly used in conventional finance.
739
 According to Don Chance and Robert Brook, 
there are four primary types based on the nature of the underlying variable: interest rate 
swaps, equity swaps, commodity swaps, and currency swaps (also known as cross-currency 
interest swaps).
740
  
According to Shariah principles, conventional swaps are prohibited because they clearly 
involve interest payments. An Islamic profit rate swap is the alternative to the conventional 
interest rate swap.
741
  
After a brief overview of conventional derivative contracts, and why conventional derivatives 
are unacceptable in Islamic finance, the chapter will move towards exploring financial 
structures available within an Islamic framework. 
6.4  Islamic Alternatives to Conventional Derivatives 
Islamic finance is based on Shariah, which provides guidelines for multiple aspects of 
Muslim life, including banking. As mentioned earlier, the basic principles of Islamic finance 
are the prohibition of interest (riba), excessive uncertainty (gharar), and speculation or 
gambling (maysir or qimar), and the adherence to profit and loss sharing between the parties 
to a transaction, as well as the promotion of ethical investments that enhance society and do 
not violate practices banned in Shariah. From these principles, it can be deduced that 
conventional derivatives contracts cannot be regarded as compliant with Shariah.
742
 
Therefore, it is important to look for Islamic alternatives to conventional derivatives. 
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A number of hedging tools exist in the Islamic financial industry that could be considered a 
basis for derivative contracts within the bounds of Islamic finance. These alternatives are Bai 
Salam, Bai Urban, Khiyarat, Wad and Islamic Swap (An Islamic Profit Rate Swap).
743
  
6.4.1 Bai Salam as an Islamic Forward 
According to AAOIFI, bai salam is the “purchase of a commodity for deferred delivery in 
exchange for immediate payment according to specified conditions or sale of a commodity 
for deferred delivery in exchange for immediate payment.”744 Therefore, bai salam can be 
seen as an Islamic forward wherein the price was paid in advance at the time of making the 
contract for prescribed goods to be delivered later.
745
 An Islamic forward is defined as a 
binding promise by the buyer, often an Islamic financial institution (IFI), to buy, and by the 
seller to sell a generic product of a specific quantity on a specific date in the future at an 
agreed-upon price.
746
 According to Anjum Siddiqui, the purpose of a bai salam contract is to 
“meet the capital requirements as well as cost of operations of farmers, industrialists, 
contractors or traders as well as craftsmen and small producers.”747 According to Mohammed 
Obaidullah, bai salam is a useful Islamic forward that can potentially be used for hedging.
748
 
A salam contract is similar to a conventional forward contract. However, the main difference 
is that in an Islamic forward contract (salam), the buyer pays the entire amount for the 
product at the time of contract, while in a conventional forward, either full or partial payment 
is allowed to be made in advance.
749
  
In Shariah, one of the basic conditions for the validity of a sale is that the commodity or 
underlying asset must currently exist in its physical sellable form or be in the constructive 
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possession of the seller.
750
 However, classical jurists agreed that the salam contract 
constituted an exception to the general prohibition of the sale of non-existent properties, as 
well as to the prohibition of the sale of properties that are not in the seller’s possession at the 
time of sale.
751
 Therefore, bai salam is a permissible sale based on certain mandatory 
conditions, as mentioned in Chapter three. In this regard, the researcher recommends modern 
jurists to stipulate such conditions in salam contracts, to minimise the elements of gharar and 
eliminate elements of riba therein.
752
  
Parallel salam is the replication of the salam transaction, where the buyer (IFI) often enters 
into two different contracts, one where the IFI acts as a seller and another in which it is a 
buyer.
753
 The key condition of Shariah is that the two contracts (salam and parallel salam) 
must be independent of each other.
754
 IFIs may use parallel salam if they do not want 
possession of the underlying commodity.
755
 According to Muhammad Ayub, the delivery 
date in the parallel salam contract can be the same as in the original salam contract, but not 
earlier than that, as this would mean the sale of commodities that one does not own.
756
  
According to Ayub, Islamic financial institutions use parallel salam to mitigate the risk when 
the IFI enters a contract to purchase commodities, as it simultaneously enters a contract with 
a buyer for those commodities. While in conventional firms, the risk can be mitigated by 
using hedging techniques,
757
 for salam with parallel salam, the IFI may face legal risk if the 
commodities cannot be delivered at the specified time unless the customer under parallel 
salam agrees to modify the delivery date.
758
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6.4.2  Bai Urban 
A bai urban contract refers to a sale with an earnest money deposited by the buyer with the 
seller as a part payment of the price in advance. Under an urban contract, the buyer pays a 
sum of money against the purchase price to the seller to indicate his intention and ability to 
implement the contract.
759
 The contract of bai urban stipulates that if the buyer continues 
with the transaction within the stipulated time period, the deposit will become a part of the 
price that has already been negotiated. Otherwise, if the buyer defaults or decides not to 
proceed, the earnest money will be forfeited in favour of the seller.
760
 According to Sidney 
Yankson, this practice of bai urban is almost identical to the option in conventional western 
finance. The key difference is that in an option contract, the premium paid for the option is 
not deducted from the sale price if the option is exercised, while in a bai urban contract it is 
considered a part payment of the purchase price.
761
 In addition, some contemporary Islamic 
jurists believe that bai urban is similar to the call option, which is likewise binding on the 
seller but not on the buyer.
762
 Hanbali jurists had even contemplated that the option period 
should be fixed; otherwise the seller may have to wait indefinitely for the potential buyer to 
decide whether or not to exercise his right.
763
  
There was an argument among Islamic scholars about the legality of bai urban, and they used 
three doctrines (madhhab) to argue against the bai urban contract. They declared that the bai 
urban contract is forbidden, based on a Prophetic tradition. The evidence for their argument 
is that the Prophet forbade the sale of bai urban.
764
 They argued that a bai urban contract 
involves uncertainty (gharar), risk-taking, and the taking of money without any consideration 
of whether the seller possesses what the buyer paid for if the buyer defaults or decides not to 
proceed.
765
  
In contrast to the majority of scholars, the Hanbali school deemed that the practice of bai 
urban is acceptable.  They relied on a Prophetic tradition
766
: The Messenger of God was 
                                                 
759
 Sidney Yankson,‘ Derivatives in Islamic Finance: A Case for Profit rate Swaps’, Journal of Islamic 
Economics, Banking and Finance (2011) 7 (1) 46. 
760
 Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2006) 91. 
761
 Sidney Yankson, ‘Derivatives in Islamic Finance: A Case for Profit rate Swaps’, Journal of Islamic 
Economics, Banking and Finance (2011) 7 (1). 46. 
762
 Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2006) 91. 
763
 Ibid., p. 91. 
764
 Ibid., p. 92. 
765
 Ibid., p. 91. 
766
 Ibid., p. 92. 
158 
 
asked about bai urban, and permitted it.
767
 Classical Hanbali and contemporary jurists of 
most schools discussed the argument of the other schools. They argued that Prophetic 
traditions that provide support through the three schools was weak, and also that bai urban 
had become very common and provided some compensation to the seller for waiting, in case 
the buyer decided not to execute the sale.
768
  
Under Resolution No: 72 (3/8) [1] of the OIC at its eighth session in Brunei in 1993, the Fiqh 
Academy of the Organization of Islamic Conferences endorsed the opinion of the Hanbali 
school. The OIC Fiqh Academy decided that bai urban is permitted if a time limit is specified 
for exercising the option.
769
 With regard to the deposit paid by the buyer to the seller in a 
buying and selling contract, the OIC Fiqh Academy decided that it is considered a part of the 
purchase price already negotiated if the sale proceeds. Otherwise, the earnest money will be 
forfeited as a gift (hibah) from the buyer to the seller if the buyer defaults or decides not to 
proceed.
770
 
The researcher believes that the opinion of the Hanbali school is the closest to the truth 
owing to the power of their argument as well as because financial transactions nowadays 
need such a contract, which is considered one of the prominent Islamic hedging instruments. 
The researcher also believes that the prohibition of this type of hedging could put a large 
number of obstacles in the way of the Islamic finance industry, which is seeking to become a 
global industry. 
6.4.3 Islamic Options (Khiyarat)  
Islamic options (Khiyarat) are an Islamic alternative to conventional options that are 
prohibited, based on resolution No. 63(1/7) of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy.
771
 Al-
khiyar is a sale with an option to one or more of the parties to accept or annul a sale contract 
within a stipulated time period; for example, a defect in the goods.
772
 The Shariah demands 
that the seller should disclose all the defects in the article being sold, otherwise the sale is not 
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valid. For example, if a person makes a purchase and is not aware, at the time of sale or 
previously, of a defect in the article bought, then the buyer has an option to annul the contract 
under al-khiyar, whether the defect is small or large.
773
  
The purpose of al-khiyar is to protect the interests of both parties to the contract against 
cheating or misrepresenting the facts (ghabn) or risk (gharar). In al-khiyar, the possibility of 
conflicts between the parties to the contract can be reduced, to avoid any possibility of wrong 
committed against a party deliberately or unintentionally, through giving them a reassessment 
period, usually three days in Islam.
774
 Thus it can be said that al-khiyar achieves equality 
between the parties to the contract, and fulfilment of proper and reasonable expectations of 
the parties to the contract.
775
  
The difference between Khiyarat and conventional options is essentially ethical. While 
conventional options in mainstream finance include all kinds of rights without obligations 
that have financial implications, Khiyarat offers the right for one or both parties to confirm or 
reject the contract.
776
  
The permissibility of Khiyarat is inferred directly from the following hadith of the holy 
Prophet (peace be upon him) reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim. When Habban Ibn 
Munqidh complained to the holy Prophet (peace be upon him) that he was the victim of 
frequent fraud in some earlier transactions, the holy Prophet (peace be upon him) is reported 
to have said “Whenever you enter into contract, say to the other party that there shall be no 
fraud, and I reserve my right of khiyar in three days”.777 According to another hadith reported 
by al-Bukhari, the holy Prophet said, “the two contracting parties have a right of option as 
long as they are not separated or the sale was a sale of option”.778 This hadith, therefore, 
proves the basic validity of khiyar al-shart (option by stipulation) along with khiyar al majlis 
(option of the contracting session).
779
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According to classical jurists, the period of al-khiyar begins as soon as the agreement is 
formally concluded. There is an argument among jurists about the period of al-khiyar. 
According to Hanbali jurists, the right of option must be exercised within three days.
780
 They 
relied on a Prophetic tradition. The Prophet said: whoever buys a sheep unmilked (for a long 
time), has the right of option for three days.
781
 According to the Hanafi and Shafii schools, 
however, the period of option is unlimited as long as it is known and defined at the time of 
contracting.
782
 This opinion has become the prevailing one at the present time.  
The jurists recognise several different types of al-khiyar including khiyar al-shart (option by 
stipulation); khiyar altayeen (option of determination or choice); khiyar al majlis (option of 
the contracting session); khiyar al-ayb (option for defect); and khiyar al-ruyat (option after 
inspection).
783
 The two main options for risk management are khiyar al-shart (option by 
stipulation) and khiyar altayeen (option of determination or choice).
784
 These types will be 
discussed briefly in the following subsections. 
6.4.3.1  Khiyar Al-Shart (Option by Stipulation) 
According to Munawar & Tariqullah, khiyar al-shart is an option in the form of a condition 
stipulated in a sale contract, about confirming or cancelling the sale contract within a specific 
time. This kind of Al-khiyarat (options) gives the right of option to one of the two parties to 
the contract, and even to a third party, to confirm or cancel the sale contract within a 
stipulated time.
785
 According to Mohammed Obaidullah, financial markets such as the stock 
market use khiyar al-shart as an Islamic hedging instrument for managing risk in the 
financial markets. For example, if party A wishes to enter into a purchase (sale) contract and 
stipulates a condition of option for itself for a period of two months, the delivery of price 
(stock X) can now be deferred until two months have expired. At the end of two months, if 
the price of stock X rises, then A can confirm the contract of purchase (sale) at the known 
contractual price and thus be immune from price risk. However, if the price of stock X falls, 
then A can rescind the contract and purchase in the market, thereby not losing the profit 
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potential. Thus, option by stipulation may provide a benefit for the party holding the option, 
at the cost of the counterparty. However, the disadvantage caused to the counterparty can be 
compensated by a higher contractual price and need not be paid separately up front to the 
counterparty. It is this feature that provides an effective curb on speculating on price 
differences and, thus, differentiates Islamic options from conventional ones.
786
 
A question arises about the period of khiyar al-shart: there is an agreement among Sunni 
jurists that the period of khiyar al-shart is three days or less, but there is an argument that it is 
more than three days. Hanafi and Shafii jurists have held the view that there is no limit on the 
duration of the time period of khiyar al-shart, while Hanbali jurists have argued that the 
period of khiyar al-shart must not exceed three days, as stipulated in the Prophetic tradition. 
If the period of khiyar al-shart finishes without declaration from the option holder (either the 
seller or the buyer, or even a third party), the right of option will be invalidated, and therefore 
the contract will be binding on all.
787
  
Munawar & Tariqullah discuss the argument between two different opinions of the scholars 
about the extent of the relationship between khiyar al-shart and conventional options. Some 
scholars have concluded that conventional options could be accommodated in khiyar al-shart, 
while other scholars have concluded that there are no grounds for legalising options by 
making an analogy with khiyar al-shart.
788
  
6.4.3.2  Khiyar Al-Tayeen (Option of Determination or Choice)  
According to Angelo Venardos, khiyar al-tayeen implies the option to choose an object of 
sale out of multiple varieties of a given article, which can be different in quality, design, 
material etc., and these varieties must not be more than three.
789
 For example, a buyer may 
wish to purchase one of three vehicles owned by the same seller, with the option to specify 
which one within a period of three days;
790
 whereas khiyar al-shart is a stipulation that any of 
the parties has the option to rescind the sale within a predefined period.
791
 The similarity 
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relates to stipulating the option in the contract and continuing for a specified time period.
792
 
Under this kind of Islamic option, the parties to the contract have more flexibility in their 
decision and, further, can compare whether the object or value to be exchanged matches their 
expectations.
793
 According to Younes and Mohd, however, in khiyar al-tayeen the buyer 
faces the challenge of a choice out of no more than three articles, and for optimal benefit he 
must choose the best of the three.
794
  
There is significant disagreement among classical jurists about the legality of khiyar al-
tayeen. According to the Hanafi school, khiyar al-tayeen is valid, based on istihsan (juristic 
preference) as it meets a legitimate need of the contracting parties. The Shafii and Hanbali 
jurists, on the contrary, consider that khiyar al-tayeen is invalid, in view of the state of 
ignorance (jahalah), and jahalah is considered gharar,
795
 which is forbidden in trading by the 
prophet Muhammed.
796
 Therefore, the contract of sale that contains khiyar al-tayeen is 
considered null and void because it includes uncertainty, according to the opinion of the 
Shafii and Hanbali jurists.
797
  
The researcher supports the Hanafi opinion, because modern jurists permit some gharar 
transactions based on maslahah (public interest). In this regard, the researcher recommends 
that contemporary scholars, whether in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, stipulate numerous 
conditions to contemporary financial transactions such as forward, futures, options and swaps 
to reduce gharar.
798
  
According to Younes and Mohd, there are numerous challenges in Islamic options 
(Khiyarat). One of these is time of contract and time of delivery; as mentioned in the 
previous example in khiyar al-shart, the contract of sale can be cancelled, based on khiyar al-
shart. Another challenge is the conditions of contract which are stipulated by the holder of 
the option. If these conditions have not been satisfied, then the contract can be cancelled.  
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6.4.4 Wad (A Unilateral Promise) 
According to Noureddine Krichene, promise (waad) refers to a unilateral promise by one 
party to complete a transaction (sale or purchase) at some specified date and in compliance 
with specified conditions.
799
 Waad has been used as a cornerstone for a variety of structured 
products and in the evolution of Islamic derivatives. For instance, waad can be used as a 
Shariah-compliant concept to replicate short-selling and hedging contracts such as profit-rate 
swap. Waad can also be used to structure a foreign exchange (forex) option.
800
  
There are different opinions among Islamic scholars on the legality of this concept. Under 
Resolution No: 40 - 41 (2/5 and 3/5) [1], the OIC Fiqh Academy has ruled that waad is 
binding not only in the eyes of God but also in a court of law when it is made in commercial 
transactions; it is a unilateral promise; and it causes the promisee to incur liabilities.
801
  The 
second view of AAOIFI is that a bilateral promise to purchase and sell currencies is 
forbidden if the promise is binding, even for the purpose of hedging against the risk of 
currency devaluation, because binding bilateral promises from two parties are equivalent to a 
contract. In contrast, according to classical Fiqh rules, waad is not legally binding and the 
promising party may rescind his promise, therefore cannot be compelled by the process of 
law. The third view (of some Maliki jurists) is that waad is not binding in normal conditions, 
but if the promisor has caused the promisee to incur some expenses or undertake some labour 
or liability on the basis of a promise, it is mandatory on him to fulfil his promise for which he 
may be compelled by the courts.
802
 Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani contends that the 
question whether or not a promise is enforceable in courts depends on the nature of the 
promise.
803
 But in commercial dealings, where a party has given an absolute promise to sell 
or purchase something and the other party has incurred liabilities on that basis, there is no 
reason why such a promise should not be enforced.
804
  
According to Hassan and Lewis, there are some conditions where waad is binding.
805
 These 
conditions are that the promise should be unilateral; it must have caused the promisee to incur 
                                                 
799
 Noureddine Krichene, Islamic Capital Markets: Theory and Practice (John Wiley & Sons 2013) 637. 
800
 Ibid. 
801
 See the official website of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy,  
<http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/qrarat/5-2.htm> [Accessed 19 September 2013]. 
802
 Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2007) 224. 
803
 Ibid. 
804
 Ibid. 
805
 Kabir Hassan and Mervyn Lewis , Handbook of Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2007) 
88. 
164 
 
some costs/liabilities; if the promise is to purchase something, the actual sale must take place 
at the appointed time by the exchange of offer and acceptance. Mere promise itself should not 
be taken as a concluded sale; if the promisor reneges on their promise, the court may force 
them either to purchase the commodity or to pay actual damages to the seller. The actual 
damages will include the actual monetary loss suffered by the promisee, and must not include 
the opportunity cost.
806
 
6.4.5  Shariah-Compliant Swap Structures 
There are a number of Shariah-compliant swap structures introduced by IFIs for the purposes 
of hedging such as foreign currency risk and interest rate fluctuations. The common types of 
these structures are the Islamic Cross Currency Swap (ICCS), and the Islamic Profit Rate 
Swap (IPRS).
807
 These types of Islamic swaps will be discussed below. 
6.4.5.1  Islamic Cross Currency Swap (ICCS) 
According to the Asian Finance Bank, the Islamic Cross Currency Swap (ICCS) is an 
agreement between two parties to exchange a series of profit and currency payments 
denominated in one currency for another series of profit and currency payments denominated 
in another currency, based on an actual principal amount over an agreed period.  ICCS is used 
to protect assets against unfavourable benchmark rates and exchange rates by a series of 
profit payments in one currency by another currency, as well as providing fully Shariah-
compliant instruments to customers to manage multi-currency swaps.
808
 In addition, they 
have other useful functions besides serving as a tool of risk management, such as reducing 
the cost of raising resources, better asset-liability management, and identifying appropriate 
investment opportunities.
809
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Although these benefits also apply to conventional swaps, Islamic swaps are different in that 
they do not involve interest-related cash flows. Therefore, according to Shariah principles, 
conventional swaps are prohibited because they clearly involve interest payments.
810
  
According to one prominent view, Islamic swaps are not free from controversy and there is 
no consensus regarding their acceptability.
811
 Contemporary juristic opinion seems to reject 
Islamic swaps on different grounds. Obaidullah states that it is one of the principles of 
Shariah that two financial transactions cannot be tied together in the sense that entering into 
one transaction is made a precondition to entering into the second.
812
 Keeping this principle 
in view, the swap transaction is not permissible because, for instance, a loan of US $50 is 
made a precondition for accepting a loan of Rs1100.
813
 
ICCS debuted recently when Standard Chartered executed the first ever swap transaction of 
this kind for Bank Muamalat Malaysia in July 2006.
814
 The basic structures of ICCS used by 
the banks in Islamic swaps are two-commodity murabaha sale contracts that generate 
offsetting cash flows in opposite currencies with maturities desired by the contracting parties, 
tawarruq and waad.
815
 An example of a two-commodity murabaha sale contract is where A 
makes a payment of Rs1000 to and receives US $50 from B today at the given rate 1:20. Both 
A and B use and invest the money so received at their own risk. At the end of a stipulated 
time period, say six months, the transaction is reversed. A repays US $50 to and receives 
Rs1000 from B. Simultaneously, Al Rajhi bank in Saudi Arabia buys an amount of 
commodity B, also under a murabaha agreement, but denominated in US dollars and sells it 
forward against payment in Malaysian Ringgit. By combining the two murabaha contracts, 
each denominated in a different currency, each party will be able to receive cash flows in the 
desired currency. Finally, both banks sell their respective commodities in order to recoup 
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their initial expense, where the fair value of each commodity (A and B) should wash out at 
the prevailing exchange rate.
816
  
This form of contracting can also be viewed as an exchange of or swapping of interest-free 
loans between A and B. This is in contrast to conventional swaps, which are generally 
interest-based and involve the swapping of principal and interest payments. Conventional 
swaps clearly have no place in the Islamic system as they involve interest payments.
817
 
6.4.5.2  Islamic Profit Rate Swap (IPRS) 
According to Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the Islamic Profit Rate Swap (IPRS)
818
 is an 
agreement between two parties to mutually exchange profit rates between a fixed rate party 
and a floating rate party (or vice versa) through the execution of a series of Shariah-
compliant sales contracts to trade certain assets. Therefore, IPRS is considered the Shariah-
compliant version of the conventional Interest Rate Swap (IRS). The objective of IPRS is to 
enable the bank to manage the mismatch between cash inflow generated from the asset and 
cash outflow arising from payment of expenditure or cost of funding associated with the 
liability side of the balance sheet.
819
 
Under Resolution No. 85, IPRS was approved by the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank 
Negara Malaysia (SAC),
820
 in its 44th meeting dated 24 June 2004. The resolution stipulates 
that SAC “has resolved that the proposed offset practice in the IPRS structure is permissible 
and is not tantamount to the sale of debt with debt, which is prohibited by the Shariah”.821 
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However, some scholars argue that the floating rate payer paying a variable amount would 
not be Shariah-compliant, due to the uncertainty of the amount to be paid.
822
  
According to Bellalah, IPRS can be structured based on murabaha and waad contracts.
823
 
Under IPRS, the parties enter into a series of separate contracts to sell Shariah-compliant 
assets (often London Metal Exchange traded metals). Murabaha contracts are structured in 
two stages. The first stage has generated a fixed profit rate and is structured around a sole 
murabaha contract at a fixed profit rate. At this stage, the fixed-rate payer sells commodities 
to the floating-rate payer under a murabaha contract, and the profit element represents the 
fixed-profit rate. The second stage involves a series of sequential secondary murabaha 
contracts. In this stage, the floating-rate payer sells commodities to the fixed-rate payer under 
a murabaha contract. The delivery is realised at the date of the contract and the payment 
coincides with the next primary murabaha instalment. The cost price of these commodities 
equals the cost price element paid by the fixed-rate payer for each instalment. The mark up 
rate is determined by a floating rate, and the determination of each fixed rate depends on a 
floating interest rate such as the LIBOR. IPRS might also be structured as a series of waad 
whereby each of the two parties issues an undertaking waad to swap relevant fixed and 
floating rate payments at some point of time.
824
 In addition, there are several other structures 
of IPRS such as tawarruq
825
 and bai-el-Inah.
826
  
6.5  How Do Islamic Financial Derivatives Work in Saudi Arabia? 
While many countries such as Malaysia and Singapore struggle to be the best example of 
Islamic financial derivatives. Yet despite the increasing demand, Saudi Arabia is still not 
involved, even though it has the capabilities, experience, Islamic scholars, and financers as 
well as the Islamic status in Muslims’ hearts, to be in this position. One example of this 
absence is the lack of regulation of the financial derivatives market, whether conventional or 
Islamic derivatives.
827
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Specialists in Islamic finance believe that the SAMA, and the Ministry of Finance for the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are accountable for not taking the lead in Islamic finance, because 
there is no independent Capital Market Authority with common criteria for all Islamic 
finance products. They are also suspicious about the concordance of Islamic finance 
procedures with present laws, whereby the regulations of Islamic finance institutions are not 
compatible with the law, and the Banking Control Law (BCL) of 1966 is a traditional one and 
not suitable for developing new products according to Islamic Shariah.
828
  
According to Hasan, despite the legal system of Saudi Arabia being based on Islamic 
Shariah, derived from the Quran and the Sunnah, the IFIs in Saudi Arabia operate under a 
strange legal framework, since the existing law of the BCL 1966 is still applicable and has 
not been repealed or amended to regulate the establishment and existence of the IFIs.
829
 
Hasan adds that despite 15 sukuk issuances between 2000 and 2008 and huge Islamic mutual 
funds in Saudi Arabia, there is no single piece of legislation specifically regulating the 
implementation of Islamic finance.
830
  
According to Meshal, General Manager of the Raqaba Company for Consultations in the UK, 
Saudi Arabia is theoretically at the top of the list of those countries able to lead Islamic 
finance, because all sovereign laws and jurisdiction in Saudi Arabia are based on Islamic 
Shariah. One of these laws is Royal Decree No. 23, dated 15 February 1958, to establish the 
SAMA, where Article 2 prohibits the paying and receiving of interest,
831
 besides the Islamic 
identity of Saudi society and the view of Muslims around the world that Saudi Arabia is the 
centre for executing Shariah in every aspect of life.
832
  
Meshal adds that although Saudi Arabia has the capabilities to take the lead in the field of 
Islamic finance instead of Malaysia and Bahrain, it is notably late in doing so. He attributes 
this absence to the lack of initiative of the supervisory authorities to improve, protect and 
enhance this field and its credibility in front of the whole world. Meshal believes that the 
absence of supervisory authorities has created a trend for Islamic banks towards making 
frequent use of tawarruq contracts (monetisation of commodities), which is similar to 
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interest-based financing, instead of using other Islamic financial contracting forms.
833
  As a 
result, the reputation of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia has been distorted, in the eyes of its 
customers, even though tawarruq is permitted by the Shariah board.
834
 
He continues by pointing out that in banks that adopt Islamic finance, the same people sit on 
several different committees or boards, and this has raised questions about the validity of 
such committees or boards and their decisions. For example, why not have one legal 
committee or Shariah board at the level of the banking sector in Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency? Or why has the Agency not issued common legal criteria for all Islamic financial 
products? Meshal believes that the establishment of an independent central Shariah board in 
Saudi Arabia, and the adoption of uniform standards of legitimacy, would reduce the 
emergence of products that do not add value to Islamic banking as tawarruq.
835
 
Alnuwayser agrees with Meshal that Saudi Arabia is qualified to become the capital of 
Islamic banking more than any other country. He considers that SAMA and the Ministry of 
Finance are responsible for the country's absence in this field which is likely to become the 
highest economic income, after oil, in the future. Alnuwayser adds that, after the financial 
crisis in 2007, many of the big banks were impressed by Islamic banking and finance, where 
the banks were more willing to confront the repercussions of the financial crisis than 
conventional banks, and especially as they looked more profitable and less exposed to risks 
than the conventional banks.
836
  
However, SAMA gave no importance to this, and did not even establish a legislative 
committee for Islamic finance based on clear regulations. Alnuwayser explains that Saudi 
banks that have Islamic windows do not have a legislative committee to ensure that all the 
financial products offered to customers comply with Islamic finance principles. He considers 
that the Ministry of Finance should develop Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia so that they work 
according to a clear approach under the supervision of an agency specialised in Islamic 
finance.
837
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Although SAMA regulates and supervises the IFIs under the BCL, there is no standard 
guideline on Shariah governance for Islamic financial institutions. According to Hasan, the 
practices of the existing Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia show that the Shariah 
governance system is based on a self-regulated approach.
838
 He adds that the notion of having 
a Shariah governance system within the IFIs is not based on any legal and supervisory 
requirements but would be a voluntary initiative.
839
 Therefore, the IFIs in Saudi Arabia are 
free to adopt their own Shariah governance without adhering either locally to SAMA or 
CMA standards or internationally to AAOIFI standards. For example, the Al-Rajhi bank has 
established its own Shariah guidelines and procedures, known as the Shariah Monitoring 
Guide and Shariah Control Guidelines, in order to ensure the proper monitoring and 
implementation of Shariah rulings.
840
  
According to Ibn Mani, a member of the council of senior scholars in Saudi Arabia, one of 
the main reasons for the absence of Islamic financial derivatives in Saudi markets is the lack 
of a system (law) for the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) of Islamic banks, where the Saudi 
banks unilaterally choose the members of the SSBs of the bank.
841
 Using the National 
Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCB) as a model, the SSB was formed based on a 
request by the Islamic Banking Development Group in NCB to scientists who meet the 
Secretariat and science to join the Shariah Fatwa for National Commercial Bank products.
842
 
This practice comes in the light of the absence of laws to regulate the work of the SSBs.  
Ibn Mani recommends finding a common denominator between Islamic banks in Saudi 
Arabia through the establishment of united SSBs, with SAMA overseeing the coordination 
between the SSBs. He added that in the case of a difference of opinion or a dispute amongst 
Shariah Boards (SBs), the difference of opinion should be presented to the International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy.
843
 
According to Hammad, it is possible to find one person being a member of a number of 
Islamic banks and financial institutions, because of the lack of laws regulating the SSBs. For 
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example, Shaykh Abdullah ibn Mani is a member of many Shariah supervisory committees 
of banks, such as the Shariah Board at Gulf Finance House (GFH),
844
 the NCB Shariah 
Board,
845
 the Shariah Board at Saudi Hollandi Bank,
846
 the Shariah Standards Board at 
AAOIFI,
847
 the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC),
848
 
and other Shariah supervisory committees. 
The researcher believes that Saudi Arabia is not ready to apply Islamic financial derivatives 
along with its compliance with Shariah for several reasons. One of the main reasons is the 
lack of a stand-alone Islamic banking law to regulate those Islamic institutions that conduct 
banking and financial activities. Currently, in Saudi Arabia, the Islamic banks are regulated 
by the Banking Control Law (BCL) of 1966.
849
 In contrast, Malaysia’s Islamic banks are 
governed by a separate Act (the Islamic Banking Act 1983 (IBA)).
850
  
The absence of a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance in 
Saudi Arabia has resulted in a questioning of the legal status of Shariah rulings and also a 
conflict of Shariah opinion (fatwa) by the Shariah boards of different IFIs on the same issue. 
In other words, the IFIs have founded a self-regulatory process within each institution. In 
addition, they are free to adopt their own Shariah governance without adhering either locally 
to SAMA or CMA standards or internationally to AAOIFI standards. This has caused a lack 
of the homogeneity that Islamic jurists need in order to be able to issue uniform fatwas for 
some financial products.  This problem is due, on the one hand, to the multiplicity of Shariah 
boards and different opinions of Islamic scholars for each bank, and, on the other, to the 
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uncertainty on the part of clients as to whether a product developed in one jurisdiction is 
Shariah-compliant in a neighbouring jurisdiction.
851
 
Another main issue is the absence of a national centralised Shariah supervisory board. In 
Saudi Arabia, there is no independent central Shariah board to regulate and supervise Islamic 
banking activities. Currently, SAMA supervises and regulates Islamic institutions that 
conduct banking and financial activities side-by-side with conventional commercial banking 
businesses under Royal Decree No. M/5, dated 11 June 1966.
852
 However, in Malaysia, the 
Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) regulates and supervises Islamic banking activities. SAC is 
the highest Shariah authority in Islamic finance, responsible for validating all Islamic 
financial products to ensure their compatibility with Shariah principles.
853
 
This absence of a central Shariah supervisory board raises the probability of conflict in 
opinions (fatwas) between Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia. These differing opinions may 
result in significant damage to the IFIs in addition to breach of confidence among 
investors.
854
 An example of this conflict between Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia was 
mentioned in Chapter four, in relation to the initial public offering of the Yanbu National 
Petrochemical Company (YANSAB). 
The researcher recommends the establishment of a stand-alone Islamic banking law, drafted 
by experts in the fields of law and Islamic finance, whose qualifications include a PhD in 
Islamic finance. This stand-alone Islamic banking law must be consistent with the provisions 
and principles of Shariah in order to fill the legislative and regulatory gap for Islamic 
banking and finance in Saudi Arabia. Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance in Saudi 
Arabia stipulates that the constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Holy Quran and 
the Sunnah.
855
 Therefore, any bill must take into account the principles of Shariah (the Holy 
Quran and the Sunnah). 
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The researcher also recommends the establishment of an independent body called the Saudi 
Shariah Advisory Council (SSAC) to regulate and supervise all Islamic banking and finance 
activities including takaful business, instead of SAMA. Members of the SSAC should be 
qualified in banking, finance, law and the application of Shariah, particularly in the areas of 
Islamic banking and finance. The number of members must be at least 25. The researcher 
further recommends that the SSAC should look into issues related to Islamic banks and their 
customers under the name “the Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes” instead of the 
Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes in SAMA which was issued, formed of three 
competent members from SAMA under a Royal Order on 1/3/1987.
856
 The Committee for 
Settlement of Banking Disputes in SAMA would continue to look into issues related to 
conventional banks and their customers, while the SSAC would look into issues related to 
Islamic banks and their customers. The lack of commercial courts in Saudi Arabia and the 
need for three competent members from SAMA to consider the banking disputes support the 
researcher’s view. The researcher’s view is that the banking disputes need a specialised body 
such as the SSAC and experts in Islamic finance to look into banking issues. The SSAC 
would not be a court and its decision would not be final and binding, but it would give an 
opinion. It would just be a settlement committee, and the binding resolution would be by 
specialised commercial courts.  
The researcher believes that the establishment of the proposed SSAC is not difficult in Saudi 
Arabia, because the system of governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is monarchical. 
Under Royal Order No: A/90 dated 1 March 1992 of the Basic Law of Governance, Article 
5/A stipulates that “the system of governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be 
monarchical”.857 Therefore, under  Articles 5/A, 57, 58 and 62 of the Basic Law of 
Governance, the establishment of an independent body called the Saudi Shariah Advisory 
Council (SSAC) to regulate and supervise all Islamic banking and finance activities in Saudi 
Arabia is the king’s prerogative. For example, Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz 
issued a Royal Decree establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to monitor and 
observe government departments.
858
 The ACC is directly connected to the King of Saudi 
Arabia under Royal Decree No. A/65 dated 18 March 2011.
859
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The researcher recommends adopting AAOIFI's standards and guidelines and the IFSB 
guidelines in IFIs such as accounting standards, auditing standards and governance standards 
until the establishment of the proposed SSAC. The SSAC would provide guidelines for 
Shariah governance framework for the Islamic financial institutions to ensure the proper 
monitoring and implementation system of Shariah rulings on the IFIs. The researcher 
believes that it is also important to amend the Banking Control Law (BCL) issued under 
Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 11 June 1966, and the Capital Market Law, issued by Royal 
Decree No. (M/30) dated 31 July 2003 in order make them accommodate standards issued 
from international bodies specialised in the field of Islamic finance. 
The researcher also recommends that the Saudi government should set up specialised 
commercial courts to look into commercial issues including Islamic banking issues. Such 
courts should take the opinion of SSAC in the Islamic banking and finance issues. Both the 
specialised commercial courts and SSAC should consider standards and recommendations 
that have been issued and developed by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI); such as governance standards, Shariah standards, 
accounting standards, auditing standards, and ethics standards.
860
 They should also consider 
decisions and recommendations that have been issued by the Islamic Fiqh Council (IFC) 
regarding Islamic banking and finance, such as Resolution No: 85 (2/9) [1] of the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy, Salam contract and its contemporary applications.
861
 
6.6  Proposed Legislative and Regulatory Framework for Islamic Banking and Finance 
Including Islamic Financial Derivatives in Saudi Arabia 
As mentioned, in Saudi Arabia there is no specific law governing Islamic banking and 
finance including Islamic financial derivatives in spite of the importance of regulating and 
supervising Islamic financial activities. There are two acts for regulating banking business 
and securities in Saudi Arabia. The first one is the Banking Control Law (BCL), issued under 
Royal Decree No. M/5, dated 11 June 1966, which is considered the main legislation to 
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regulate all banking business in Saudi Arabia.
862
 Under this law, SAMA is responsible for the 
regulation of Saudi banks. For example, Article 3 of the BCL stipulates that all applications 
to carry on a banking business in Saudi Arabia shall be addressed to SAMA.
863
 
The second act is the Capital Market Law, issued by Royal Decree No. (M/30) dated 31/ July 
2003. Under this act, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) is responsible for regulating the 
Saudi Arabian Capital Market and creating an appropriate investment environment, boosting 
confidence, reinforcing transparency and disclosure standards in all listed companies, and 
protecting investors and dealers from illegal acts in the market.
864
 
Neither act mentions Islamic banking, nor have SAMA and CMA issued a single document 
pertaining to Islamic banking and financial business, in contrast to the central bank of 
Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)), and the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC), or 
even the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK, which have issued numerous 
documents and guidelines pertaining to Islamic banking and finance. For example, in March 
1993, BNM introduced a scheme known as an interest-free Banking Scheme which allows 
existing banking institutions to offer Islamic banking products through their existing 
infrastructure and branch network.
865
 In 2005, BNM issued its Guidelines on the Governance 
of Shariah Committees, known as BNM/GPS 1, which regulates the governance of the 
Shariah Committee of IFIs in Malaysia.
866
 BNM has also issued Guidelines on the Disclosure 
of Reports and Financial Statements of Islamic Banks, known as BNM/GPS8-i.
867
 The 
Shariah framework is set by the SAC of BNM, and this SAC approved several financing 
techniques and capital market instruments.
868
 
In addition, some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have mentioned Islamic 
banking in their legislation. For example, in Kuwait, the Central Bank of Law was amended 
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to bring the Islamic banks formally under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank of Kuwait 
(CBK).
869
 In Bahrain, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) issued a rulebook for Islamic 
Banks.
870
 In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 mentions ten 
articles regarding Islamic banking, financial institutions and investment companies.
871
 
The researcher believes that there is an urgent need to enact a special law to regulate and 
supervise Islamic banking and financial services in Saudi Arabia, like the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 2009 (CBA), the Banking Regulation Act 2003 in Sudan, and the Islamic 
Banking Law 1983 in Iran. To address this legislation gap, the researcher  proposes a 
legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance including Islamic 
financial derivatives in Saudi Arabia. This framework consists of three chapters and key 
elements, as follows: 
Chapter 1: Licensing Requirement  
a. All applications, for the granting of licences to establish or conduct an Islamic bank or 
cooperative insurance company (takaful) or Islamic banking business or Islamic 
financial business in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be addressed to the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which will study the applications after obtaining 
all the necessary information with the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council, and submit 
their recommendations to the Ministry of Finance for endorsement. 
b. The licence for an Islamic bank or cooperative insurance company (takaful) shall 
stipulate the following: 
i. Any licensed institution carrying on an Islamic banking business or Islamic 
financial business shall not involve any element that is not approved by the 
religion of Islam such as dealing in transactions that contain excessive risk or 
speculation or investment in businesses related to alcohol, pork-related 
products, conventional financial services, pornography, weapons and defence. 
ii. Any licensed institution carrying on an Islamic banking business or Islamic 
financial business shall not involve usury or interest (riba), uncertainty 
(gharar), or gambling (maysir). 
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iii. Any licensed institution shall consult the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council 
with respect to carrying on an Islamic banking business or Islamic financial 
business. 
iv. The cooperative insurance company (takaful) acts as the agent for the fund 
management and receives a fee for underwriting the fund in a wakala contract, 
while it acts as the fund manager for managing investments and sharing the 
profit from the investment of the takaful fund in a mudaraba contract. 
Chapter 2: The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council (SSAC) 
a. Establishment of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council. There shall be established an 
independent body known as the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council (SSAC), under 
Royal Decree from the King of Saudi Arabia under the powers granted to him under 
the 58th Article of the Basic Law of Governance issued by Royal Order No. A / 90 
dated 01 March 1992. The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall be the highest 
Shariah authority for the determination of Shariah for Islamic financial business in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall be given 
authority for the ascertainment of Shariah for the purposes of Islamic financial 
business, Islamic banking business, Islamic bonds (sukuk), takaful business, Islamic 
financial derivatives, and Islamic development financial business, or any other Islamic 
financial business. The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council is the final arbiter in the 
interpretation of Shariah principles on Islamic banking and financial business.  
b. Functions. The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall have the following functions: 
i. To regulate all Islamic banking business and Islamic finance business 
including Islamic bonds (sukuk), cooperative insurance (takaful), and Islamic 
financial derivatives. 
ii. Effective supervision of Islamic banks, cooperative insurance companies and 
Islamic finance companies to ensure that all internal and external operations 
comply with Shariah principles.  
iii. To contribute to the realisation of the bank’s Islamic banking strategy through 
supporting plans and policies necessary for the bank’s compliance with the 
provisions of Shariah. 
iv. To ascertain that the operations of Islamic financial institutions or Islamic 
windows of conventional banks are undertaken according to Shariah 
principles.  
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v. To issue fatwas, Shariah rulings, Shariah standards, accounting standards, 
auditing standards, governance standards, and guidelines concerning products, 
services and operations of Islamic financial institutions. 
vi. To establish a sound and robust Shariah governance framework for Islamic 
financial institutions. 
vii. To regulate the governance of the Shariah Committees at the Islamic financial 
institutions by setting out the rules, regulations and procedures in the 
establishment of the Shariah Committees.  
viii. To advise the central bank of Saudi Arabia or any Islamic financial institution 
or an internal Shariah committee established within each Islamic financial 
institution on any Shariah issue relating to Islamic financial business. 
ix. To innovate and develop new financial products and services in line with the 
precepts of Shariah. 
x. To settle financial and commercial disputes between the Islamic financial 
institution and others – whether the dispute is between the Islamic financial 
institution and the investors or shareholders, or between the Islamic financial 
institution and the government, or between public legal persons and private 
legal persons, or one of the public or private sector companies or individuals – 
through the arbitration centre of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council. 
xi. Coordination and cooperation with specialised international bodies in the field 
of Islamic banking and finance, such as the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB), International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA), and 
the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC). 
xii. To form a Shariah committee if the Islamic financial institutions require their 
own Shariah committee to be established. 
c. Functions of the Shariah committee:  
i. Verifying that the Islamic financial institutions’ transactions comply with 
fatwas by the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council.  
ii. Issuing an annual report to the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council that all 
financial transactions comply with Shariah principles.  
iii. Educating employees in Islamic financial institutions through training courses 
so that they are legally qualified to complete the tasks assigned to them.  
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iv. The Shariah committee is responsible for calculating and paying zakat 
(purification).  
v. The members of the Shariah committee shall be appointed by the Saudi 
Shariah Advisory Council for three years.  
vi. A member from the Shariah committee of Islamic financial institutions shall 
be appointed by the SSAC as an internal inspector to ensure that all internal 
and external operations comply with the provisions of Shariah.  
vii. No member of the Shariah committee shall be a member of another board 
within the same industry.  
viii. The members of the Shariah committee shall not be nor have been employed 
by an Islamic Financial Institution or any of its related companies for the 
current or previous financial year. 
d. Qualifications of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council and the Shariah committee 
members. 
i. Every member of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council and every member of 
the Shariah committee shall be a Muslim individual. 
ii. The majority of the Saudi Shariah Advisory members shall hold a Doctorate 
degree in Islamic banking and finance. 
iii. All the Shariah committee members shall have a Masters degree in Islamic 
banking and finance. 
iv. All members of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council and the Shariah 
committee members should be able to demonstrate strong proficiency in and 
knowledge of both written and oral Arabic, and the majority of them should 
also have a good understanding of the English language. 
v. The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council and the Shariah committee members 
preferably shall comprise members of diverse backgrounds in terms of 
qualification, knowledge and experience. 
e. Appointment of members to the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council.  
i. The President and members of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall be 
appointed by the King of Saudi Arabia on the advice of the Minister of 
Finance after consultation with the central bank of Saudi Arabia.  
ii. The President of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall be appointed on a 
Minister’s rank.  
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iii. The members of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall be composed of 
eleven members including the President appointed for four years.  
iv. The members of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall be elected from 
among Shariah scholars, lawyers, bankers, accountants and central bankers as 
well as from among Islamic financial professionals and scholars.  
v. No member of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall be a member of 
another board within the same industry.  
vi. The members of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall not be nor have 
been employed by an Islamic Financial Institution or any related companies 
for the current or previous financial year. 
f. Secretariat to the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council. The Saudi Shariah Advisory 
Council may establish a secretariat and such other committees as it considers 
necessary to assist the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council in carrying out its functions; 
and appoint any officer of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council or any other person to 
be a member of the secretariat or such other committees. 
g. Reference to the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council for any ruling from court or 
arbitrator. In any proceedings relating to Islamic financial business, the court or 
arbitrator shall take into consideration any published rulings of the Saudi Shariah 
Advisory Council.  
h. Effect of Shariah rulings. Any ruling made by the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council 
shall be binding on the Islamic financial institutions. 
i. Shariah Advisory Council ruling prevails. Where the ruling given by a Shariah 
committee constituted by an Islamic financial institution or by Islamic windows of 
conventional banks is different from the ruling given by the Saudi Shariah Advisory 
Council, the ruling of the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council shall prevail. 
Chapter 3: The Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 
a. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the Saudi Shariah Advisory 
Council are responsible for establishing a sound and robust Shariah governance 
framework with emphasis placed on the roles of key functionalities in ensuring 
effective implementation of the Shariah governance framework. 
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b. Under this framework, the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council will be responsible for the 
overall Shariah oversight of Islamic financial institutions and the effective 
functioning of the Shariah governance structure, policies and processes. 
c. Regulation, oversight, accountability and responsibility. 
i. Regulation. the Saudi Shariah Advisory Council regulates all Islamic banking 
business and Islamic finance business including Islamic bonds (sukuk), 
cooperative insurance (takaful) and Islamic financial derivatives. The Saudi 
Shariah Advisory Council regulates the governance of the Shariah 
Committees at the Islamic financial institutions by setting out the rules, 
regulations and procedures in the establishment of the Shariah Committee.  
ii. Oversight. The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council is responsible for effective 
supervision of Islamic banks, cooperative insurance companies and Islamic 
finance companies to ensure that all internal and external operations comply 
with Shariah rules and principles. The Shariah committee shall monitor the 
activities and the implementation of Shariah rulings with the assistance of the 
Shariah Control Department to facilitate greater transparency and disclosure 
in financial reporting and to maximise public confidence in Islamic financial 
institutions of the application of Shariah rules and principles. 
iii. Accountability and responsibility.  
The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council is ultimately accountable and 
responsible for the overall Shariah governance framework and for Shariah 
compliance of the Islamic financial institutions, through putting in place the 
appropriate mechanisms.  
The Saudi Shariah Advisory Council is responsible for issuing fatwas, 
Shariah rulings, Shariah standards, accounting standards, auditing standards, 
governance standards, and guidelines concerning products, services and 
operations of Islamic financial institutions.  
The members of the Shariah committee shall be appointed by the Saudi 
Shariah Advisory Council for three years, based on the recommendation of the 
Nominating Committee in the Islamic financial institutions.  
The Shariah committee is responsible for verifying that the Islamic financial 
institutions’ transactions comply with fatwas issued by the Saudi Shariah 
Advisory Council.  
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The Shariah committee is responsible for issuing an annual report to the 
general assembly of Islamic financial institutions, and the Saudi Shariah 
Advisory Council shows that all financial transactions comply with Shariah 
principles.  
The Shariah committee is responsible for calculating and paying zakat 
(purification).  
Employees shall be educated in the Islamic financial institutions through 
training courses so that they are legally qualified to complete the tasks 
assigned to them. 
The Shariah Committee shall be accountable and responsible for all its 
decisions, opinions and views related to Shariah matters. 
6.7 Legal Challenges in Applying the Proposed Framework for Islamic Banking and 
Finance in Saudi Arabia 
There are some challenges that prevent the application of the proposed framework. The first 
challenge is the restriction of Shariah fatwa. Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah issued Royal 
Order No: B/13876 dated 12 August 2010 to restrict Shariah fatwa on the Council of Senior 
Scholars in Saudi Arabia (also known as the Senior Council of Ulema).
872
 This royal order 
prevents any body or person from practising the fatwa except the Council of Senior Scholars. 
To address this issue, this royal order needs to be amended so as to appoint the Saudi Shariah 
Advisory Council with the Council of Senior Scholars as the body that is responsible for 
issuing Shariah fatwa regarding Islamic financial business, Islamic banking business, Islamic 
bonds (sukuk), takaful business, Islamic financial derivatives, Islamic development financial 
business, or any other Islamic financial business. 
Another challenge that should be clear to all Islamic financial institutions is liquidity risk. In 
the case of these institutions’ exposure to the liquidity crisis, SAMA will not support or 
provide the necessary liquidity to them. It is known that SAMA as a central bank acts as the 
lender of last resort if commercial banks encounter any liquidity risk, by lending them the 
necessary money but requiring them to return the money with interest later. Therefore, the 
lending policy in SAMA is based on interest payment. It is known that Islamic financial 
institutions cannot borrow money on an interest basis either from SAMA or any other body 
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such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), because interest (riba) is forbidden in Islam. 
So what is the solution? The solution from the researcher’s point of view is that Islamic 
financial institutions enter into a contract with the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Saudi 
Arabia whereby the IDB will grant loans without interest to the IFIs to address their crisis. 
Finally, an amendment to the law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies was 
issued by Royal Decree No. M/32 on 01/08/2003, and its implementing regulation was issued 
by Ministerial Decision No. 1/596 on 20/04/2004 in order to appoint the Saudi Shariah 
Advisory Council as the body responsible for overseeing and regulating Islamic financial 
institutions, including cooperative insurance companies. 
The researcher hopes that this proposal will be taken into consideration by SAMA and the 
Ministry of Finance. The proposal is intended as the first step towards the enactment of a law 
regulating Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. The researcher also recommends 
taking advantage of the Malaysian experience where the Islamic Banking Act (IBA 1983) 
and the Bank and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA 1993, amended) were enacted in order to 
cater for Islamic banking practices.
873
 Malaysia also established the Shariah Advisory 
Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC) in May 1997 as the highest Shariah authority in 
Islamic finance in Malaysia.
874
 
6.8  Summary 
This chapter has aimed to provide a comprehensive and critical review of Islamic financial 
derivatives in Saudi Arabia, including their concept, mechanism, principles, practices and 
models, as an Islamic alternative to conventional derivatives. This chapter has also examined 
whether the current uses of accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance 
are compatible with the principles of Shariah. The research question of this chapter has 
discussed how Islamic financial derivatives work in Saudi Arabia. 
The researcher found that there is no special law to regulate and supervise Islamic banking 
and financial services in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
regulates and supervises Islamic institutions that conduct banking and financial activities 
side-by-side with conventional commercial banking businesses under the Banking Control 
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Law (BCL) of 1966. Unlike Malaysia, there is no independent central Shariah board to 
regulate and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. The 
researcher also found that there are no specialised commercial courts in Saudi Arabia to look 
into commercial issues including Islamic banking issues. 
The researcher recommended the enactment of a special law for Islamic banking and finance, 
drafted by experts in the fields of law and Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia. The researcher 
also recommended establishing an independent body called the Saudi Shariah Advisory 
Council (SSAC) to regulate and supervise all Islamic banking and finance activities including 
takaful business, instead of SAMA. The researcher recommended adopting AAOIFI's 
standards and guidelines and the IFSB guidelines in IFIs such as accounting standards, 
auditing standards and governance standards until the establishment of the proposed SSAC. 
The researcher further recommended the establishment of specialised commercial courts to 
look into commercial issues including Islamic banking issues in Saudi Arabia. In addition, 
the researcher recommended transferring the Malaysian experience in the field of Islamic 
banking and finance to Saudi Arabia with some modifications that would be commensurate 
with the nature of the Saudi regime. 
In this chapter, the researcher proposed an initial legislative and regulatory framework for 
Islamic banking and finance including Islamic financial derivatives in Saudi Arabia. The 
researcher examined the legal challenges in applying the proposed framework in Saudi 
Arabia, and offered possible solutions to meet those challenges. The researcher hopes that 
SAMA and the Ministry of Finance will consider this framework and make it a first step 
towards the enactment of a law regulating Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1  Introduction  
The final chapter summarises the main conclusions, based on the research undertaken from 
the critical literature review and comparative analysis. This chapter presents the major 
findings that were discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six. It also provides 
recommendations for reforming and improving the existing laws and regulations governing 
Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. It then suggests ideas for further 
research and presents a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance 
in Saudi Arabia as a main contribution to research knowledge.        
The main purpose of this research was to examine whether the current practices of Islamic 
banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia, including the current uses of sukuk (Islamic 
bonds), the models of takaful (Islamic insurance) and accepted risk transfer mechanisms in 
Islamic structured finance (Islamic derivatives), are compatible with the principles of 
Shariah.  
7.2  Conclusion 
The first chapter introduced the research questions and stated the research objectives, as well 
as explaining the rationale of choosing the research topic. It also briefly discussed the 
research methodology and research scope and limitation. An outline of the thesis was also 
presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Two provided background information to the Saudi legal structure and Islamic 
banking and financial systems in Saudi Arabia. It gave a brief overview of the meaning of 
Shariah and its legal sources, and also the main Sunni schools (madhhab). It also explained 
about the authorities responsible for the regulation and supervision of Islamic banking and 
financial activities in Saudi Arabia. This chapter answered the research question about the 
basic laws for Islamic banking and financial activities including Islamic bonds, Islamic 
insurance and Islamic derivatives in Saudi Arabia. 
This second chapter explained that the constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based 
on Shariah.
875
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Shariah derives its provisions from the primary and secondary sources. The Holy Quran and 
Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad are considered the primary sources of Shariah, while Islamic 
scholarly consensus (ijma) and analogical reasoning by Muslim judges (Qiyas) are secondary 
sources. The primary sources of Shariah govern all administrative regulations of the State.
876
 
In Saudi Arabia, Shariah is interpreted by Islamic judges (qadis) who have been influenced 
by the Hanbali madhhab (school) of Islamic jurisprudence which is applied by Saudi courts. 
In Shariah, there are four Islamic Sunni schools, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali 
schools.
877
  
The conclusion reached in this chapter was that there are three laws to regulate and supervise 
all Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. The first law is the Banking 
Control Law (BCL) issued under Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 11/6/1966, which is 
considered the main legislation to regulate all banking business in Saudi Arabia. Under this 
law, SAMA is responsible for the regulation of Saudi banks.
878
 The second is the Law of 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies issued by Royal Decree No. M/32 on 
01/08/2003, and its implementing regulations issued by the Ministerial Decision No. 1/596 on 
20/04/2004 to regulate and supervise the cooperative insurance companies sector in Saudi 
Arabia. Under this law, SAMA is considered the regulatory authority for regulating and 
supervising the cooperative insurance companies in Saudi Arabia.
879
 The third law is the 
Capital Market Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/30, dated 31/07/2003. Under this law, 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) is responsible for regulating the Saudi Arabian Capital 
Market and creating an appropriate investment environment, boosting confidence, reinforcing 
transparency and disclosure standards in all listed companies, and protecting investors and 
dealers from illegal acts in the market.
880
  
Chapter Three reviewed the body of knowledge concerning Islamic finance laws, principles, 
distinguishing features, contracting forms, risks and challenges from the Shariah point of 
view. It also explained the nature and scope of Islamic finance, using a comparative approach 
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to make a comparison with the conventional system so as to broaden the  understanding of 
the subject. This chapter highlighted the main question of this research through a review of 
Islamic financial contracting forms, which are applied in Islamic banks or by Islamic 
windows in conventional banks.  
This third chapter concluded that Islamic finance is based on the principles of Shariah, and 
involves the sharing of profits and losses. Islamic finance includes a set of financial contracts 
which are compatible with Shariah principles. Such contracts are offered by Islamic banks 
and the Islamic banking windows in conventional banks. The major financial principles of 
Shariah are the prohibitions on interest (riba), either riba an-Nasia or riba al-Fadl; gambling 
(qimar/maisir) and uncertainty (gharar), but the most important of these is the prohibition of 
interest (riba). Therefore, all Islamic banks and financial institutions must perform their 
activities on the basis of non-interest or interest-free banking. Instead of interest or usury, 
Shariah seeks to promote ethical behaviour and entrepreneurship, and to encourage risk-
sharing and equitable distribution of wealth in order to bring about social and economic 
justice and the preservation of property rights.  
Islamic finance faces a number of risks in its operations, due to the nature of its balance sheet 
and compliance with Shariah; these risks are Credit risk, Liquidity risk, Market risk and 
Operational risk. Islamic banks are just as exposed to financial risks in their present contracts 
as conventional banks are, but the nature of the risks faced by Islamic banks is complex and 
difficult to mitigate. In addition, Islamic finance also faces a set of challenges. It could be 
claimed that the biggest reason for these risks and challenges is the Shariah risk, which is 
exemplified in the multiplicity of Shariah boards and the different opinions of Islamic 
scholars in each bank to ensure that Islamic financial products and activities are compliant 
with Shariah. In this regard, Shariah scholars need to learn more about conventional finance 
in order to reduce the risks and challenges that face Islamic banks and to benefit from the 
experiences of conventional banks in this field. 
Chapter Four provided a comprehensive and critical review of sukuk issuance in Saudi 
Arabia, its concept, mechanism, principles, practices and models as an Islamic alternative to 
conventional bonds. The focus of this chapter was on the regulatory framework of the 
issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia from the Shariah point of view. This chapter discussed the 
difference between sukuk and conventional bonds on the basis of contract legitimacy and 
Shariah-compliance. It also discussed why conventional bonds are prohibited and 
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unacceptable in Shariah. The aim of this chapter was to examine whether the current uses of 
sukuk provided by the CMA are compatible with the principles of Shariah.  
This fourth chapter concluded that the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is regulated and 
supervised side-by-side with the issuance of shares and debt instruments by the Capital 
Market Authority under the CMA Listing Rules and the CMA Offer of Securities 
Regulations. Islamic sukuk offer a mechanism of partial ownership under a financial 
obligation (known as sukuk murabaha), business (sukuk Al musharaka), investment (sukuk Al 
istithmar), project (sukuk Al istisna), and asset (sukuk Al ijarah). Sukuk issuance in Saudi 
Arabia faces a set of challenges, perhaps the most important of which is the lack of a 
legislative and regulatory framework for sukuk issuance. The issuance of sukuk and 
convention debt instruments share many common features, especially assets-backed bonds. 
However, there are two important differences between them. With regard to the future flow 
of money, in the case of conventional bonds, investors are ensured a fixed rate of return or 
interest on the maturity of bond, while the financial structure of sukuk is based upon the 
exchange of those assets that have been approved with a few scales, instead of the exchange 
of money with the certificates alone. The second major difference can be recognised in terms 
of financial situations where a bond issuer cannot repay the debt and interest to investors; in 
these financial circumstances, a bond holder may lose his/her investment, as the contractual 
obligations of the bond do not guarantee the security of recovering the principal investment. 
In the case of sukuk, investors can claim some of their investment through collateral to the 
contract sukuk.  
Chapter Five reviewed the body of knowledge concerning Islamic insurance, its principles, 
regulation and supervision, challenges and its models from the Shariah point of view. The 
aim of this chapter was to determine the legal conflict between the law of supervision of 
cooperative insurance companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations. This 
chapter discussed the difference between takaful and conventional insurance, and why 
conventional insurance is prohibited and unacceptable in Shariah. This chapter answered the 
research question about to what extent the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations comply with Shariah law.  
In Saudi Arabia, Islamic insurance is regulated and supervised side-by-side with conventional 
insurance by SAMA under the Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and 
its implementing regulations. The three main operational models used in the takaful industry 
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in Saudi Arabia are the mudarabah, wakala and hybrid ones. The general principles of 
takaful are the same as those of Islamic finance, which is the prohibition of interest or usury 
(riba), uncertainty (gharar), and gambling (maisir), but takaful as a contract of mutual 
insurance is based on the principles of mutual cooperation (taawun) and donation (tabaru), 
cooperative risk sharing, mutual responsibility, mutual protection, and solidarity among 
groups of participants.  
Conventional insurance is prohibited in Islam because it involves elements of uncertainty 
(gharar) in the subject matter. Moreover, gharar can exist in conventional insurance in four 
forms: in the outcome, in the existence, in the results of the exchange and in the contract 
period. Conventional insurance also involves riba (interest) both directly and indirectly in its 
investment activities: the direct involvement of riba is an excess on one side in the case of 
exchange between the amount of the premiums and the sum insured.  Investment in interest-
based businesses by the insurer refers to the indirect involvement of the policyholder in riba-
based transactions such as putting insurance funds in interest-bearing instruments such as 
bond and loans. In addition, conventional insurance involves gambling, where one party is 
always hoping for a gain, resulting in a loss for another party. 
Chapter Six gave a comprehensive and critical review of Islamic financial derivatives as an 
alternative to conventional derivatives in Saudi Arabia. The aim of this chapter was to 
examine whether the current uses of accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured 
finance are compatible with the principles of Shariah. This chapter offered a critical and 
comparative analysis of the principles and practices of derivatives in Islamic and 
conventional finance and also discussed the difference between them. It then discussed why 
derivatives in conventional finance are prohibited and unacceptable in Shariah. This sixth 
chapter critically analysed how Islamic financial derivatives work in Saudi Arabia from the 
Shariah point of view. In this same chapter, the researcher proposed a legislative and 
regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance including Islamic financial derivatives 
in Saudi Arabia. The chapter examined the legal challenges in applying the proposed 
framework for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia, and provided solutions to meet 
those challenges. 
Islamic financial derivatives in Saudi Arabia are regulated and supervised by SAMA under 
the Banking Control Law (BCL) of 1966.  A number of hedging tools exist in the Islamic 
financial industry that could be considered a basis for derivative contracts within the bounds 
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of Islamic finance. These alternatives are Bai Salam, Bai Urban, Khiyarat, Wad and Islamic 
Swap (An Islamic Profit Rate Swap). Conventional derivatives are not permissible in Shariah 
because they involve interest (riba), gambling and pure games of chance (maysir), 
uncertainty (gharar) and exchange of one debt for another debt or bai-al-kali-bi-al-kali or 
bai-al-dayn-bi-al-dayn. 
7.3 Research Findings 
The major findings of the research were presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six, which 
were closely connected to the research questions, and may be summarised as follows: 
One of the most significant findings to emerge from this study is that there are no specific 
laws and regulations governing Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. 
Currently, Islamic banking and financial activities are regulated and supervised, side-by-side 
with conventional commercial banking businesses, by SAMA under the Banking Control 
Law (BCL) of 1966. The lack of a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking 
and finance in Saudi Arabia has founded a self-regulatory process within the IFIs in the sense 
that each Islamic financial institution in Saudi Arabia is free to adopt its own Shariah 
governance without adhering either locally to SAMA or CMA standards or internationally to 
AAOIFI standards. In addition, the absence of a legal framework for Islamic banking and 
finance in Saudi Arabia has resulted in a questioning of the legal status of Shariah rulings and 
also a conflict of Shariah opinion (fatwa) by the Shariah scholars of different IFIs on the 
same issue, and an example of this conflict is the initial public offering of the Yanbu National 
Petrochemical Company (YANSAB). This absence of a legal framework has resulted also in 
the multiplicity of Shariah boards and different opinions of Islamic scholars for each IFI, in 
addition to a lack of certainty by clients as to whether the current practices of Islamic banking 
and financial activities in Saudi Arabia are compatible with the principles of Shariah. Finally, 
despite the fact that the Saudi capital market is one of the largest markets for Islamic banking 
and finance in the world because of the oil revolution, the absence of laws and regulations is 
an obstacle to foreign investors. 
The second major finding is that there is no independent central Shariah board to regulate 
and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. In most cases, the 
Saudi banks unilaterally choose the members of the Shariah supervisory board of the bank. 
This practice is a result of the absence of laws that regulate the work of the Shariah 
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supervisory boards in Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. One of the implications 
of the absence of an independent central Shariah is the conflict in fatwas between Shariah 
scholars in Saudi Arabia, which may result in a breach of confidence among customers and 
investors. Another implication of this absence is weakness of regulation, oversight, 
accountability and responsibility within IFIs, due to the absence of a Shariah governance 
framework for IFIs.  
The research findings have shown that there are no specialised commercial courts to look into 
commercial issues including Islamic banking issues in Saudi Arabia. Currently, the 
Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes in SAMA which was issued, formed of three 
competent members from SAMA under a Royal Order on 1/3/1987, are responsible for 
looking into issues related to both Islamic and conventional banks and their customers. In 
addition, the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes issued by the Board of the 
Capital Market Authority is responsible for looking into issues related to securities disputes 
including sukuk issuance. The problem is that these committees, known as quasi-judicial 
committees, do not have binding force to implement the provisions or the decisions issued by 
them, and their decisions are not conclusive because they are not Shariah courts. In addition, 
they are linked with the boards of directors of SAMA and CMA and the Ministry of 
Commerce, and as such are not an independent judiciary.  
This study has found that the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is not consistent with the 
principles of Shariah, due to the absence of a regulatory and supervisory framework for 
sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia. Currently, the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia is regulated 
and supervised side-by-side with the issuance of shares and debt instruments by CMA under 
the Offers of Securities Regulations and the Listing Rules. In addition, there is no Shariah 
board or Shariah committee in CMA to regulate and supervise the issuance of sukuk in Saudi 
Arabia. This absence of a Shariah board raises the probability of conflict in opinions (fatwas) 
between Islamic scholars about the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia. These differing 
opinions between Islamic scholars may result in significant damage to the issuer of sukuk in 
addition to breach of confidence among investors. The researcher has therefore proposed a 
legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia 
including the issuance of sukuk in order to ensure compatibility with the principles of 
Shariah.  
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This research has found that the current uses of accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic 
structured finance such as Bai Salam as an Islamic Forward, Bai Urban, Islamic Options 
(Khiyarat), Wad (a Unilateral Promise), Islamic Cross-Currency Swap (ICCS) and Islamic 
Profit Rate Swap (IPRS) are not applied effectively in Islamic financial institutions in Saudi 
Arabia. This is because of the absence of a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic 
financial derivatives. The BCL of 1966 is considered the main legislation to regulate all 
banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia including Islamic financial derivatives. 
Under this law, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) is responsible for the 
regulation of Saudi banks. This law is still applicable and has not been repealed or amended 
to accommodate the new financial innovations such as financial derivatives. 
This study has found that some articles of the law of supervision of cooperative insurance 
companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations, do not comply with Shariah, 
such as Articles 1, 70-2/e, 61-1, 59-2, 3-3, and 42 of the implementing regulations. In 
addition, there is some incompatibility between the Law of Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies and its implementing regulations in some articles. Moreover, there is 
no Shariah board or Shariah committee in SAMA to regulate and supervise Islamic insurance 
operations in Saudi Arabia so as to ensure that all internal and external operations of takaful 
comply with Shariah principles. 
The research has found that there are many common features between Islamic and 
conventional bonds, especially asset-backed bonds. However, the issue of ownership is 
considered the main difference between them. Sukuk represent ownership in a tangible asset, 
whereas bonds represent the issuer’s pure debt. On the other hand, there is a big difference 
between Islamic insurance and conventional insurance in the basic principles. The difference 
lies in the nature of the contract, in the way the risk is assessed and handled and in the 
relationship between the operator and the participant. For example, the operations of takaful 
are based on the principle of the mudarabah model, which is profit and loss sharing 
techniques, whereas conventional insurance is based on interest (riba) in its operations. 
Finally, Islamic financial derivatives differ from conventional derivatives contracts because 
conventional derivatives involve interest (riba), excessive uncertainty (gharar), and 
speculation or gambling (maysir or qimar) in their contracts, while the Islamic financial 
system is based on the profit and loss sharing between the parties to a transaction, as well as 
the promotion of ethical investments that enhance society and do not violate practices banned 
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in Shariah. Therefore, the researcher found that there is a possibility of a rapprochement 
between Islamic and conventional bonds because of the presence of common factors between 
them, whereas such rapprochement does not seem possible between Islamic and conventional 
insurance and also between Islamic financial derivatives and conventional derivatives, due to 
the great difference in the basic principles between them.  
7.4  Recommendations 
Some recommendations and suggestions emerged from the research, which relate to 
improving the legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi 
Arabia in line with the standards of the AAOIFI of Islamic finance and also the Malaysian 
experience. Thus, this thesis adopts the following recommendations:   
1. There is an urgent need to enact special laws and regulations in order for Islamic 
banking and financial services in Saudi Arabia to be regulated and supervised by 
experts in the field of law and Islamic finance, whose qualifications include a PhD in 
Islamic finance. These proposed laws and regulations of Islamic banking and finance 
must be consistent with the provisions and principles of Shariah in order to fill the 
legislative and regulatory gap for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia. The 
absence of a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance in 
Saudi Arabia could generate confusion between Islamic financial contracting forms 
and conventional finance.    
2. It is necessary to establish an independent Shariah advisory body called the Saudi 
Shariah Advisory Council (SSAC) to regulate and supervise all Islamic banking and 
finance activities including takaful business, instead of SAMA. Members of the 
SSAC should be qualified in banking, finance, law and application of Shariah, 
particularly in the areas of Islamic banking and finance. The SSAC should be the 
highest Shariah authority for the determination of Shariah for Islamic financial 
business in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The SSAC should be given authority for the 
ascertainment of Shariah for the purposes of Islamic financial business, Islamic 
banking business, Islamic bonds (sukuk), takaful business, Islamic financial 
derivatives, and Islamic development financial business, or any other Islamic financial 
business. The SSAC should be the final arbiter in the interpretation of Shariah 
principles on Islamic banking and financial business. 
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3. There is additionally a need for specialised commercial courts to be established by the 
Saudi government, in order to look into commercial issues, including Islamic banking 
issues, in Saudi Arabia. The researcher recommends amending the present regulatory 
procedures for the Settlement of Banking Disputes in SAMA to cover disputes over 
Islamic banking and finance, and for the Resolution of Securities Disputes procedures 
in CMA to cover disputes over sukuk issuance until specialised commercial courts 
have been established to look into commercial issues including all Islamic banking 
and financial business. The specialised commercial courts should take into account 
the opinion of the proposed SSAC in the Islamic banking and finance issues in order 
to avoid conflicts of opinion between them. 
4. It is necessary to amend Articles 1, 70-2/e, 61-1, 59-2, 3-3, and 42 of the Law of 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia, and its 
implementing regulations, in order to comply with Islamic Shariah Law and also to 
avoid incompatibility between the law and its implementing regulations. 
5. There is a need to amend the present regulations for the offering and issuance of 
securities in Saudi Arabia by the Board of the Capital Market Authority in order to 
cover a wider range of financial investment instruments, such as the issuance of 
sukuk. It is also necessary to establish a Shariah advisory body in the CMA, to be 
called the Securities Commission Shariah Advisory Council (SCSAC), in order to 
regulate and supervise the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia. The SCSAC would be 
appointed by the proposed SSAC to ensure that the issuance of sukuk is in compliance 
with Shariah principles. 
6. SAMA and CMA should adopt standards and recommendations that have been issued 
and developed by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI); such as governance standards, Shariah standards, accounting 
standards, auditing standards, and ethics standards. They should also consider 
decisions and recommendations that have been issued by the Islamic Fiqh Council 
(IFC) regarding Islamic banking and finance. 
7. There is a need to create new innovative financial products and services in the light of 
Shariah, instead of the Islamisation of certain conventional financial products. 
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7.5   Suggestions for Future Research  
Islamic financial contracts in Saudi Arabia have been covered by few academic studies from 
a legal perspective. This study is one of the first to investigate three types of Islamic finance 
in Saudi Arabia from the Shariah point of view. The current study has concentrated on the 
issuance of sukuk (Islamic bonds), the models of takaful (Islamic insurance) and accepted risk 
transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance (Islamic derivatives) in Saudi Arabia from 
the Shariah perspective. Therefore, there is a need to cover more research in the fields of 
Islamic financial contracting forms in Saudi Arabia from the legal point of view. Some 
suggestions for future research concerning Islamic financial contracts in Saudi Arabia are as 
follows: 
1. Ways to incorporate Islamic and conventional financial products and services in one 
contract offered by the Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. 
2. The impact of the multiplicity of Shariah bodies in Islamic financial institutions on 
the development and growth of the Islamic finance industry in Saudi Arabia in the 
light of the lack of an independent Shariah advisory body governing Islamic banking 
and finance activities in Saudi Arabia. 
3. Concentrating on the investigation of the new laws and implementing regulations of 
mortgage in Saudi Arabia from the Shariah point of view. 
4. Promoting and advancing the Shariah governance framework for Islamic financial 
institutions in Saudi Arabia. 
5. The impact of the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) which has launched the ISDA/IIFM 
Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement on accepted risk transfer mechanisms in 
Islamic structured finance in Saudi Arabia. 
7.6   Contribution to Knowledge  
The main contribution of this study is to propose a legislative and regulatory framework for 
Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia in order to reach satisfactory practices of these 
in Saudi Arabia in line with the standards of the AAOIFI of Islamic finance and also the 
Malaysian experience. This proposal will be presented to the Saudi Ministry of Finance and 
the central bank of Saudi Arabia (SAMA), as the first step towards the enactment of a law 
regulating Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia. The proposal consists of three 
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chapters and key elements, namely the licensing requirement, the Saudi Shariah advisory 
council (SSAC) and the Shariah governance framework for Islamic financial institutions. 
These chapters and key elements have been carefully selected as a way to reform the current 
practices of Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia, and also to accommodate the new 
financial innovations in the future. Finally, the researcher has taken into account some legal 
challenges that prevent the application of the proposed framework in Saudi Arabia, and has 
suggested some solutions to these legal challenges. 
The second contribution is to fill the gap in the literature concerning Islamic financing 
contracts as an alternative to conventional loan products in Saudi Arabia from the Shariah 
point of view by using two mentalities and two languages; namely, Arabic and English. In 
this regard, the researcher conducted a critical literature review for three laws and regulations 
that govern Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia, and also reviewed three 
types of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia – Islamic bonds, Islamic insurance and Islamic 
financial derivatives – in order to reform and improve the existing laws and regulations 
governing Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the researcher 
conducted a comparative analysis between Islamic and conventional finance in order to 
determine the main similarities and differences between them. Another comparison was 
conducted between Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, in the field of laws and regulations governing 
Islamic financial contracting forms, in order to attempt to transfer the Malaysian experience 
to Saudi Arabia.  
The third contribution is to reform the legal conflict between the Law of Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies and its implementing regulations in some articles, through 
the proposal to amend Articles No. 1, 70-2/e, 61-1, 59-2, 3-3, and 42 of the Law of 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing 
regulations. In addition to the proposed reform of the legal conflict between the law and its 
implementing regulations, the researcher has suggested some solutions to reform the 
ineffectiveness of the participants’ body (PB) in takaful companies, the ineffectiveness of 
some Shariah boards (SBs) and the weakness of technical and vocational rehabilitation for 
some Shariah boards, in order to improve the practices of Islamic insurance in Saudi Arabia.  
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APPENDIX I 
Banking Control Law 
Issued by Royal Decree No. M/5 Dated 22.2.1386 
Article One: 
In this Law the following expressions shall have the definitions specified in this Article: 
a. "Bank" means any natural or juristic person practicing basically any of the banking 
business in the Kingdom. 
b. "Banking Business" means the business of receiving money on current or fixed 
deposit account, opening of current accounts, opening of letters of credit, issuance of 
letters of guarantee, payment and collection of cheques, payment orders, promissory 
notes and similar other papers of value, discounting of bills, bills of exchange and 
other commercial papers, foreign exchange transactions and other banking business. 
c. "National bank" means a bank the head office and branches of which are situated in 
the Kingdom. "Foreign Bank" means a bank with branches in the Kingdom and its 
head office outside it. "Agency" means the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 
"Invested Capital,” means the capital assigned by a foreign bank for the capital use of 
its branches in the Kingdom.  
Article Two: 
No person, natural or juristic, unlicensed in accordance with the provisions of this Law, shall 
carry on basically any of the banking business. However, 
a. Juristic persons licensed in accordance with another law or special decree to carry on 
banking business may practice such business within the limits of their intended 
purposes. 
b. Licensed moneychangers may practice basically exchange of currency in the form of 
notes and coins, but no other banking business. 
Article Three: 
All applications, for the grant of licenses to carry on banking business in the Kingdom, shall 
be addressed to the Agency which will study the applications after obtaining all the necessary 
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information and submit its recommendations to the Minister of Finance and National 
Economy. The license for a National Bank shall stipulate the following: 
1. It shall be a Saudi Joint Stock Company. 
2. The paid-up capital shall not be less than Rls. 2.5 million and all subscriptions 
towards share capital shall be payable in cash. 
3. The founders and members of the board of directors shall be persons of good 
reputation. 
4. The memorandum and articles of association shall be acceptable to the Minister of 
Finance and National Economy.  
In the case of a Foreign Bank wishing to set up a branch or branches in the Kingdom, the 
grant of a license shall be subject to such conditions as the Council of Ministers may stipulate 
upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance and National Economy. The license 
shall in all cases be issued by the Minister of Finance and National Economy after the 
approval of the Council of Ministers. 
Article Four: 
As an exception to the provisions of the previous Article, the licenses or authorizations 
previously issued to the persons carrying on banking business in the Kingdom and effective 
at the time of promulgation of this Law shall continue to be recognized. The Agency may, 
however, call such documents and information from these persons, as it may deem necessary. 
The Agency with the approval of the Council of Ministers may call upon them to comply 
with all or any of the provisions of Article 3 of this Law within such period as it may fix. 
Article Five: 
Any person not authorized basically to carry on banking business in the Kingdom is not 
allowed to use the word "Bank", or its synonyms, or any similar expression in any language 
on his papers or printed matter, or in his commercial address, or his name or in his 
advertisements. 
Article Six: 
The deposit liabilities of a bank shall not exceed fifteen times its reserves and paid-up or 
invested capital. If the deposit liabilities exceed this limit, the bank must within one month of 
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the date of submission of the statement referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 15, either 
increase its capital and reserves to the prescribed limit or deposit fifty percent of the excess 
with the Agency.    
Article Seven: 
Every bank shall maintain with the Agency at all times a statutory deposit of a sum not less 
than fifteen percent of its deposit liabilities. The Agency may, if it deems it to be in the public 
interest, vary the aforesaid percentage provided that it shall not be reduced below 10 percent 
nor increased to more than 17.5 percent. The Agency may, however, vary these two limits 
with the approval of the Minister of Finance and National Economy. 
In addition to the statutory deposit provided for in the previous paragraph, every bank shall 
maintain a liquid reserve of not less than 15 percent of its deposit liabilities. Such reserve 
shall be in cash, gold or assets, which can be converted into cash within a period not 
exceeding 30 days. The Agency may, if deemed necessary, increase the aforesaid percentage 
up to twenty percent. 
Article Eight: 
No bank shall grant a loan or extend a credit facility, or give a guarantee or incur any other 
financial liability with respect to any natural or juristic person for amounts aggregating more 
than 25 percent of the Bank's reserves and paid-up or invested capital. The Agency may, in 
the public interest, and subject to such conditions as it may impose, increase this percentage 
up to 50 percent. 
The provisions of the above paragraph do not apply to transactions between banks or between 
head offices and their branches or between these branches. 
Article Nine: 
No bank shall undertake the following transactions: 
1. Granting a loan or extending credit facilities, or issuing a guarantee or incurring any 
other financial liability on the security of its own shares. 
2. Granting, without security, a loan or credit facilities, or issuing a guarantee or 
incurring any other financial liability in respect of: 
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a. Member of its Board of Directors or its Auditors. 
b. Establishments not taking the form of joint-stock companies in which any of its   
Directors or Auditors is a partner or is a manager or has a direct financial interest. 
c. Persons or establishments not taking the form of joint stock companies in cases where 
any of the Bank's directors or Auditors is a Guarantor. 
3. Granting, without security, a loan or a credit facility or giving a guarantee or incurring 
any other financial liability in favor of any of its officials or employees for amounts 
exceeding four months salary of any such concerned person. 
Any bank director or auditor or manager who contravenes paras 2 and 3 of this Article, shall 
be considered as having resigned his position. 
Article Ten: 
No bank shall undertake any of the following activities: 
1. To engage, whether for its own account or on a commission basis, in the wholesale or 
retail trade including the import or export trade. 
2. To have any direct interest, whether as a stock-holder, partner, owner, or otherwise, in 
any commercial, industrial, agricultural or other undertaking exceeding the limits 
referred to in para 4 of this Article, except when such interest results from the 
satisfaction of debts due to the bank, provided that all such interests shall be disposed 
of within a period of two years or within any such longer period as may be determined 
in consultation with the Agency. 
3. To purchase, without the approval of the Agency, stocks and shares of any bank 
conducting its business in the Kingdom. 
4. To own stocks of any other joint-stock company incorporated in the Kingdom, in 
excess of ten percent of the paid up capital of such a company provided that the 
nominal value of these shares shall not exceed twenty percent of the bank's paid-up 
capital and reserves; the above limits may, when necessary, be increased by the 
Agency. 
5. To acquire or lease real estate except in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of 
conducting its banking business, housing of its employees or for their recreation or in 
satisfaction of debts due to the Bank. 
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In cases where a bank acquires real estate in satisfaction of debts due to it and such real estate 
is not necessary for the Bank's own banking business or housing of its employees or for their 
recreation, it shall dispose of it within three years of its acquisition or, in exceptional and 
justifiable circumstances, within such period or periods as may be approved by the Agency 
and subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to prescribe. 
As an exception to the provisions of para 5 of this Article, the bank may, in special and 
justifiable circumstances and with the approval of the agency, acquire real estate, the value of 
which shall not exceed 20 percent of its paid-up capital and reserves. 
Article Eleven: 
Banks are precluded from undertaking any of the following operations except after the 
written approval of the Agency and according to the conditions it prescribes: 
a. Altering the composition of their paid-up or invested capital. 
b. Entering into any scheme of amalgamation or participation in the business of another 
bank or another establishment carrying on banking business. 
c. Acquiring shares in a company established outside the Kingdom. 
d. Ceasing to carry on banking business. In such a case, the Agency must, before 
agreeing to this cessation, ascertain that the Bank has made necessary arrangements to 
safeguard the rights of the depositors. 
e. Opening branches or other offices in the Kingdom and also opening of branches or 
other offices by national banks outside the Kingdom. Before granting the written 
license provided for under this paragraph, the Agency should get the approval of the 
Minister of Finance and National Economy. 
Article Twelve: 
No person shall be a director of more than one bank. 
No person in the following cases shall be elected as a director or shall become a manager of 
any bank without prior written approval of the Agency: 
a. If he occupied a similar position in a banking concern that was wound up, even if the 
liquidation had been made before the promulgation of this Law. Such approval shall 
not be given by the Agency until it becomes clear that the person concerned was not 
responsible for that liquidation. 
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b. If he was removed from a similar post in any banking establishment, even if such 
removal was before the promulgation of this Law. The approval of the Agency shall 
in this case be based on acceptable reasons. 
Any director or manager of a bank, who is adjudicated bankrupt or convicted of a moral 
offense, shall be considered as having resigned his post. 
Article Thirteen: 
Every bank shall, before declaring distribution of any profits, transfer a sum equal to not less 
than 25 percent of its net profits, to the statutory reserve, until the amount of that reserve 
equals as a minimum of the paid-up capital. 
(Amended Clause*) “No bank shall pay dividends or remit any part of its profits abroad, 
until its aggregate foundation expenditures and losses incurred have completely been written 
off, and after deducting not less than 10% of the value of capitalized expenditures until all 
these expenditures have been completely written off”. 
(Amended in accordance with Royal Decree No. M/2 dated 6.1.1391 AH.) 
Any action taken to declare or pay dividends in contranvention to the provisions of this 
Article shall be considered null and void. 
Article Fourteen: 
Every bank shall appoint annually two auditors from amongst the approved list of auditors 
registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The Auditors shall submit a report 
on the Balance sheet and profit and loss account. This report shall include whether in the 
auditor's opinion the Bank's balance sheet duly and correctly represents its financial position 
and the extent of their satisfaction with any explanations or information they may have 
requested from the bank's manager or other staff. 
With regards to banks taking the form of a company, the report referred to in the above 
paragraph shall be read together with the annual report of the Bank management in the 
General Meeting, which must be held within the six months following the end of the bank's 
financial year. The bank management should send copies of these two reports to the Agency. 
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The provisions of the first para of this Article shall apply to foreign banks in respect of their 
branches operating in the Kingdom. They should send a copy of the Auditor's report to the 
Agency. 
Article Fifteen: 
Every bank shall furnish the Agency by the end of the following month with a consolidated 
monthly statement of its financial position relating to the previous month, which shall be true 
and correct, and be in the form prescribed by the Agency. Every bank shall also furnish the 
Monetary Agency within six months of the close of its financial year with a copy of its 
annual balance sheet and profit and loss accounts certified by its auditors in the form 
prescribed by the Agency. 
Article Sixteen: 
The Monetary Agency may, with the approval of the Minister of Finance and National 
economy, issue general rules regarding the following matters: 
1. The maximum limits of total loans that can be extended by a bank or banks. 
2. The prohibition or limitation of specified categories of loans or other transactions. 
3. Fixing the terms and conditions, which banks, should take into consideration when 
carrying out certain types of transactions for their customers. 
4. The cash margins to be obtained by banks against specified categories of credits or 
guarantees. 
5. The minimum ratio to be observed between the limits for loans and the collateral for 
such loans. 
6. Fixing the assets to be maintained by each bank within the Kingdom. Such assets 
should not fall below a certain percentage of the Bank's deposit liabilities, which shall 
be fixed by the Agency from time to time. 
The Agency may, from time to time, issue decisions concerning the following: 
1. Definition of the expression "deposit liabilities" referred to in this Law. 
2. Determination of bank holidays and bank business hours. 
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Article Seventeen: 
The Agency may, at any time, request any bank to supply it, within a time limit it will specify 
and in the manner it will prescribe, with any information that it deems necessary for ensuring 
the realization of the purposes of this Law. 
Article Eighteen: 
The Agency may, with the approval of the "Minister of Finance and National Economy, 
conduct an inspection of the books and accounts of any bank, either by the Agency's own 
staff or by outside auditors assigned by it. The examination of the bank's books and accounts 
should take place in the bank's premises. In such a case the bank staff must produce all the 
required books and records of accounts and other documents in their custody or within their 
authority and must furnish any information they have relating to the bank. 
Article Nineteen: 
Any person who comes into possession of information during the performance of his duties in 
the implementation of this Law, is not allowed to disclose such information or to make use of 
it in any manner. 
Article Twenty: 
The Agency shall periodically publish combined statements of the principal data contained in 
the returns mentioned in Article 15. 
Article Twenty One: 
The Minister of Finance and National Economy, in exceptional circumstances, and with the 
prior approval of the Council of Ministers, may exempt any bank from any provision of this 
Law or from the regulations issued in execution thereof for a limited period and subject to 
such other conditions as may be laid down in each case. 
Article Twenty Two: 
If the Agency finds that a bank has failed to comply with the provisions of this Law, or with 
the provisions of any regulations issued under this Law, or if a Bank adopts a policy that 
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might seriously affect its solvency or liquidity, it may, with the approval of the Minister of 
Finance and National Economy, take one or more of the following measures: 
a. Appoint one or more advisers to advise the bank in the conduct of its business. 
b. Order the suspension or removal of any director or officer of the bank. 
c. Limit or suspend the granting of credits or the acceptance of deposits. 
d. Require the bank to take such other steps, as it may consider necessary. 
If the Agency finds that a bank persistently contravenes the provisions of this Law or the 
decisions or regulations made thereunder, it may call upon such a bank to submit its reasons 
for the contravention, accompanied by its proposals to rectify the position within a stated 
period. If the Agency is of the opinion that such proposals are not sufficient for their purpose 
or if the bank fails to implement an agreed or prescribed course of action within the stated 
period, the Minister of Finance and National Economy may, subject to the approval of the 
Council of Ministers, revoke the license of the said bank. 
Article Twenty Three: 
1. Any person who contravenes the provisions of para 1 of Article 2, Article 5 and items 
a, b and c of para 1 of Article 11, Article 12 and Article 18, shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years and to a fine not exceeding Rls 
5,000 for every day the offense continues or to either of these penalties. 
2. Any person who contravenes the provisions of Article 19 shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years and to a fine not exceeding Rls 
20,000 or to either of these penalties. 
3. Any person who contravenes the provisions of Articles 8, 9 and 10 shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and to a fine not exceeding Rls 
10,000 or to either of these penalties. 
4. Any person who contravenes the provisions of articles 7, 14 and 15 shall be liable to a 
fine not exceeding Rls 500 for every day the contravention continues. 
5. Any person who contravenes any other provision of this Law or the regulations and 
decisions issued in execution thereof shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Rls 5,000. 
6. In the event that offenses punishable according to paras 2,3 and 5 of this Article are 
committed by the same person for one purpose and provided that such offenses are 
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inter-related as to object and timing, they are to be considered as one offense 
punishable by one penalty. 
In imposing the penalties contained in this Article it is to be observed that should an offense 
be punishable by more than one penalty, the offender shall be subjected to the severest. 
Article Twenty Four: 
The Chairman, the Managing Director, the Directors, head office Manager and Branch 
manager shall be responsible, each within his own jurisdiction, for any contravention of this 
Law or the decisions and rules issued for its execution. 
Article Twenty Five: 
The Minister of Finance and National Economy shall appoint a committee of three persons 
from outside the Agency and specify the conditions and measures to be observed in 
adjudging contraventions punishable under this Law at the request of the Agency. 
Article Twenty Six: 
The Deputy Premier and the Minister of Finance shall put this Law into effect and it shall 
come into force from the date of its publication. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Capital Market Authority 
 
Offers of Securities Regulations 
  
Issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority Pursuant to its Resolution Number 2-11-
2004 Dated 20/8/1425H Corresponding to 4/10/2004G Based on the Capital Market Law 
issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2/6/1424H 
 
Amended by Resolution of the Board of the Capital Market Authority Number 1-33-2004 
Dated 9/11/1425H Corresponding to 21/12/2004G 
 
PART 1: PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
Article One: Offer of securities  
For the purpose of the application of these Regulations, offering securities shall mean issuing 
securities, inviting the public to subscribe therefor or the direct or indirect marketing thereof; 
or any statement, announcement or communication that has the effect of selling, issuing or 
offering securities, but does not include preliminary negotiations or contracts entered into 
with or among underwriters. 
Article Two: Definitions  
a. Any reference to the “Capital Market Law” in these Regulations shall mean the 
Capital Market Law issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2/6/1424H.  
b. Expressions and terms in these Regulations have the meaning which they bear in the 
Capital Market Law and in the Glossary of defined terms used in the Regulations and 
Rules of the Capital Market Authority, unless the contrary intention appears. 
PART 2: GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article Three: Restrictions on offers of securities  
a. Securities may not be offered in the Kingdom except in accordance with these 
Regulations.  
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b. Securities issued by a company in the Kingdom may not be offered unless the 
company is a joint stock company. 
Article Four: The offeror   
A person shall be considered an offeror of securities if he makes an offer or invites a person 
to make an offer which, if accepted, would give rise to the issue or sale of securities by him 
or by another person with whom he has made arrangements for the issue or sale of the 
securities. 
Article Five:The offeree  
a. Each of the following persons shall be considered an offeree:  
1. any person to whom the offeror makes an offer;  
2. any person to whose agent the offeror makes an offer where the agent is acting in his 
capacity as such; or  
3. any person who receives during the period of the offer an offer of securities from a 
person (referred to here as the “distributor”) to whom the offeror has made an offer of 
such securities and the offeror knows or should reasonably know that the distributor 
makes such an offer.  
b. For the purposes of paragraph (a) of this Article, the offeror will be deemed not to know 
that a person is acting as an agent for a third party or as a distributor unless he receives 
information or a representation that such person is acting in such capacity. 
Article Six: Types of Offers of Securities  
An offer of securities may be a public offer, a private placement or an exempt offer. 
PART 3: PUBLIC OFFERS 
Article Seven: Definition of public offer  
An offer of securities is a public offer if it does not fulfil the conditions of a private 
placement and does not fall within the categories of an exempt offer.  
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Article Eight: Public offer requirements  
Securities may not be offered by way of a public offer unless all the requirements and 
conditions provided for in the Listing Rules have been fulfilled. 
PART 4: PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 
Article Nine: Definition of private placement 
An offer of securities is a private placement if it is not an exempt offer and where the 
following two conditions are fulfilled:  
1. the amount payable by each offeree in the Kingdom is not less than Saudi Riyals 1 
million or an equivalent amount; and  
2. the offer is made only to any of the following persons:  
- the government of the Kingdom;  
- SAMA;  
- any supranational authority recognised by the Authority;  
- the Exchange and any other stock exchange recognised by the Authority;  
- the Depositary Center;  
- authorised persons acting for their own account; 
-  clients of an authorised person, provided that the offer to the client is made 
through the authorised person;  
- institutions acting for their own account; or  
- any other persons that the Authority considers exempt. 
Article Ten: Private placement memorandum requirements  
a. No person may offer securities by way of private placement unless the Authority has 
approved the private placement memorandum. The private placement memorandum 
constitutes a prospectus as described in the Capital Market Law. 
b. The private placement memorandum must contain all information which is necessary 
to enable an investor to make an assessment of the activities of the issuer of the 
securities, and of its assets and liabilities, financial position, management and 
prospects, profits and losses, in addition to information in relation to the rights and 
privileges attaching to the securities being offered.  
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c. Annex (1) to these Regulations specifies the minimum information, and the form of 
disclaimer which must be included in the private placement memorandum. 
Article Eleven: Obligations of the person wishing to offer securities by way of private 
placement  
A person wishing to offer securities by way of private placement must:  
1. submit an application to the Authority signed by an authorised signatory containing such 
information as is specified in Annex (2) to these Regulations;  
2. submit the private placement memorandum for approval by the Authority; and  
3. pay such fees to the Authority as the Authority may specify. 
Article Twelve: Powers and obligations of the Authority with respect to the private 
placement memorandum  
a. The Authority will endeavour to review the private placement memorandum within 
30 days of receiving the application in order to consider whether to approve it. 
b. If having reviewed the private placement memorandum the Authority considers that 
the proposed offer of securities may not be in the interest of investors in the Kingdom 
or may result in a breach of the Capital Market Law or the Implementing Regulations 
then it may take any of the following actions: 
1. carry out any enquiries which it considers appropriate including requiring the 
concerned person or its representative to appear before the Authority to answer the 
questions of the Authority and to explain any matters that the Authority considers 
relevant to the application; 
2. require the concerned person or others to provide additional information or to 
confirm, in such manner as the Authority may specify, that the information 
provided is accurate; or 
3. defer making any decision for such period as may be reasonably necessary to 
carry out a further study and examination or to allow for additional information to 
be provided. 
c. If, having taken action pursuant to paragraph (b) of this Article, the Authority determines that 
the offer to be made pursuant to the private placement memorandum is still not in the interest 
of investors in the Kingdom or may result in a breach of the Capital Market Law or the 
Implementing Regulations, the Authority may, after giving the offeror a suitable opportunity 
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to be heard, issue a "notification" to the offeror stating that the private placement 
memorandum has not been approved, or publish a "notice" prohibiting the offer, sale or 
transfer of the securities to which the private placement memorandum relates. 
d. The applicant has the right to appeal to the Committee in respect of any decisions or actions 
that the Authority takes under the provisions of this Article. 
Article Thirteen: Distribution of the private placement memorandum   
The private placement memorandum approved by the Authority must be made available to 
the offerees free of charge at a specific address in the Kingdom or via the internet from the 
time the securities are first offered until the end of the period during which the offer remains 
open. 
Article Fourteen: No continuing obligations  
 Except as set out in the provisions of this part, an offeror of securities by way of a private 
placement is not required to produce, or to register with the Authority or the Exchange, any 
document relating to the offer of the securities, or to inform the Authority of any material 
developments relating to the securities. 
Article Fifteen: Restrictions on secondary market activity  
a. A person (referred to as a “transferor”) who has acquired securities pursuant to a private 
placement may not offer or sell such securities to any person (referred to as a “transferee”) 
unless the price to be paid by the transferee for such securities equals or exceeds Saudi Riyals 
1 million.  
b. If what is provided for in paragraph (a) of this Article cannot be fulfilled because the price of 
the securities being offered or sold to the transferee has declined since the date of the original 
private placement, the transferor may offer or sell securities to the transferee if their purchase 
price during the period of the original private placement was equal to or exceeded Saudi 
Riyals 1 million.  
c. If what is provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article cannot be fulfilled, a transferor 
may offer or sell the securities if he sells his entire holding of such securities to one 
transferee. 
d. The provisions of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this Article shall apply to all subsequent 
transferees of such securities.  
e. The restrictions in this Article shall cease to apply upon approval of listing on the Exchange 
of securities of the same class as the securities that are subject to such restrictions. 
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PART 5: EXEMPT OFFERS 
Article Sixteen: Exempt offer  
a. An offer of securities is exempt from the public offer and of the private placement 
requirements in any of the following circumstances: 
1. if the securities are issued by the government of the Kingdom;  
2. if the securities are issued by a supranational authority recognised by the 
Authority;  
3. if the securities are offered to no more than 60 offerees in the Kingdom and the 
minimum amount payable per offeree is not less than Saudi Riyals 1 million or an 
equivalent amount. An issuer may not treat an offer of its securities as being 
exempt by virtue of this paragraph more than once in a 12- month period;  
4. if the total value of the securities offered by the issuer is less than Saudi Riyals 5 
million or an equivalent amount. An issuer may not treat an offer of its securities 
as being exempt by virtue of this paragraph more than once in a 12- month period; 
or  
5. if the issuer of the securities is a member of a group of companies and the issuer 
offers the securities to a member of the same group. 
b. The Authority may, in circumstances other than those described in paragraph (a) of 
this Article and upon application of a person seeking to make an offer of securities, 
determine that such offer of securities shall be treated as an exempt offer subject to 
compliance with such limitations as the Authority may impose.  
Article Seventeen: Exempt offer requirements   
a. No person may offer securities by way of an exempt offer unless it notifies the 
Authority in writing in accordance with the instructions set out in Annex (3) to these 
Regulations, at least 10 days prior to the proposed date of the offer. 
b. If the Authority determines that the proposed offer of securities is not in the interest of 
investors in the Kingdom or may result in a breach of the Capital Market Law or the 
Implementing Regulations, the Authority may, after giving the offeror a suitable 
opportunity to be heard, issue a "notification" to the offeror stating that the offer is not 
to be made, or publish a "notice" prohibiting the offer, sale or transfer of the securities 
to which the exempt offer relates. 
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c. The offeror has the right to appeal to the Committee in respect of any decisions or 
actions that the Authority takes under the provisions of this Article. 
Article Eighteen: No continuing obligations   
Except as set out at Article 17 of these Regulations, an offeror of securities by way of an 
exempt offer is not required to produce, or to register with the Authority or the Exchange, a 
prospectus or any other document relating to the offer of the securities, or to inform the 
Authority of any material developments relating to the securities. 
Article Nineteen: Restrictions on secondary market activity  
a. A person (referred to as a “transferor”) who has acquired securities pursuant to an exempt 
offer under any of sub-paragraphs (3) or (5) of paragraph (a) of Article 16 may not offer or 
sell such securities to any person (referred to as a “transferee”) unless the price to be paid by 
the transferee for such securities equals or exceeds Saudi Riyals 1 million. 
b. If what is provided for in paragraph (a) of this Article cannot be fulfilled because the 
price of the securities being offered or sold to the transferee has declined since the 
date of the original exempt offer, the transferor may offer or sell securities to the 
transferee if their purchase price during the period of the original exempt offer was 
equal to or exceeded Saudi Riyals 1 million. 
c. If what is provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article cannot be fulfilled, the 
transferor may offer or sell the securities if he sells his entire holding of such 
securities to one transferee. 
d. The provisions of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this Article shall apply to all 
subsequent transferees of such securities. 
e. The restrictions in this Article shall cease to apply upon approval of listing on the 
Exchange of securities of the same class as the securities that are subject to such 
restrictions. 
PART 6: LIABILITY FOR INCORRECT DOCUMENTS 
Article Twenty: Liability for incorrect or incomplete documents  
Liability for an incorrect or incomplete private placement memorandum or prospectus shall 
be determined in accordance with Article 55 of the Capital Market Law.  
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PART 7: PUBLICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE 
Article Twenty One: Publication and entry into force  
These Regulations shall become effective upon their publication. 
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APPENDIX III 
Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Issued by Royal Decree No M/32 dated 31 July 2003 
Article One: 
Insurance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be provided by insurance companies 
registered in the Kingdom operating in accordance with the practice of cooperative insurance 
in line with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation of the National Company for 
Cooperative Insurance issued by Royal Decree No (M/5) dated 17/4/1405 H, and not 
inconsistent with the provisions of Shari'ah. 
Article Two: 
Subject to the provisions of the Cooperative Health Insurance Law, promulgated by Royal 
Decree M/10 dated 1/5/1420 H, The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (the "Agency") shall, 
in the course of implementing the Regulations, have the following powers: 
1. To receive applications for establishing cooperative insurance and re-insurance 
companies, study the applications to ensure compliance with applicable rules and 
conditions and, if approved, refer the applications to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry to take the necessary legal requirements. 
2. To supervise and technically control insurance and re-insurance activities in 
accordance with the principles specified in the implementing regulations of this Law 
and the means of control employed by the Agency, specially the following: 
a. Regulating and approving rules for the investment of premiums of insurance and 
re-insurance operations, and designing a formula to distribute the surplus of 
insurance and re-insurance operations among shareholders and the insured, 
provided that separate accounts are kept for shareholders, the insured and 
insurance operations. 
b. Determining the sums of money required to be deposited with one of the local 
banks in order to provide each of the different types of insurance. 
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c. Approving standard forms of insurance and re-insurance policies, and determining 
the minimum amounts of third party insurance coverage, subject to the provisions 
of laws applicable in this regard. 
d. Setting rules and restrictions determining the method of investing the assets of 
insurance and re-insurance companies. 
e. Setting general rules determining the assets which each company shall keep inside 
and outside the Kingdom, the minimum and maximum for each type of insurance, 
and the conditions that shall be observed in each type, and the 
f. Setting rules and restrictions which protect the rights of the beneficiaries, and 
ensure the ability of the insurance companies to satisfy claims and obligations. 
Article Three: 
An Insurance or re-insurance company may not be formed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
except by a license issued pursuant to a Royal Decree upon a resolution by the Council of 
Ministers and a recommendation by the Minister of Commerce and Industry according to 
Article Two of this Law, and subject to the following: 
1. The company shall be a public joint-stock company. 
2. The company's principal object shall be to perform any insurance and re-insurance 
activity and shall not undertake other objects unless they are necessary or 
complementary [to its principal object]. Insurance companies may not directly own 
companies or brokerage establishments, and re-insurance companies may not own re-
insurance brokerage companies or establishments. However, insurance companies – 
upon the approval of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency– may own companies or 
establishments that act as brokers in re-insurance activities. 
3. The paid-up capital of the insurance company shall not be less than one hundred 
million Saudi riyals and the paid-up capital of the re-insurance company or the 
insurance company carrying out re-insurance activities simultaneously shall not be 
less than two hundred million Saudi riyals. The capital may not be changed without 
the approval of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, and pursuant to the Companies 
Law. 
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Article Four: 
The implementing regulations shall specify the insurance operations governed by this Law, 
and each insurance company shall specify the types of insurance it shall provide. 
Article Five: 
An insurance or re-insurance company - upon commencing business - may not suspend its 
insurance activities without the prior approval of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. This 
is to ensure that insurance companies take all necessary measures to safeguard the rights of 
the insured and the investors. 
Article Six: 
Selection of members of the board of directors of insurance and re-insurance companies shall 
be subject to the approval of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency in accordance with the 
criteria specified for in the implementing regulations. 
Article Seven: 
The chairman of the board of directors of insurance or re-insurance company, managing 
director, a member of the board of directors and general manager shall be liable, each within 
the limits of his authority, for the company's violation of any of the provisions of this Law or 
its implementing regulations. 
Article Eight: 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency may inspect the records and accounts of any insurance 
or re-insurance company through the Agency's employees or auditors appointed by it, 
provided that the inspection be carried out at the site of the insurance or re-insurance 
company. In this case the employees of the company shall submit whatever is in their 
possession or under their authority or records, data, and documents requested from them, and 
disclose any information they have, relating to the company, to the employees of the Agency 
or whoever it may appoint as auditors. 
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Article Nine: 
An insurance or re-insurance company may not open any branch or office inside or outside 
the Kingdom, agree to merge with, own any insurance or banking activity, have control 
thereof, or own shares of another insurance or re-insurance company without the written 
approval of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 
Article Ten: 
1. The general assembly of the insurance or re-insurance company shall annually 
appoint two auditing offices from among the certified accountants licensed to practice 
the profession in the Kingdom and shall determine their fees. 
2. The auditors shall include in their annual report presented to the general assembly– in 
addition to the data provided for in the Companies Law– their opinion as to whether 
the financial statements of the company correctly reflect its true financial position on 
the date of the budget and the results of its activities during the fiscal year which 
expires on that date, and as to whether the preparation, presentation and audit of these 
statements conform to the generally accepted accounting principles applied in the 
Kingdom. 
3. Financial statements and the auditors' report shall be published within three months 
from the date of the end of the company's fiscal year. 
Article Eleven: 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency may at any time request any insurance or re-insurance 
company to submit to it– at the time and in the form it determines– any information it deems 
necessary to fulfill the purposes of this Law. It shall also send to the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency at its request the following: 
1. A statement of the returns and expenses of each insurance type. 
2. A detailed statement of the insurance activities carried out by the company during the 
stated period. 
3. Statistical statements and general information about the activities of the company. 
4. A statement of the investments of the company. 
5. Any other information requested by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 
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Article Twelve: 
It is prohibited for any person who obtains any information, while carrying out any work 
related to the application of the provisions of this Law, to disclose or benefit from it in any 
way. 
Article Thirteen: 
All insurance and re-insurance companies shall submit to the Department of Zakat and 
Income Tax their zakat or tax returns, the audited financial statements and any other 
information or documents which the Department deems necessary for the purpose of 
determining the amount subject to zakat or taxation in accordance with the provisions of the 
Tax Law, the Zakat Collection Law and their implementing regulations and payment of the 
sums due, within the times specified by the Law. 
Article Fourteen: 
Insurance and re-insurance companies governed by this Law shall deposit in one of the local 
banks, a legally required deposit to the order of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, and the 
implementing regulations shall determine the restrictions relating to this deposit. 
Article Fifteen: 
The insurance and re-insurance companies shall allocate a part of their annual profits, not less 
than 20%, as a legal reserve, until the total reserve amounts to 100% of the capital paid. 
Article Sixteen: 
All insurance and re-insurance companies shall setup the required reserves for their insurance 
types, and other reserves as provided for in the implementing regulations of this Law. 
Article Seventeen: 
All insurance and re-insurance companies governed by the provisions of this Law shall keep 
a separate account for each type of insurance as specified in the implementing regulations of 
this Law. They shall also keep records and books to record insurance policies issued by the 
company, names and addresses of the holders of such policies and the date of concluding 
each policy, its effectiveness, prices and conditions provided for in it. Any change or 
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amendment occurring in such policies shall also be recorded in these records and books. The 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency may issue the decisions it deems necessary to compel 
insurance companies to record in the books and records any data it deems necessary to 
exercise its authority of control and supervision. The data contained in the records and books 
mentioned above may be entered in the computer in accordance with the rules and procedures 
provided for in the implementing regulations of the Law of Commercial Books. 
Article Eighteen: 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency shall set the necessary conditions for issuing licenses to 
practice self-employment professions relating to the insurance activity, especially the 
following: 
1. Insurance brokers. 
2. Insurance Consultants. 
3. Inspection and loss assessment experts. 
4. Specialists in settlement of insurance claims. 
5. Actuaries. 
Licenses for these professions shall be issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency shall control and supervise the activities of the 
professions referred to. 
Article Nineteen: 
If the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency finds that any of the insurance or re-insurance 
companies has violated the provisions of this Law or its implementing regulations or 
followed a policy liable to adversely affect its ability to fulfill its obligations, the Agency may 
take one or more of the following measures: 
1. Appointing one consultant or more to provide consultation to the company in relation 
to the management of its activities. 
2. Suspending any member of the Board of Directors or any of its employees proven to 
be responsible for the violation. 
3. Preventing the company from accepting any new shareholders, investors or members 
in any of its insurance activities or restricting it in this respect. 
4. Compelling the company to take any other measures the Agency deems necessary. 
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If the Agency finds that the company persists to violate the provisions of this Law or its 
implementing regulations and does not respond to any of the measures taken by the Agency 
in accordance with this Article, and despite the infliction of the punishments provided for in 
this Law, the Agency may request the dissolution of the company. 
Article Twenty: 
One or more committees shall be formed based on a Resolution by the Council of Ministers, 
upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, composed of three specialized 
members, at least one of whom shall be a legal counselor, to be entrusted with the settlement 
of disputes occurring between insurance companies and their clients, or between these 
companies and others that may substitute for the insured, and shall decide on cases of 
violations of control and supervision instructions for the licensed insurance and re-insurance 
companies, and the violations of those practicing self-employment professions referred to in 
Article Eighteen of this Law. Prosecuting before the Committee – in connection with these 
violations – is represented by the employees appointed by a decision of the Minister of 
Finance. 
Decisions of these Committees may be appealed before the Board of Grievances. 
Article Twenty One: 
Without prejudice to any harsher punishment provided for in any other law, anyone who 
violates any provision of this Law shall be punished with a fine not exceeding one million 
riyals and imprisonment for a period not exceeding four years, or by either. 
Article Twenty Two: 
Without prejudice to the powers of the committee provided for in Article Twenty of this Law, 
the Board of Grievances shall have jurisdiction in the following: 
1. Deciding all disputes between insurance companies and re-insurance companies, or 
between companies of either type. 
2. Deciding cases of violations of this Law and the implementation of the punishment 
provided for in Article Twenty One. 
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3. Initial review of the case in any suit in which the Monetary Agency or the Committee 
formed in accordance with Article Twenty requests the infliction of the punishment of 
imprisonment. 
4. Prosecution before the Board of Grievances shall be carried out by the employees 
appointed pursuant to a decision issued by the Minister of Finance. 
Article Twenty Three: 
The implementing regulations of this Law shall be issued by a decision of the Minister of 
Finance, and shall be published within sixty days from the date of publication of this Law, 
and shall come into effect on the date of the enforcement of this Law. 
Article Twenty Four: 
Subject to what is stated in Article One of this Law whatever is not provided for therein shall 
be governed by the Companies Law, to the extent permitted by the nature of such type of 
companies. 
Article Twenty Five: 
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into effect after ninety 
days from the date of its publication. 
